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Global migration: causes and consequences.

• Benjamin Helms Benjamin Helms Department of Politics, University of Virginia
• , and  David Leblang David Leblang Department of Politics, Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy, University of Virginia
• https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.631
• Published online: 25 February 2019

International migration is a multifaceted process with distinct stages and decision points. An initial decision to leave one’s country of birth may be made by the individual or the family unit, and this decision may reflect a desire to reconnect with friends and family who have already moved abroad, a need to diversify the family’s access to financial capital, a demand to increase wages, or a belief that conditions abroad will provide social and/or political benefits not available in the homeland. Once the individual has decided to move abroad, the next decision is the choice of destination. Standard explanations of destination choice have focused on the physical costs associated with moving—moving shorter distances is often less expensive than moving to a destination farther away; these explanations have recently been modified to include other social, political, familial, and cultural dimensions as part of the transaction cost associated with migrating. Arrival in a host country does not mean that an émigré’s relationship with their homeland is over. Migrant networks are an engine of global economic integration—expatriates help expand trade and investment flows, they transmit skills and knowledge back to their homelands, and they remit financial and human capital. Aware of the value of their external populations, home countries have developed a range of policies that enable them to “harness” their diasporas.

• immigration
• international political economy
• factor flows
• gravity models

Introduction

The steady growth of international labor migration is an important, yet underappreciated, aspect of globalization. 1 In 1970 , just 78 million people, or about 2.1% of the global population, lived outside their country of birth. By 1990 , that number had nearly doubled to more than 150 million people, or about 2.8% of the global population (United Nations Population Division, 2012 ). Despite the growth of populist political parties and restrictionist movements in key destination countries, the growth in global migration shows no signs of slowing down, with nearly 250 million people living outside their country of birth as of 2015 . While 34% of all global migrants live in industrialized countries (with the United States and Germany leading the way), 38% of all global migration occurs between developing countries (World Bank, 2016 ).

Identifying the causes and consequences of international labor migration is essential to our broader understanding of globalization. Scholars across diverse academic fields, including economics, political science, sociology, law, and demography, have attempted to explain why individuals voluntarily leave their homelands. The dominant thread in the labor migration literature is influenced by microeconomics, which posits that individuals contemplating migration are rational, utility-maximizing actors who carefully weigh the potential costs and benefits of leaving their country of origin (e.g., Borjas, 1989 ; Portes & Böröcz, 1989 ; Grogger & Hanson, 2011 ). The act of migration, from this perspective, is typically conceptualized as an investment from which a migrant expects to receive some benefit, whether it be in the form of increased income, political freedom, or enhanced social ties (Schultz, 1961 ; Sjaastad, 1962 ; Collier & Hoeffler, 2014 ).

In this article we go beyond the treatment of migration as a single decision and conceive of it as a multifaceted process with distinct stages and decision points. We identify factors that are relevant at different stages in the migration process and highlight how and when certain factors interact with others during the migration process. Economic factors such as the wage differential between origin and destination countries, for example, may be the driving factor behind someone’s initial decision to migrate (Borjas, 1989 ). But when choosing a specific destination, economic factors may be conditioned by political or social conditions in that destination (Fitzgerald, Leblang, & Teets, 2014 ). Each stage or decision point has distinguishing features that are important in determining how (potential) migrants respond to the driving forces identified by scholars.

This is certainly not a theoretical innovation; migration has long been conceived of as a multi-step process, and scholars often identify the stage or decision point to which their argument best applies. However, most interdisciplinary syntheses of the literature on international labor migration do not provide a systematic treatment of this defining feature, instead organizing theoretical and empirical contributions by field of study, unit or level of analysis, or theoretical tradition (e.g., Portes & Böröcz, 1989 ; Massey et al., 1993 ; European Asylum Support Office, 2016 ). Such approaches are undoubtedly valuable in their own right. Our decision to organize this discussion by stage allows us to understand this as a process, rather than as a set of discrete events. As a result, we conceptualize international labor migration as three stages or decision points: (a) the decision to migrate or to remain at home, (b) the choice of destination, and (c) the manner by which expatriates re-engage—or choose not to re-engage—with their country of origin once abroad. We also use these decision points to highlight a number of potential new directions for future research in this still-evolving field.

Figure 1. Global migration intentions by educational attainment, 2008–2017.

Should I Stay or Should I Go, Now?

The massive growth in international labor migration in the age of globalization is remarkable, but the fact remains that over 95% of the world’s population never leave their country of origin (United Nations Population Division, 2012 ). Figure 1 shows the percentage of people who expressed an intention to move abroad between 2008 and 2017 by educational attainment, according to data from the Gallup World Poll. Over this time period, it appears that those who were highly educated expressed intent to migrate in greater numbers than those who had less than a college education, although these two groups have converged in recent years. What is most striking, however, is that a vast majority of people, regardless of educational attainment, expressed no desire to move abroad. Even though absolute flows of migrants have grown at a near-exponential rate, relative to their non-migrating counterparts, they remain a small minority. What factors are important in determining who decides to migrate and who decides to remain at home? 2

From Neoclassical Economics to the Mobility Transition

Neoclassical economic models posit that the primary driving factor behind migration is the expected difference in wages (discounted future income streams) between origin and destination countries (Sjaastad, 1962 ; Borjas, 1989 ; Clark, Hatton, & Williamson, 2007 ). All else equal, when the wage gap, minus the costs associated with moving between origin and destination, is high, these models predict large flows of labor migrants. In equilibrium, as more individuals move from origin to destination countries, the wage differential narrows, which in turn leads to zero net migration (Lewis, 1954 ; Harris & Todaro, 1970 ). Traditional models predict a negative monotonic relationship between the wage gap and the number of migrants (e.g., Sjaastad, 1962 ). However, the predictions of neoclassical models are not well supported by the empirical record. Empirical evidence shows that, at least in a cross-section, the relationship between economic development and migration is more akin to an inverted U. For countries with low levels of per capita income, we observe little migration due to a liquidity constraint: at this end of the income distribution, individuals do not have sufficient resources to cover even minor costs associated with moving abroad. Increasing income helps to decrease this constraint, and consequently we observe increased levels of emigration as incomes rise (de Haas, 2007 ). This effect, however, is not monotonic: as countries reach middle-income status, declining wage differentials lead to flattening rates of emigration, and then decreasing rates as countries enter later stages of economic development. 3

Some research explains this curvilinear relationship by focusing on the interaction between emigration incentives and constraints : for example, increased income initially makes migration more affordable (reduces constraints), but also simultaneously reduces the relative economic benefits of migrating as the wage differential narrows (as potential migrants now have the financial capacity to enhance local amenities) (Dao, Docquier, Parsons, & Peri, 2016 ). The theoretical underpinnings of this interaction, however, are not without controversy. Clemens identifies several classes of theory that attempt to explain this curvilinear relationship—a relationship that has been referred to in the literature as the mobility transition (Clemens, 2014 ). These theories include: demographic changes resulting from development that also favor emigration up to a point (Easterlin, 1961 ; Tomaske, 1971 ), the loosening of credit restraints on would-be migrants (Vanderkamp, 1971 ; Hatton & Williamson, 1994 ), a breakdown of information barriers via the building of transnational social networks (Epstein, 2008 ), structural economic changes in the development process that result in worker dislocation (Zelinsky, 1971 ; Massey, 1988 ), the dynamics of economic inequality and relative deprivation (Stark, 1984 ; Stark & Yitzhaki, 1988 ; Stark & Taylor, 1991 ), and changing immigration policies in destination countries toward increasingly wealthy countries (Clemens, 2014 ). While each of these play some role in the mobility transition curve, Dao et al. ( 2016 ) run an empirical horse race between numerous explanations and find that changing skill composition resulting from economic development is the most substantively important driver. Economic development is correlated with an increase in a country’s level of education; an increase in the level of education, in turn, is correlated with increased emigration. However, traditional explanations involving microeconomic drivers such as income, credit constraints, and economic inequality remain important factors (Dao et al., 2016 ). The diversity of explanations offered for the mobility transition curve indicates that while most research agrees the inverted-U relationship is an accurate empirical portrayal of the relationship between development and migration, little theoretical agreement exists on what drives this relationship. Complicating this disagreement is the difficulty of empirically disentangling highly correlated factors such as income, skill composition, and demographic trends in order to identify robust causal relationships.

Political Conditions at the Origin

While there is a scholarly consensus around the mobility transition and the role of economic conditions, emerging research suggests that the political environment in the origin country may also be salient. We do not refer here to forced migration, such as in the case of those who leave because they are fleeing political persecution or violent conflict. Rather, we focus on political conditions in the homeland that influence a potential migrant’s decision to emigrate voluntarily. Interpretations of how, and the extent to which, political conditions in origin countries (independent of economic conditions) influence the decision to migrate have been heavily influenced by Hirschman’s “Exit, Voice, and Loyalty” framework (Hirschman, 1970 , 1978 ). Hirschman argues that the opportunity to exit—to exit a firm, an organization, or a country—places pressure on the local authorities; voting with one’s feet forces organizations to reassess their operations.

When applied to the politics of emigration, Hirschman’s framework generates two different hypotheses. On the one hand, politicians may allow, encourage, or force the emigration of groups that oppose the regime as a political safety valve of sorts. This provides the government with a mechanism with which to manage potential political challengers by encouraging their exit. On the other hand, politicians—especially those in autocracies—may actively work to prevent exit because they fear the emigration of economic elites, the highly skilled, and others who have resources vital to the survival of the regime. 4

A small number of studies investigate how local-level, rather than national, political circumstances affect a potential migrant’s calculus. The limited empirical evidence currently available suggests that local conditions are substantively important determinants of the emigration decision. When individuals are highly satisfied with local amenities such as their own standard of living, quality of public services, and overall sense of physical security, they express far less intention to migrate compared with highly dissatisfied individuals (Dustmann & Okatenko, 2014 ). Furthermore, availability of public transport and access to better education facilities decreases the propensity to express an intention to emigrate (Cazzuffi & Modrego, 2018 ). This relationship holds across all levels of wealth and economic development, and there is some evidence that satisfaction with local amenities matters as much as, or even more than, income or wealth (Dustmann & Okatenko, 2014 ).

Political corruption, on both national and local levels, also has substantively important effects on potential migrants, especially those who are highly skilled. Broadly defined as the use of public office for political gain, political corruption operates as both a direct and an indirect factor promoting emigration. 5 Firstly, corruption may have a direct effect on the desire to emigrate in that it can decrease the political and economic power of an individual, leading to a lower standard of living and poorer quality of life in origin countries. If the reduction in life satisfaction resulting from corruption is sufficiently high—either by itself or in combination with other “push” factors—then the exit option becomes more attractive (Cooray & Schneider, 2016 ). Secondly, corruption also operates through indirect channels that influence other push factors. Given the large literature on how political corruption influences a number of development outcomes, it is conceivable that corruption affects the decision-making process of a potential migrant through its negative effect on social spending, education, and public health (Mo, 2001 ; Mauro, 1998 ; Gupta, Davoodi, & Thigonson, 2001 ).

The combination of its direct and indirect impacts means that corruption could be a significant part of a migrant’s decision-making process. At present there is limited work exploring this question, and the research does not yield a consensus. Some scholars argue that political corruption has no substantive effect on total bilateral migration, but that it does encourage migration among the highly skilled (Dimant, Krieger, & Meierrieks, 2013 ). This is the case, the argument goes, because corruption causes the greatest relative harm to the utility of those who have invested in human capital, who migrate to escape the negative effect on their fixed investment. In contrast, others find that a high level of corruption does increase emigration at the aggregate level (Poprawe, 2015 ). More nuanced arguments take into account the intensity of corruption: low to moderate levels of corruption lead to increased emigration of all groups, and especially of the highly skilled. But at high levels of corruption, emigration begins to decrease, indicating that intense corruption can act as a mobility constraint (Cooray & Schneider, 2016 ). All of these existing accounts, however, employ state-level measures of corruption by non-governmental organizations, such as those produced by Transparency International. Scholars have yet to harness micro-level survey data to explore the influence of personal corruption perception on the individual’s decision-making process.

The Land of Hopes and Dreams

Given that an individual has decided to emigrate, the next decision point is to choose a destination country. Advanced industrial democracies, such as those in the OECD, are major migrant-receiving countries, but so are Russia and several Gulf countries including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (World Bank, 2016 ). A country’s constellation of political, economic, and social attributes is crucial to understanding an emigrant’s choice of destination. Potential migrants weigh all of these factors simultaneously when choosing a destination: will the destination allow political rights for the migrant and their children, is access to the labor market possible, and does the destination provide an opportunity for reunification with friends and family? In this section we focus on the non-economic factors that draw migrants to certain countries over others. In addition, we emphasize how skill level adds layers of complexity to a migrant’s calculus.

Political Environment, Both Formal and Informal

As noted earlier, traditional neoclassical models and their extensions place wage differentials and associated economic variables at the heart of a migrant’s choice. Gravity models posit that migrants choose a destination country based on their expected income—which itself is a function of the wage rate and the probability of finding employment in the destination—less the costs associated with moving (Ravenstein, 1885 ; Todaro, 1969 ; Borjas, 1989 ). A rigid focus on economic factors, however, blinds us to the empirical reality that a destination country’s political environment influences what destination a migrant chooses (Borjas, 1989 ). A country’s legal and political rights structure for migrants, as well as its level of tolerance for newcomers, is critical to migrants discriminating between an array of potential destinations. Fitzgerald, Leblang, and Teets ( 2014 ) argue, for example, that states with restrictive citizenship policies and strong radical right anti-immigrant parties will receive fewer migrants, while states with relatively liberal citizenship requirements and weak radical right political movements will receive more migrants. In the rational actor framework, migrants seek countries with hospitable political environments to maximize both their political representation in government and their access to labor market opportunities as a result of citizenship rights and social acceptance (Fitzgerald et al., 2014 ).

Using a broad sample of origin countries and 18 destination countries, they find that relative restrictiveness of citizenship policies and level of domestic support for the radical right are substantively important determinants of global migratory flows. Further, they find that these political variables condition a migrant’s choice of destination: the relative importance of economic factors such as the unemployment rate or the wage differential diminishes as a destination country’s political environment becomes more open for migrants. In other words, when migrants are choosing a destination country, political considerations may trump economic ones—a finding that is an important amendment to the primarily economics-focused calculus of the initial stage of the immigration decision.

However, prior to choosing and entering a destination country, a migrant must also navigate a country’s immigration policy—the regulation of both migrant entry and the rights and status of current migrants. While it is often assumed that a relatively more restrictive immigration policy deters entry, and vice versa, a lack of quantitative data has limited the ability of scholars to confirm this intuition cross-nationally. Money ( 1999 ) emphasizes that the policy output of immigration politics does not necessarily correlate with the outcome of international migrant flows. There are a number of unanswered questions in this field, including: is immigration policy a meaningful determinant of global flows of migration? Do certain kinds of immigration policies matter more than others? How does immigration policy interact with other political and economic factors, such as unemployment and social networks?

Only a handful of studies analyze whether or not immigration policy is a significant determinant of the size and character of migratory flows. Perhaps the most prominent answer to this question is the “gap hypothesis,” which posits that immigration rates continue to increase despite increasingly restrictive immigration policies in advanced countries (Cornelius & Tsuda, 2004 ). Some subsequent work seems to grant support to the gap hypothesis, indicating that immigration policy may not be a relevant factor and that national sovereignty as it relates to dictating migrant inflows has eroded significantly (Sassen, 1996 ; Castles, 2004 ). The gap hypothesis is not without its critics, with other scholars arguing that the existing empirical evidence actually lends it little or no support (Messina, 2007 ).

A more recent body of literature does indicate that immigration policy matters. Brücker and Schröder ( 2011 ), for example, find that immigration policies built to attract highly skilled migrants lead to higher admittance rates. They also show that diffusion processes cause neighboring countries to implement similar policy measures. Ortega and Peri ( 2013 ), in contrast to the gap hypothesis literature, find that restrictive immigration policy indeed reduces migrant inflows. But immigration policy can also have unintended effects on international migration: when entry requirements increase, migrant inflows decrease, but migrant outflows also decrease (Czaika & de Haas, 2016 ). This indicates that restrictive immigration policy may also lead to reduced circular migrant flows and encourage long-term settlement in destination countries.

Disaggregating immigration policy into its different components provides a clearer picture of how immigration policy may matter, and whether certain components matter more than others. Immigration policy is composed of both external and internal regulations. External regulations refer to policies that control migrant entry, such as eligibility requirements for migrants and additional conditions of entry. Internal regulations refer to policies that apply to migrants who have already gained status in the country, such as the security of a migrant’s legal status and the rights they are afforded. Helbling and Leblang ( 2017 ), using a comprehensive data set of bilateral migrant flows and the Immigration Policies in Comparison (IMPIC) data set, find that, in general, external regulations prove slightly more important in understanding migrant inflows (Helbling, Bjerre, Römer, & Zobel, 2017 ). This indicates that potential migrants focus more on how to cross borders, and less on the security of their status and rights once they settle. They do find, however, that both external and internal components of immigration are substantively important to international migrant flows.

The effects of policy, however, cannot be understood in isolation from other drivers of migration. Firstly, poor economic conditions and restrictive immigration policy are mutually reinforcing: when the unemployment rate is elevated, restrictive policies are more effective in deterring migrant flows. An increase in policy effectiveness in poor economic conditions suggests that states care more about deterring immigration when the economy is performing poorly. Secondly, a destination country’s restrictive immigration policy is more effective when migrants come from origin countries that have a common colonial heritage. This suggests that cultural similarities and migrant networks help to spread information about the immigration policy environment in the destination country. Social networks prove to be crucial in determining how much migrants know about the immigration policies of destination countries, regardless of other cultural factors such as colonial heritage or common language (Helbling & Leblang, 2017 ). In summary, more recent work supports the idea that immigration policy of destination countries exerts a significant influence on both the size and character of international migration flows. Much work remains to be done in terms of understanding the nuances of specific immigration policy components, the effect of policy change over time, and through what mechanisms immigration policy operates.

Transnational Social Networks

None of this should be taken to suggest that only political and economic considerations matter when a potential migrant contemplates a potential destination; perhaps one of the biggest contributions to the study of bilateral migration is the role played by transnational social networks. Migrating is a risky undertaking, and to minimize that risk, migrants are more likely to move to destinations where they can “readily tap into networks of co-ethnics” (Fitzgerald et al., 2014 , p. 410). Dense networks of co-ethnics not only help provide information about economic opportunities, but also serve as a social safety net which, in turn, helps decrease the risks associated with migration, including, but not limited to, finding housing and integrating into a new community (Massey, 1988 ; Portes & Böröcz, 1989 ; Portes, 1995 ; Massey et al., 1993 ; Faist, 2000 ; Sassen, 1995 ; Light, Bernard, & Kim, 1999 ). Having a transnational network of family members is quite important to destination choice; if a destination country has an immigration policy that emphasizes family reunification, migrants can use their familial connections to gain economically valuable permanent resident or citizenship status more easily than in other countries (Massey et al., 1993 , p. 450; Helbing & Leblang, 2017 ). When the migrant is comparing potential destinations, countries in which that migrant has a strong social network will be heavily favored in a cost–benefit analysis.

Note, however, that even outside of a strict rational actor framework with perfect information, transnational social networks still may be quite salient to destination choice. An interesting alternative hypothesis for the patterns we observe draws on theories from financial market behavior which focus on herding. Migrants choosing a destination observe the decisions of their co-ethnics who previously migrated and assume that those decisions were based on a relevant set of information, such as job opportunities or social tolerance of migrants. New migrants then choose the same destination as their co-ethnics not based on actual exchanges of valuable information, but based solely on the assumption that previous migration decisions were based on rational calculation (Epstein & Gang, 2006 ; Epstein, 2008 ). This is a classic example of herding, and the existing empirical evidence on the importance of transnational social networks cannot invalidate this alternative hypothesis. One could also explain social network effects through the lens of cumulative causation or feedback loops: the initial existence of connections in destination countries makes the act of migration less risky and attracts additional co-ethnics. This further expands migrant networks in a destination, further decreasing risk for future waves of migrants, and so on (Massey, 1990 ; Fussel & Massey, 2004 ; Fussel, 2010 ).

No matter the pathway by which social networks operate, the empirical evidence indicates that they are one of the most important determinants of destination choice. Potential migrants from Mexico, for example, who are able to tap into existing networks in the United States face lower direct, opportunity, and psychological costs of international migration (Massey & Garcia España, 1987 ). This same relationship holds in the European context; a study of Bulgarian and Italian migrants indicates that those with “social capital” in a destination community are more likely to migrate and to choose that particular destination (Haug, 2008 ). Studies that are more broadly cross-national in nature also confirm the social network hypothesis across a range of contexts and time periods (e.g., Clark et al., 2007 ; Hatton & Williamson, 2011 ; Fitzgerald et al., 2014 ).

Despite the importance of social networks, it is, again, important to qualify their role in framing the choice of destinations. It seems that the existence of co-ethnics in destination countries most strongly influences emigration when they are relatively few in number. Clark et al. ( 2007 ), in their study of migration to the United States, find that the “friends and relatives effect” falls to zero once the migrant stock in the United States reaches 8.3% of the source-country population. In addition, social networks alone cannot explain destination choice because their explanatory power is context-dependent. For instance, restrictive immigration policies limiting legal migration channels and family reunification may dampen the effectiveness of networks (Böcker, 1994 ; Collyer, 2006 ). Social networks are not an independent force, but also interact with economic and political realities to produce the global migration patterns we observe.

The Lens of Skill

For ease of presentation, we have up to now treated migrants as a relatively homogeneous group that faces similar push and pull factors throughout the decision-making process. Of course, not all migrants experience the same economic, political, and social incentives in the same way at each stage of the decision-making process. Perhaps the most salient differentiating feature of migrants is skill or education level. Generally, one can discuss a spectrum of skill and education level for current migrants, from relatively less educated (having attained a high school degree or less) to relatively more educated (having attained a college or post-graduate degree). The factors presented here that influence destination choice interact with a migrant’s skill level to produce differing destination choice patterns.

A migrant’s level of education, or human capital, often serves as a filter for the political treatment he or she anticipates in a particular destination country. For instance, the American public has a favorable view of highly educated migrants who hold higher-status jobs, while simultaneously having an opposite view of migrants who have less job training and do not hold a college degree (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2010 ; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2015 ). Indeed, the political discourse surrounding migration often emphasizes skill level and education as markers of migrants who “should be” admitted, across both countries and the ideological spectrum. 6 While political tolerance may be a condition of entry for migrants in the aggregate, the relatively privileged status of highly educated and skilled migrants in most destination countries may mean that this condition is not as salient.

While it is still an open question to what extent immigration policy influences international migration, it is clear that not all migrants face evenly applied migration restrictions. Most attractive destination countries have policies that explicitly favor highly skilled migrants, since these individuals often fill labor shortages in advanced industries such as high technology and applied science. Countries such as Australia, Canada, and New Zealand all employ so-called “points-based” immigration systems in which those with advanced degrees and needed skills are institutionally favored for legal entry (Papademetriou & Sumption, 2011 ). Meanwhile, the United States maintains the H-1B visa program, which is restricted by educational attainment and can only be used to fill jobs in which no native talent is available (USCIS). Even if destination countries decide to adopt more restrictive immigration policies, the move toward restriction has typically been focused on low-skilled migrants (Peters, 2017 ). In other words, even if immigration policy worldwide becomes more restrictive, this will almost certainly not occur at the expense of highly skilled migrants and will not prevent them choosing their most preferred destination.

Bring It on Home to Me

This article began by asserting that international labor migration is an important piece of globalization, as significant as cross-border flows of capital, goods, and services. This section argues that migrant flows enhance flows of capital and commodities. Uniquely modern conditions such as advanced telecommunications, affordable and efficient international travel, and the liberalization of financial flows mean that diasporas—populations of migrants living outside their countries of origin—and home countries often re-engage with each other (Vertovec, 2004 ; Waldinger, 2008 ). This section reviews some of the newest and most thought-provoking research on international labor migration, research that explores diaspora re-engagement and how that re-engagement alters international flows of income, portfolio and foreign direct investment (FDI), trade, and migratory flows themselves.

Remittances

As previously argued, migration is often driven by the prospect of higher wages. Rational, utility-maximizing migrants incur the cost of migration in order to earn increased income that they could not earn at home. But when migrants obtain higher wages, this additional increment to income is not always designated for individual consumption. Often, migrants use their new income to send remittances, direct transfers of money from one individual to another across national borders. Once a marginal financial flow, in 2015 remittances totaled $431 billion, far outpacing foreign aid ($135 billion) and nearly passing private debt and portfolio equity ($443 billion). More than 70% of total global remittances flow into developing countries (World Bank, 2016 ). In comparison with other financial flows such as portfolio investment and FDI, remittances are more impervious to economic crises, suggesting that they may be a countercyclical force to global downturns (Leblang, 2017 ).

Remittances represent one of the most common ways in which migrants re-engage with their homeland and alter both global income flows and distribution. Why do migrants surrender large portions of their new income, supposedly the very reason they migrated in the first place, to their families back home? New economics of labor migration (NELM) theory argues that immigration itself is motivated by a family’s need or demand for remittances—that remittances are an integral part of a family’s strategy for diversifying household financial risk (Stark & Bloom, 1985 ). Remittances “are a manifestation of informal contractual agreements between migrants and the households from which they move,” indicating that remitting is not an individual-level or purely altruistic action but rather occurs in a larger social context, that of one’s immediate or extended family (European Asylum Support Office, 2016 , p. 15).

The impact of migrant remittances on countries of origin is multifaceted yet somewhat ambiguous. Most scholarly work focuses on whether remittances positively or negatively influence existing economic conditions. A number of studies find that remittances modestly reduce poverty levels in developing countries (Adams & Page, 2005 ; Yang & Martinez, 2006 ; Acosta, Calderon, Fajnzybler, & Lopez, 2008 ; Lokshin, Bontch-Osmolovski, & Glinskaya, 2010 ). On other measures of economic well-being, such as growth, inequality, and health, the literature is quite mixed and no definitive conclusions can be drawn. For instance, some studies find that remittances encourage investment in human capital (Yang, 2008 ; Adams & Cuecuecha, 2010 ), while others find no such effect and suggest that families typically spend remittances on non-productive consumption goods (Chami, Fullenkamp, & Jahjah, 2003 ). Here we can only scratch the surface of the empirical work on remittances and economic outcomes. 7

Some of the most recent research in the field argues that remittances have a distinct political dimension, affecting regime support in developing countries and altering the conditions in which elections are held. Ahmed ( 2012 ), grouping remittances with foreign aid, argues that increased remittances allow autocratic governments to extend their tenure in office. These governments can strategically channel unearned government and household income to finance political patronage networks, which leads to a reduced likelihood of autocratic turnover, regime collapse, and mass protests against the regime. More recent research posits nearly the exact opposite: remittances are linked to a greater likelihood of democratization under autocratic regimes. Escriba-Folch, Meseguer, and Wright ( 2015 ) argue that since remittances directly increase household incomes, they reduce voter reliance on political patronage networks, undermining a key tool of autocratic stability.

Remittances may also play an important role in countries with democratic institutions, yet more research is needed to fully understand the conditions under which they matter and their substantive impact. Particularly, remittances may alter the dynamics of an election as an additional and external financial flow. There is evidence of political remittance cycles : the value of remittances spikes in the run-up to elections in developing countries. The total value of remittances to the average developing country increases by 6.6% during election years, and by 12% in elections in which no incumbent or named successor is running (O’Mahony, 2012 ). The effect is even larger in the poorest of developing countries. Finer-grained tests of this hypothesis provide additional support: using monthly and quarterly data confirms the existence of political remittance cycles, as well as using subnational rather than cross-national data (Nyblade & O’Mahony, 2014 ). However, these studies do not reveal why remittances spike, or what the effects of that spike are on electoral outcomes such as vote share, campaign financing, and political strategy.

Remittances represent a massive international financial flow that warrants more scholarly attention. While there are numerous studies on the relationship between remittances and key economic indicators, there remains much room for further work on their relationship to political outcomes in developing countries. Do remittances hasten the downfall of autocratic regimes, or do they contribute to autocratic stability? In democratic contexts, do remittances substantively influence electoral outcomes, and if so, which outcomes and how? Finally, do remittances prevent even more migration because they allow one “breadwinner from abroad” to provide for the household that remains in the homeland? While data limitations are formidable, these questions are important to the study of both international and comparative political economy.

Bilateral Trade

The argument that migrant or co-ethnic networks play an important role in international economic exchange is not novel. Greif ( 1989 , 1993 ) illustrates the role that the Maghrebi traders of the 11th century played in providing informal institutional guarantees that facilitated trade. This is but a single example. Cowen’s historical survey identifies not only the Phoenicians but also the “Spanish Jews [who] were indispensable for international commerce in the Middle Ages. The Armenians controlled the overland route between the Orient and Europe as late as the nineteenth century . Lebanese Christians developed trade between the various parts of the Ottoman empire” (Cowen, 1997 , p. 170). Rauch and Trindade ( 2002 ) provide robust empirical evidence linking the Chinese diaspora to patterns of imports and exports with their home country.

A variety of case studies document the importance of migrant networks in helping overcome problems of information asymmetries. In his study of Indian expatriates residing in the United States, Kapur ( 2014 ) documents how that community provides U.S. investors with a signal of the work ethic, labor quality, and business culture that exists in India. Likewise, Weidenbaum and Hughes ( 1996 ) chronicle the Bamboo Network—the linkages between ethnic Chinese living outside mainland China and their homeland—and how these linkages provide superior access to information and opportunities for investment.

Connections between migrant communities across countries affect cross-national investment even when these connections do not provide information about investment opportunities. In his work on the Maghrebi traders of the 11th century , Greif argues that this trading network was effective because it was able to credibly threaten collective punishment by all merchants if even one of them defected (Greif, 1989 , 1993 ). Grief shows that this co-ethnic network was able to share information regarding the past actions of actors (they could communicate a reputation)—something that was essential for the efficient functioning of markets in the absence of formal legal rules. Weidenbaum and Hughes reach a similar conclusion about the effectiveness of the Bamboo Network, remarking that “if a business owner violates an agreement, he is blacklisted. This is far worse than being sued, because the entire Chinese networks will refrain from doing business with the guilty party” (Hughes, 1996 , p. 51).

Migrants not only alter the flow of income by remitting to their countries of origin, but also influence patterns of international portfolio investment and FDI. Most existing literature on international capital allocation emphasizes monadic factors such as the importance of credible commitments and state institutional quality, failing to address explicitly dyadic phenomena that may also drive investment. Diaspora networks, in particular, facilitate cross-border investment in a number of ways. They foster a higher degree of familiarity between home and host countries, leading to a greater preference for investment in specific countries. Diaspora networks can also decrease information asymmetries in highly uncertain international capital markets in two ways. Firstly, they can provide investors with salient information about their homeland, such as consumer tastes, that can influence investment decision-making. Secondly, they can share knowledge about investment opportunities, regulation and procedures, and customs that decrease transaction costs associated with cross-border investment (Leblang, 2010 ). This place of importance for migrants suggests to the broader international political economy literature the importance of non-institutional mechanisms for channeling economic activity.

Although the hypothesized link between migrants and international investment has only recently been identified, the quantitative evidence available supports that hypothesis. Leblang ( 2010 ), using dyadic cross-sectional data, finds that diaspora networks “have both a substantively significant effect and a statistically significant effect on cross-border investment,” including international portfolio investment and FDI (p. 584). The effect of bilateral migratory flows correlates positively with the degree of information asymmetry: when informational imperfections are more pervasive in a dyad, migrants (especially the highly skilled) play a disproportionately large role in international capital allocation (Kugler, Levinthal, & Rapoport, 2017 ). Other quantitative studies find substantively similar results for FDI alone (e.g., Javorcik, Özden, Spatareanu, & Neagu, 2011 ; Aubry, Rapoport, & Reshef, 2016 ).

Many questions still remain unanswered. Firstly, does the effect of migrants on investment follow the waves of the global economy, or is it countercyclical as remittances have been shown to be? Secondly, how does this additional investment, facilitated by migrants, affect socioeconomic outcomes such as inequality, poverty, and economic development (Leblang, 2010 )? Does the participation of migrants lead to more successful FDI projects in developing countries because of their ability to break down information barriers? Within portfolio investment, do migrants lead to a preference for certain asset classes over others, and if so, what are the effects on bilateral and international capital markets? These are just a few directions in an area ripe for additional research.

Return Migration and Dual Citizenship

Besides financial flows, migrants themselves directly contribute to global flows of capital by returning to their countries of origin in large numbers. This phenomenon of return migration—or circular migration—can come in a few temporal forms, including long-term migration followed by a permanent return to a country of origin, or repeat migration in which a migrant regularly moves between destination and origin countries (Dumont & Spielvogel, 2008 ). While comparable data on return migration is scarce, some reports suggest that 20% to 50% of all immigrants leave their destination country within five years after their arrival (e.g., Borjas & Bratsberg, 1996 ; Aydemir & Robinson, 2008 ; Bratsberg, Raaum, & Sørlie, 2007 ; Dustmann & Weiss, 2007 ). An independent theoretical and empirical account of return migration does not yet exist in the literature and is beyond the scope of this paper. But in the rational actor framework, motivations to return home include a failure to realize the expected benefits of migration, changing preferences toward a migrant’s home country, achievement of a savings or other economic goal, or the opening of additional employment opportunities back home due to newly acquired experience or greater levels of economic development (Dumont & Spielvogel, 2008 ).

While most migration literature treats the country of origin as a passive actor that only provides the conditions for migration, new literature on return migration gives home country policies pride of place. Origin countries can craft policies that encourage diaspora re-engagement, incentivizing individuals to return home. Dual citizenship, for example, is an extension of extraterritorial rights, allowing migrants to retain full legal status in their home country. Dual citizenship “decreases the transaction costs associated with entering a host country’s labor market and makes it easier for migrants to return home” (Leblang, 2017 , p. 77). This leads migrants to invest their financial resources in the form of remittances back home as well as their valuable human capital. When states provide such extraterritorial rights, expatriates are 10% more likely to remit and 3% more likely to return home. Dual citizenship is also associated with a doubling of the dollar amount of remittances received by a home country (Leblang, 2017 ). These striking results suggest that in addition to the power of migrants to affect cross-border flows of money and people, countries of origin can also play a significant role.

Conclusion and Future Directions

This brief article has attempted to synthesize a broad range of literature from political science, economics, sociology, migration studies, and more to construct an account of international labor migration. To do so, the migratory process was broken down into distinct stages and decision points, focusing particularly on the decision to migrate, destination choice, and the re-engagement of migrants with their homeland. In doing so, the article also discussed the interlinkages of international migration with other fields of study in international political economy, including cross-border financial flows, trade, and investment. Through a multiplicity of approaches, we have gained a greater understanding of why people decide to move, why they decide to move to one country over another, and how and why they engage with the global economy and their homeland. Despite this intellectual progress, there remain many paths for future research at each stage of the migratory process; we highlight just a few of them here.

We know that income differentials, social ties, and local political conditions are important variables influencing the migration process. Yet the question remains: why do a small but growing number of people choose to leave while the overwhelming majority of people remain in their country of birth? Here, individual- or family-level subjective characteristics may be significant. There are a handful of observational studies that explore the relationship between subjective well-being or life satisfaction and the intention to migrate, with the nascent consensus being that life dissatisfaction increases the intention to migrate (Cai, Esipova, Oppenheimer, & Feng, 2014 ; Otrachshenko & Popova, 2014 ; Nikolova & Graham, 2015 ). But more research on intrinsic or subjective measures is needed to understand (a) their independent importance more fully and (b) how they interact with objective economic, political, and social factors. For instance, do those who are more optimistic migrate in larger numbers? Do minority individuals who feel they live in an environment in which diversity is not accepted feel a greater urge to leave home? Synthesizing these types of subjective variables and perceptions with the more prominent gravity-style models could result in a more complete picture of the international migration process.

For the “typical” migrant, one who is relatively less educated than the population in the chosen destination and does not have specialized skills, social networks are key to minimizing the risk of migrating and quickly tapping into economic opportunities in destination countries. Does this remain true for those who are highly educated? Although little empirical research exists on the topic, greater human capital and often-accompanying financial resources may operate as a substitute for the advantages offered by social networks, such as housing, overcoming linguistic barriers, and finding gainful employment. This would indicate that the “friends and family effect” is not as influential for this subset of migrants. Economic considerations, such as which destination offers the largest relative wage differential, or political considerations, such as the ease of quickly acquiring full citizenship rights, may matter more for the highly skilled. Neoclassical economic models of migration may best capture the behavior of migrants who hold human capital and who have the financial resources to independently migrate in a way that maximizes income or utility more broadly.

Since we have focused on international migration as a series of discrete decision points in this article, we have perhaps underemphasized the complexity of the physical migration process. In reality, migrants often do not pick a country and travel directly there, but travel through (perhaps several) countries of transit such as Mexico, Morocco, or Turkey along the way (Angel Castillo, 2006 ; Natter, 2013 ; Icduygu, 2005 ). There is little existing theoretical work to understand the role of transit countries in the migratory process, with much of it focusing on the potential for cooperation between destination and transit countries in managing primarily illegal immigration (Kahana & Lecker, 2005 ; Djajic & Michael, 2014 ; Djajic & Michael, 2016 ). Another related strand of the literature focuses on how wealthy destination countries are “externalizing” their immigration policy, encompassing a broader part of the migratory process than simply crossing a physically demarcated border (Duvell, 2012 ; Menjivar, 2014 ). But many questions remain, such as the following: how do we understand those who desire to enter, say, the United States, but instead relocate permanently to Mexico along the way? How do countries of transit handle the pressure of transit migrants, and how does this affect economic and political outcomes in these countries?

Finally, the focus of nearly all literature on international migration (and this article as a byproduct) implicitly views advanced economies as the only prominent destinations. However, this belies the fact that 38% of all migration stays within the “Global South” (World Bank, 2016 ). While there is certainly some literature on this phenomenon (see Ratha & Shaw, 2007 ; Gindling, 2009 ; Hujo & Piper, 2007 ), international political economy scholars have yet to sufficiently tackle this topic. The overarching research question here is: do the same push and pull factors that influence the decision to migrate and destination choice apply to those who migrate within the Global South? Do we need to construct new theories of international migration with less emphasis on factors such as wage differentials and political tolerance, or are these sufficient to understand this facet of the phenomenon? If we fail to answer these questions, we may miss explaining a significant proportion of international migration with its own consequences and policy implications.

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1. Our use of the term international labor migration follows academic and legal conventions; we use the term migration to refer to the voluntary movement of people across national borders, either in a temporary or permanent fashion. This excludes any discussion of refugees, asylum seekers, or any other groups that are forced to migrate.

2. We do not have space in this article to delve into the theoretical and empirical work unpacking the effect of demographic characteristics—age, gender, marital status, household size, and so forth on the migration decision and on subsequent flows of migrants. For comprehensive reviews, see Lichter ( 1983 ), Morrison and Lichter ( 1988 ); United Nations Population Division ( 2013 ); and Zaiceva and Zimmerman ( 2014 ).

3. Zelinsky ( 1971 ) originally identified this relationship and termed it mobility transition curve . A wealth of empirical work supports Zelinsky’s descriptive theory in a number of contexts (see Akerman, 1976 ; Gould, 1979 ; Hatton & Williamson, 1994 ; and Dao et al., 2016 ).

4. For a review of the arguments as well as some empirical tests, see Miller and Peters ( 2018 ) and Docquier, Lodigiani, Rapoport, and Schiff ( 2018 ).

5. Transparency International. “What is corruption?”

6. For example, former United Kingdom Independence Party leader Nigel Farage has called for the United Kingdom to adopt an immigration system that only allows in highly skilled migrants (“UKIP launches immigration policy”). In 2014, US President Barack Obama emphasized that he wanted to attract international students to American universities and that they “create jobs, businesses, and industries right here in America” (USA Today: “Full text: Obama’s immigration speech”). A key issue in Germany’s 2018 government formation was the creation of skill-based migration laws (Severin & Martin, 2018 ).

7. For a more comprehensive review, see Rapoport and Docquier ( 2006 ); and Adams ( 2011 ).

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Essay on Migration

Students are often asked to write an essay on Migration in their schools and colleges. And if you’re also looking for the same, we have created 100-word, 250-word, and 500-word essays on the topic.

Let’s take a look…

100 Words Essay on Migration

Understanding migration.

Migration refers to the movement of people from one place to another. It can be within a country (internal migration) or between different countries (international migration).

Reasons for Migration

People migrate for various reasons. Some move for better job opportunities, while others might move due to conflicts or natural disasters in their home region.

Effects of Migration

Migration can have both positive and negative effects. It can lead to cultural diversity and economic growth, but it can also cause overcrowding and strain on resources.

Migration is a complex issue with many facets. It’s important to understand why people migrate and its impact on societies.

250 Words Essay on Migration

Introduction.

Migration, an inherent human phenomenon, has shaped societies and cultures since the dawn of civilization. It is a complex process influenced by an intricate interplay of economic, political, social, and environmental factors.

Types of Migration

Migration can be categorized broadly into internal and international. Internal migration involves movement within a country, often from rural to urban areas, driven by the pursuit of better economic opportunities. International migration, on the other hand, involves crossing national borders, often influenced by factors like conflict, persecution, or economic disparity.

The Push-Pull Theory

The push-pull theory provides a framework to understand migration. ‘Push’ factors include poverty, political instability, or environmental disasters that compel people to leave their homes. Conversely, ‘pull’ factors attract individuals to new regions, such as better job opportunities, political stability, or higher living standards.

Impacts of Migration

Migration has profound implications on both the source and destination regions. While it can lead to brain drain and demographic imbalances in the source region, it can also alleviate poverty and foster development. In destination regions, it can stimulate economic growth but may also strain resources and potentially cause social tension.

Migration, an integral part of our globalized world, presents both challenges and opportunities. It is crucial to foster policies that maximize its benefits while mitigating its potential drawbacks. Understanding the dynamics of migration can pave the way for more inclusive, equitable, and sustainable societies.

500 Words Essay on Migration

The driving forces of migration.

The primary drivers of migration are often classified as push and pull factors. Push factors refer to the conditions that drive individuals to leave their homes, such as poverty, lack of opportunities, political instability, or environmental disasters. Pull factors, on the other hand, are the attractive aspects of the destination, like better economic opportunities, political stability, or higher living standards.

Migration can be categorized into different types based on various parameters. Internal migration refers to the movement within a country, while international migration involves crossing national borders. Migration can also be voluntary, where individuals choose to move, or forced, where individuals are compelled to leave due to circumstances beyond their control.

For the destination region, migration can lead to an increase in diversity and cultural richness. It can also fill labor gaps, contributing to economic growth. However, if not managed well, it can lead to social tensions.

Migration in the Age of Globalization

In the era of globalization, migration has become more accessible and prevalent. The interconnectedness of economies has led to increased labor mobility. However, it has also exposed the stark inequalities between regions, further motivating migration. The rise of transnational communities, where migrants maintain strong ties with their home countries while integrating into the host society, is another notable trend.

Challenges and Opportunities

In conclusion, migration is an inherent part of human society, driven by a complex interplay of factors. It has far-reaching impacts on individuals, communities, and nations. As the world becomes increasingly interconnected, the dynamics of migration will continue to evolve, presenting both challenges and opportunities. Understanding and managing migration effectively is crucial to building inclusive, diverse, and prosperous societies.

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Global migration’s impact and opportunity

Migration is a key feature of our increasingly interconnected world . It has also become a flashpoint for debate in many countries, which underscores the importance of understanding the patterns of global migration and the economic impact that is created when people move across the world’s borders. A new report from the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI), People on the move: Global migration’s impact and opportunity , aims to fill this need.

Refugees might be the face of migration in the media, but 90 percent of the world’s 247 million migrants have moved across borders voluntarily, usually for economic reasons. Voluntary migration flows are typically gradual, placing less stress on logistics and on the social fabric of destination countries than refugee flows. Most voluntary migrants are working-age adults, a characteristic that helps raise the share of the population that is economically active in destination countries.

By contrast, the remaining 10 percent are refugees and asylum seekers who have fled to another country to escape conflict and persecution. Roughly half of the world’s 24 million refugees are in the Middle East and North Africa, reflecting the dominant pattern of flight to a neighboring country. But the recent surge of arrivals in Europe has focused the developed world’s attention on this issue. A companion report, Europe’s new refugees: A road map for better integration outcomes , examines the challenges and opportunities confronting individual countries.

While some migrants travel long distances from their origin countries, most migration still involves people moving to neighboring countries or to countries in the same part of the world (exhibit). About half of all migrants globally have moved from developing to developed countries—indeed, this is the fastest-growing type of movement. Almost two-thirds of the world’s migrants reside in developed countries, where they often fill key occupational shortages . From 2000 to 2014, immigrants contributed 40 to 80 percent of labor-force growth in major destination countries.

Moving more labor to higher-productivity settings boosts global GDP. Migrants of all skill levels contribute to this effect, whether through innovation and entrepreneurship or through freeing up natives for higher-value work. In fact, migrants make up just 3.4 percent of the world’s population, but MGI’s research finds that they contribute nearly 10 percent of global GDP. They contributed roughly $6.7 trillion to global GDP in 2015—some $3 trillion more than they would have produced in their origin countries. Developed nations realize more than 90 percent of this effect.

Would you like to learn more about the McKinsey Global Institute ?

Employment rates are slightly lower for immigrants than for native workers in top destinations, but this varies by skill level and by region of origin. Extensive academic evidence shows that immigration does not harm native employment or wages, although there can be short-term negative effects if there is a large inflow of migrants to a small region, if migrants are close substitutes for native workers, or if the destination economy is experiencing a downturn.

Realizing the benefits of immigration hinges on how well new arrivals are integrated into their destination country’s labor market and into society. Today immigrants tend to earn 20 to 30 percent less than native-born workers. But if countries narrow that wage gap to just 5 to 10 percent by integrating immigrants more effectively across various aspects of education, housing, health, and community engagement, they could generate an additional boost of $800 billion to $1 trillion to worldwide economic output annually. This is a relatively conservative goal, but it can nevertheless produce broader positive effects, including lower poverty rates and higher overall productivity in destination economies.

People on the move: Migrant voices

A series of portraits tells migrants’ stories—part of the 'i am a migrant' campaign.

The economic, social, and civic dimensions of integration need to be addressed holistically. MGI looked at how the leading destinations perform on 18 indicators and found that no country has achieved strong integration outcomes across all of these dimensions, though some do better than others. But in destinations around the world, many stakeholders are trying new approaches. We identify more than 180 promising interventions that offer useful models for improving integration. The private sector has a central role to play in this effort—and incentives to do so. When companies participate, they stand to gain access to new markets and pools of new talent.

The stakes are high. The success or failure of integration can reverberate for many years, influencing whether second-generation immigrants become fully participating citizens who reach their full productive potential or remain in a poverty trap.

Lola Woetzel , Jacques Bughin , and James Manyika are directors of the McKinsey Global Institute, where Anu Madgavkar is a partner and Ashwin Hasyagar is a fellow; Khaled Rifai is a partner in McKinsey’s New York office, Frank Mattern is a senior partner in the Frankfurt office, and Tarek Elmasry and Amadeo Di Lodovico are senior partners in the Dubai office.

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Global migration in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries: the unstoppable force of demography

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This paper sheds light on the global migration patterns of the past 40 years, and produces migration projections for the 21st century. To do this, we build a simple model of the world economy, and we parameterize it to match the economic and socio-demographic characteristics of the world in the year 2010. We conduct backcasting and nowcasting exercises, which demonstrate that our model fits very well the past and ongoing trends in international migration, and that historical trends were mostly governed by demographic changes. Then, we describe a set of migration projections for the 21st century. In line with the backcasts, our world migration prospects are mainly governed by socio-demographic changes. Using immigration restrictions or development policies to curb these pressures requires sealing borders or triggering unprecedented economic takeoffs in migrants’ countries of origin. Increasing migration is thus a likely phenomenon for the 21st century.

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The Future of Global Migration

International Migration

Gravity Models for Global Migration Flows: A Predictive Evaluation

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1 Introduction

Between 1960 and 2019, the worldwide stock of international migrants increased from 92 to 270 million, almost at the same pace as the world population. The worldwide share of migrants has fluctuated around 3% until 2010 (Ozden et al. 2011 ), with a rise since then until reaching 3.5% in 2019. In contrast, the foreign-born population increased more rapidly than the total population in high-income countries (HIC), boosting the average proportion of foreigners from 4.5 to 12.0% (+7.5 percentage points). A remarkable fact is that this change is mostly explained by the inflow of immigrants from less developed countries (LDC). The underlying root causes of this trend are known (population growth disparities between rich and poor countries, economic inequality, increased globalization, political instability, etc.). However, quantitatively speaking, little is known about their relative importance, and about the changing educational structure of past migration flows. Furthermore, the very same root causes are all projected to exert a strong influence on migration in the coming decades, while little is known about the predictability of future migration flows. This paper sheds light on these issues, addressing key questions such as: How have past income disparities, educational changes and population growth differentials shaped past migration flows? What are the pairs of countries responsible for large variations in low-skilled and high-skilled migration? How many potential migrants can be expected for the 21st century? How will future changes in education and productivity affect migration flows in general, and migration pressures to HIC in particular? Can development or visa policies be implemented to limit these flows?

To address these issues, we develop a simple and abstract model of the world economy that highlights the major mechanisms underlying migration decisions and wage inequality in the long term. It builds on a migration technology and a production technology, uses consensus specifications, and includes a limited number of parameters that can be calibrated to match the economic and socio-demographic characteristics of the world in the year 2010. Then, we conduct a set of backcasting and nowcasting experiments, which consists in simulating bilateral migration stocks retrospectively or for very recent years, and in comparing the backcasts and nowcasts with observed migration stocks. We show that our backcasts and nowcasts fit very well the observed migration data. This suggests that our model can be used to identify the main sources of variation and to predict long-run migration trends.

Analyzing counterfactual historical trends with constant distributions of income, education level or population, we highlight the key role of demography. In LDCs, the total stock of emigrants increased almost at the same pace as the total population, leading to small fluctuations of the average emigration rate between 2.6 and 3.0%. As part of this emigration process, the average propensity to emigrate from LDCs to HICs has increased by less than one percentage point over half a century. These changes have been governed by several factors (such as conflicts, rising income disparities, rising education level, or changing migration costs). They are too small to explain the threefold increase in immigration experienced in the North. Population growth differential is the main factor that reconciles stable emigration patterns in LDCs with “explosive” immigration patterns in HICs. Over the last 50 years, population growth has been systematically greater in developing countries. Footnote 1 Our numerical experiments confirm that most of the historical changes in international migration are explained by population growth differentials between countries. In particular, the world migration stocks would have virtually been constant if the population size of developing countries had not changed. Importantly, this does not mean that convergence in income and education does not matter (as apparent from our forecasting experiments). It simply means that convergence has been way to small to counteract the effect of demography, whatever the calibration of the technology and the size of human capital externalities.

We then feed our calibrated model with exogenous socio-demographic scenarios, and produce micro-founded projections of migration stocks by education level for the 21st century. We are aware that the future of migration can be influenced by many unforeseeable factors (e.g., emergence of new attractive immigration centers, economic and demographic effects of global pandemics, geopolitical cataclysms, etc.). For example, only time will tell whether the current Covid-19 pandemic will transform migration dynamics and in which direction. Hence, the objective is not to predict future migration but to identify how the traditional root drivers of migration will affect migration trends all other things being equal.

In line with the backcasting exercise, we find that the future trends in international migration are mostly governed by socio-demographic changes (i.e., changes in population size and in educational attainment). Focusing on OECD member states, we foresee a highly robust increase in their proportion of immigrants. The magnitude of the change is highly insensitive to the technological environment, and to the education scenario. In particular, a rise in schooling in developing countries increases the average propensity to emigrate but also reduces population growth rates; as far as migrant stocks are concerned, these effects are balancing each other. Changes in educational attainment strongly affect the skill composition of future migration flows but have little effect on their size. Overall, under constant immigration policies, the average share of immigrants in OECD countries increases from 12 to 25–28% during the 21st century. Given their magnitude, expected changes in immigration are henceforth referred to as migration pressures , although we do not make any value judgments about their desirability or about their welfare effects within the sending and receiving countries. This surge is mostly due to rising migration flows from sub-Saharan Africa, from the Middle East, and from a few Asian countries. Expected immigration pressures are greater in European countries (+21.2 percentage points) than in the United States (+14.3 percentage points). The greatest variations in immigration rates are observed in the United Kingdom, France, Spain; Canada is also strongly affected.

Curbing such migration pressures is difficult. Sealed borders are virtually needed to keep future migration stocks at their current level. Such drastic restrictive policies are unlikely to be implementable if the basic right to family reunification is respected. Turning our attention to development policies, we show that keeping their total emigration stock constant requires triggering unprecedented economic takeoffs.

Our paper speaks to the literature on long-term migration forces. The interdependencies between migration, population and income have rarely been accounted for in projection exercises. The demographic projections of the United Nations do not anticipate the economic and demographic forces that shape migration flows. Footnote 2 The Wittgenstein projections rely on a more complex methodology that consists of a set of probabilities to emigrate (or to immigrate) multiplied by the native population levels in the origin countries but imperfectly account for interdependencies between migration and economic variables (Lutz et al. 2017 ). Footnote 3 Hatton and Williamson ( 2003 ) examine the determinants of net emigration from Africa using a panel of 21 countries between 1977 and 1995, then subsequently use the regression estimates to predict an intensification of migration from Africa by the year 2025. From the receiving countries’ perspective, Hatton and Williamson ( 2011 ) identify the various drivers of emigration rates from developing countries to the United States from 1970 to 2004, and find abating signs of migration from Latin America and Asia to the United States while rising trend will continue in Africa. Hanson and McIntosh ( 2016 ) use empirical regressions to establish a link between changes in the demographic size/structure at origin and emigration flows. Ignoring changes in education levels and considering an exogenous economic environment, they show that the African migration pressures will mostly affect European countries until the mid-21st century.

The common feature of the present study is the use of past observations and exogenous demographic forecasts to project future migration. Our contribution is threefold. First, in terms of modeling, our paper builds on a general equilibrium framework which accounts for the interactions between migration decisions, productivity and wage disparities. Our migration projections are demographically and economically rooted. They result from a micro-founded migration technology and are compatible with the endogenous evolution of income disparities. Second, the use of a random utility specification allows allocating the world labor across multiple corridors as a function of the relative attractiveness of all destinations. Third, in terms of country coverage, our world-economy model includes the majority of countries in the world (i.e., 180 countries). The simulation results therefore offer a better overview of future global migration, although we acknowledge that migrant concentrate in a small number of corridors. Footnote 4

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model, defines its competitive equilibrium, and discusses its parameterization. Section 3 presents the results of the backcasting and nowcasting exercises. Forecasts are then provided in Sect.  4 . Finally, Sect.  5 concludes.

The model depicts an abstract economy with two classes of workers and J countries \((j=1,\ldots ,J)\) . The skill type s is equal to h for college graduates, and to l for the less educated. We first describe the migration technology, which determines the condition under which migration to a destination country j is profitable for type- s workers born in country i . We then describe the production technology, which determines wage disparities. The combination of endogenous migration decisions and equilibrium wages jointly determines the world distribution of income and the allocation of the world population. Finally, we discuss some important simplifying assumptions of the model and explain how we calibrate it to match migration, economic and socio-demographic data for the year 2010.

Migration technology At each period t , the number of working age natives of type s and originating from country i is denoted by \(N_{i,s,t}\) . Each native decides whether to emigrate to another country or to stay in their home country; the number of migrants from i to j is denoted by \(M_{ij,s,t}\) (hence, \(M_{ii,s,t}\) represents the number of non-migrants). After migration, the resident labor force of type s in country j is given by \(L_{j,s,t}\) .

Individual decisions to emigrate result from the comparison of discrete alternatives. To model them, we use a standard Random Utility Model (RUM) with a deterministic and a random component. The deterministic component is assumed to be logarithmic in income and to include an exogenous dyadic component. Footnote 5 At time t , the utility of a type- s individual born in country i and living in country j is given by:

where \(w_{j,s,t}\) denotes the wage rate attainable in the destination country j ; \(\widetilde{\gamma }\) is a parameter governing the marginal utility of income; \(v_{ij,s,t}\) stands for the non-wage income and amenities in country j (public goods, non-monetary amenities, and transfers minus taxes) and is netted from the legal and private costs of moving from i to j ; \(\xi _{ij,s,t}\) is the random taste component capturing heterogeneity in the preferences for alternative locations, in mobility costs, in assimilation costs, etc. This random component guarantees that individuals make heterogeneous location decisions, and cross-migration flows are possible.

The utility obtained when the same individual stays in his origin country is given by:

The random term \(\xi _{ij,s,t}\) is assumed to follow an iid extreme-value distribution of type I with scale parameter \(\mu \) . Footnote 6 Under this hypothesis, the probability that a type- s individual born in country i moving to country j is given by the following logit expression (McFadden 1984 ):

Hence, the emigration rate from i to j depends on the characteristics of all potential destinations k . The staying rates ( \(\frac{M_{ii,s,t}}{N_{i,s,t}}\) ) are governed by the same logit expression. It follows that the emigrant-to-stayer ratio is given by:

where \(\gamma \equiv \frac{\widetilde{\gamma }}{\mu }\) , the elasticity of migration choices to wage disparities, is a combination of preference and distribution parameters, and \(V_{ij,s,t}\equiv \left( \frac{v_{ij,s,t}}{v_{ii,s,t}}\right) ^{1/\mu }\) is a scale factor of the migration technology. The ratio of emigrants from i to j to stayers only depends on the characteristics of the two countries.

Production technology Income is determined based on an aggregate production function. Each country has a large number of competitive firms characterized by the same production technology and producing a homogenous good. The output in country j , \(Y_{j,t}\) , is a multiplicative function of the total quantity of labor in efficiency units, denoted by \(L_{j,T,t}\) , supplied by low-skilled and high-skilled workers by a “modified” total factor productivity (referred to as TFP henceforth), \(A_{j,t}\) . Footnote 7 Following the recent literature on labor markets, immigration and growth, Footnote 8 we assume that labor in efficiency units is a CES function of the number of college-educated and less educated workers employed. We have:

where \(\theta _{j,s,t}\) is the country and time-specific value share parameter for workers of type s (such that \(\theta _{j,h,t}+\theta _{j,l,t}=1\) ), and \(\sigma \) is the common elasticity of substitution between the two groups of workers.

Firms maximize profits and the labor market is competitive. The equilibrium wage rate for type- s workers in country j is equal to the marginal productivity of labor:

Hence, the wage ratio between college graduates and less educated workers is given by:

As long as this ratio is greater than one, a rise in human capital increases the average productivity of workers. Furthermore, greater contributions of human capital to productivity can be obtained by assuming technological externalities. Two types of technological externality are factored in. First, we consider a simple Lucas-type, aggregate externality (Lucas 1988 ) and assume that the TFP scale factor in each sector is a concave function of the skill-ratio in the resident labor force. This externality captures the fact that educated workers facilitate innovation and the adoption of advanced technologies. Its size has been the focus of many recent articles and has generated a certain level of debate. Using data from US cities (Moretti 2004 ) or US states (Acemoglu and Angrist 2000 ; Iranzo and Peri 2009 ), some instrumental-variable approaches give substantial externalities (Moretti 2004 ) while others do not (Acemoglu and Angrist 2000 ). In the empirical growth literature, there is evidence of a positive effect of schooling on innovation and technology diffusion (Benhabib and Spiegel 1994 ; Caselli et al. 2006 ; Ciccone and Papaioannou 2009 ). In parallel, another set of contributions highlights the effect of human capital on the quality of institutions (Castelló-Climent 2008 ; Bobba and Coviello 2007 ; Murtin and Wacziarg 2014 ). We write:

where \(\lambda _{t}\) captures the worldwide time variations in productivity (common to all countries), \(\overline{A}_{j}\) is the exogenous country-specific component of TFP in country j (reflecting exogenous factors such as arable land, climate, geography, etc.), and \(\epsilon \) is the elasticity of TFP to the skill ratio.

Second, we assume skill-biased technical change. As technology improves, the relative productivity of high-skilled workers increases (Acemoglu 2002 ; Restuccia and Vandenbroucke 2013 ). For example, Autor et al. ( 2003 ) show that computerization is associated with a declining relative demand in industry for routine manual and cognitive tasks, and increased relative demand for non-routine cognitive tasks. The observed relative demand shift favors college versus non-college labor. We write:

where \(\overline{Q}_{j}\) is the exogenous country-specific component of the skill bias in productivity in country j , and \(\kappa \) is the elasticity of the skill bias to the skill ratio.

Competitive equilibrium The link between the native and resident population is tautological:

The dynamics of the world economy is governed by a succession of temporary equilibria defined as:

Definition – For a set \(\left\{ \gamma ,\sigma ,\epsilon ,\kappa ,\lambda _{t}\right\} \) of common parameters, a set \(\left\{ \overline{A}_{j},\overline{Q}_{j}\right\} _{\forall j}\) of country-specific parameters, a set \(\left\{ V_{ij,s,t}\right\} _{\forall i,j,s}\) of bilateral (net) migration costs, and for given distribution of the native population \(\left\{ N_{j,s,t}\right\} _{\forall j,s}\) , a temporary competitive equilibrium for period t is an allocation of labor \(\left\{ M_{ij,s,t}\right\} _{\forall i,j,s}\) and a vector of wages \(\left\{ w_{j,s,t}\right\} _{\forall j,s}\) satisfying (i) utility maximization conditions, Eq. ( 4 ), (ii) profit maximization conditions, Eq. ( 6 ), (iii) technological constraints, Eqs. ( 8 ) and ( 9 ), and (iv) the aggregation constraints, Eq. ( 10 ).

A temporary equilibrium allocation of labor is characterized by a system of \(2\times J\times (J+1)\) i.e., \(2\times J\times (J-1)\) bilateral ratio of migrants to stayers, \(2\times J\) wage rates, and \(2\times J\) aggregation constraints. In the next sub-sections, we use data for 180 countries (developed and developing independent territories) and explain how we parameterize our system of 65,160 simultaneous equations per period. Once properly calibrated, this model can be used to conduct a large variety of numerical experiments.

Parameterization for the year 2010 The year 2010 is the most recent year for which skill-specific matrices of bilateral migration stocks are available. The model can be parameterized to match the economic and socio-demographic characteristics of 180 countries as in the year 2010.

Regarding the production technology, we collect data on GDP in PPP values ( \(Y_{j,2010}\) ) from the Maddison’s project described in Bolt and Van Zanden ( 2014 ), and combine them with data on the size and structure of the labor force from the Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human Capital ( \(L_{j,s,2010}\) ), and data on the wage ratio between college graduates and less educated workers, \(\frac{w_{j,h,2010}}{w_{j,l,2010}}\) , from Hendricks ( 2004 ). Footnote 9 The labor force is proxied by population aged 25 to 64. Using these data, we proceed in three steps to calibrate the production technology. First, in line with the labor market literature (Ottaviano and Peri 2012 ; Angrist 1995 ), we assume that the elasticity of substitution between college-educated and less educated workers, \(\sigma \) , is equal to 2 or 3. Second, for a given \(\sigma \) , we calibrate the ratio of value shares, \(\frac{\theta _{j,h,2010}}{\theta _{j,l,2010}}\) , as a residual from Eq. ( 7 ) to match the observed wage ratio. Since \(\theta _{j,h}+\theta _{j,l}=1\) , this determines both \(\theta _{j,h,2010}\) and \(\theta _{j,l,2010}\) as well as the quantity of labor per efficiency unit, \(L_{j,T,2010}\) , defined in Eq. ( 5 ). Third, we use Eq. ( 5 ) and calibrate the TFP level, \(A_{j,2010}\) , to match the observed GDP and we normalize \(\lambda _{2010}\) to unity (without loss of generality). When simulating the model backward or forward (see below), we consider several variants for \(\epsilon \) and for \(\kappa \) , allowing the ratio of value shares and the TFP level vary with the skill ratio. When all technological parameters are calibrated, we use Eq. ( 6 ) to proxy the wage rates for each skill group.

As for the migration technology, we use the DIOC-E database of the OECD. DIOC-E builds on the Database on Immigrants in OECD countries (DIOC) described in Arslan et al. ( 2015 ) where migrants are defined as foreign-born population. The data are collected by country of destination and are mainly based on population censuses or administrative registers. The DIOC database provides detailed information on the country of origin, demographic characteristics and level of education of the population of 34 OECD member states. DIOC-E extends the latter by characterizing the structure of the population of 86 non-OECD destination countries. Focusing on the populations aged 25 to 64, we thus end up with matrices of bilateral migration from 180 origin countries to 120 destination countries (34 OECD + 86 non-OECD countries) by education level, as well as proxies for the native population ( \(N_{i,s,2010}\) ). We assume that immigration stocks in the 60 missing countries are zero, which allows us to compute comprehensive migration matrices. Footnote 10

Regarding the elasticity of bilateral migration to the wage ratio, \(\gamma \) , Bertoli and Moraga Fernandez-Huertas ( 2013 ) find a value between 0.6 and 0.7. We use 0.7 as a benchmark but other values (0.5 or 1.0) are considered in our robustness checks. Finally, we calibrate \(V_{ij,s,2010}\) as a residual of Eq. ( 4 ) to match the observed ratio of bilateral migrants to stayers. In Appendix A, we show that the calibrated scale factors are negatively correlated with standard determinants of migration costs such as geographic distance, migration policy, etc.

In sum, the migration and technology parameters are such that our model perfectly matches the world distribution of income, the world population allocation and skill structure as well as bilateral migration stocks as of the year 2010.

Caveats Our model relies on simplifying assumptions that may, at first, seem unrealistic but do not, arguably, invalidate our results. Firstly, although one period is meant to represent 10 years, we assume a “drawing-with-replacement” migration process. This means that we ignore path dependency in migration decisions (i.e., having migrated to country j at time t influences the individual location at time \(t+1\) ), as if all migrants returned to their home country at the end of each period t , and made new migration decisions at the beginning of period \(t+1\) . This simplification is compatible with the existence of both temporary and permanent migrants although it disregards differences between them. This “drawing-with-replacement” migration hypothesis allows us to model the trends in migration stocks as a simple function of concomitant population trends and without keeping track of the entire log of past migration flows. Footnote 11 This is why we can compute the competitive equilibrium as a succession of temporary equilibria.

Secondly, the migration technology is calibrated using migration stock data, which are assumed to reflect the long-run migration equilibrium. This implies that the calibrated values for \(V_{ij,s,t}\) implicitly account for net amenity differentials, private and visa costs of migration, and network effects (i.e., the effect of past migration stocks on migration flows). Migration costs are expressed as a disutility. They include monetary moving costs (e.g., passport and travel costs) a well as utility-loss equivalents of migration quotas (similar to tariff equivalent of non-tariff barriers in trade). These costs are treated as exogenous. Footnote 12

Thirdly, the model is calibrated to match labor force and migration stock data by education level, assuming that these stocks are proxied by the number of individuals aged 25–64. We thus consider individuals aged 25–64 as a homogenous group and abstract from the heterogeneity in the propensity to migrate across age groups. We are aware that individuals aged 20–34 are more migratory than older age groups (Hatton and Williamson 1998 ; UNDESA 2013 ) due to higher present values of migration in intertemporal utility function (Hatton and Williamson 2011 ; Djajic et al. 2016 ). However, in Appendix A, we show that the past variations in the population aged 20–34 are highly correlated with past variations in the population aged 25–64. The correlation equals 0.77 over the period 1970–2010 and the slope of the regression line is close to unity. Similarly, when using the medium variant of the UN population projections, this correlation equals 0.70 over the long period of 2010–2100. Hence, variations in the population aged 25 to 64 capture well the migration pressures related to demographic factors.

Fourthly, our model without physical capital features a globalized economy with a common international interest rate. This hypothesis is in line with Kennan ( 2013 ) or Klein and Ventura ( 2009 ) who assume that capital “chases” labor. Footnote 13 Eq. ( 5 ) can be seen as the reduced form of a system of two equations, a first-stage production function with capital and labor (e.g., in the Cobb-Douglas case, \(Y_{j,t}= \tilde{A}_{j,t} K_{j,t}^{\alpha } L_{j,T,t}^{1-\alpha }\) where \(\tilde{A}_{j,t}\) is the actual TFP level of country j at time t ) and an arbitrage condition implying that the interest rates are equalized across countries ( \(R_{t}= \tilde{A}_{j,t} \alpha K_{j,t}^{\alpha -1} L_{j,T,t}^{1-\alpha }\) ). Substituting the arbitrage equation into the first-stage production function gives Eq. ( 5 ), in which the “modified” TFP level is defined as \(A_{j,t} = \tilde{A}_{j,t}^{1/(1-\alpha )}(\alpha /R_{t})^{\alpha /(1-\alpha )}\) . Clearly, changes in the international interest rate \(R_{t}\) or multiplicative changes in TFP level (due to exogenous technological progress, \(\lambda _{t}\) ) have no effect on the ratio of “modified” TFP and on the ratio of wage rates between two countries. From Eq. ( 4 ), they have no effect on migration behaviors.

3 Backcasting and nowcasting

Our first objective is to gauge the ability of our model to replicate aggregate historical and contemporaneous migration data as well as to backcast the educational structure of past migration stocks. In our backcasting exercises, we use the model to simulate retrospectively bilateral migration stocks by education level, and compare the results with proxies of observed migration stocks for the years 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000. Footnote 14 Similarly, we test the performance of our nowcasts by comparing the data predicted by our model for the year of 2020 with the most recent migration data of 2019 obtained from the United Nations Global migration database. To do so, we feed the model with two types of inputs, namely skill-specific wage rates and levels of the native (pre-migration) population for all countries. In the nowcasting simulation, we use the population estimates for 2020 from Lutz et al. ( 2017 ), as in the forecasting section. Footnote 15 These backasting and nowcasting exercises shed light on the relevance our parameterization strategy (i.e. what value for \(\gamma \) , \(\sigma \) and \(\kappa \) should be favored?) and on the role of socio-demographic and technological changes in explaining the aggregate variations in past migration.

Worldwide migration stocks Figure 1 illustrates the backcasting and nowcasting results obtained for the worldwide stock of working-age migrants in our benchmark scenario with \(\gamma = 0.7\) , \(\sigma = 2\) , and \(\kappa = 0.214\) . In particular, Fig.  1 a compares the evolution of actual and predicted worldwide migration stocks by decade for the year 1970 to 2020. For the \(180\times 120\) corridors, the (rescaled) data gives a stock of 55 million migrants aged 25 to 64 in 1970, 120 million migrants in 2010, and 141 million migrants in 2020. Our benchmark model almost exactly matches this evolution. By construction, the model perfectly matches the 2010 data. Interestingly, it almost perfectly matches the data for the years 1970 and 2020, Footnote 16 while it slightly overestimates the stock in 1980, 1990 and 2000.

We see this result as evidencing the realism of the model. In Appendix C.2, we check whether the model’s aggregate performance depends on the parameter set. We produce backcasts under 18 scenarios, considering three possible values for \(\gamma \) (0.5, 0.7 and 1.0), two possible values for \(\sigma \) (2.0 and 3.0) and three possible values for \(\kappa \) (0, half the estimated elasticity of the value shares to the skill ratio, and 100% of the estimated elasticity). Figure C.1 shows that the model with \(\gamma = 0.7\) gives the best fit. Assuming \(\gamma = 1.0\) leads to an overestimation of past migrant stocks, while \(\gamma = 0.5\) leads to an underestimation. By contrast, our backcasts are fairly robust to the choice of \(\sigma \) , the elasticity of substitution between workers, and of \(\kappa \) , the skill-biased externality. Although technological variants drastically affect within-country income disparities (in particular, the wage ratio between college graduates and the less educated), they have negligible effects on aggregate migration stocks. This is due to the fact that income disparities are mostly governed by between-country inequality (i.e., by the TFP levels, which are calibrated under each scenario to match the average levels of income per worker), and that the worldwide proportion of college graduates is so small that changes in their migration propensity have negligible effects on the aggregate.

Coming back to the benchmark scenario with \(\gamma =0.7\) , \(\sigma =2\) and \(\kappa =0.214\) , Fig.  1 b compares our backcasts for the years 1970 to 2000 with counterfactual retrospective simulations. The first counterfactual neutralizes demographic changes that occurred between 1970 and 2010; it assumes that the size of the working age population is kept constant at the 2010 level in all countries. The second counterfactual neutralizes the changes in education; it assumes that the share of college graduates is kept constant in all countries. The third counterfactual neutralizes the changes in income disparities; it assumes constant wage rates in all countries.

On the one hand, the simulations reveal that past changes/rises in education marginally increased the worldwide migration stock, while the past changes/decreases in income inequality marginally reduced it. These effects are quantitatively small, which does not mean that cross-country disparities in education and income have no influence on migration trends. It is because past changes in human capital has been limited in poor countries, and income disparities have been stable for the last fifty years (with the exception of emerging countries). Hence, the contribution of these two factors has been limited.

On the other hand, Fig.  1 b shows that demographic changes explains a large amount of the variability in migration stocks. The number of worldwide migrants in 1970 would have almost been equal to the current stocks (in fact, it would have been 2% smaller only) if the population size of each country had been identical to the current level. This confirms that past changes in aggregate migrant stocks were predominantly governed by population growth in LDCs and demographic imbalances. Indeed, the population ratio between developing and high-income countries increased from 3.5 in 1970 to 5.5 in 2010.

Actual and predicted migrant stocks (in million). a Actual and predicted migrant stocks, 1970–2020. b Counterfactual historical stocks, 1970–2010. Note : Fig. a compares actual and predicted stocks of working-aged migrants. To obtain the actual working-age migrant stocks, we use the share of working-aged migrants in 2010 to rescale the total migrant stocks from Ozden et al. ( 2011 ) for the years 1960–2000 and from the UNPOP database for the year 2020. Predicted migrants stocks are computed from the scenario in which \(\gamma = 0.7\) , \(\sigma = 2\) , and \(\kappa = 0.214\) . In Fig. b , the first counterfactual keeps the size of the working-age population constant at the 2010 level in all countries. The second counterfactual keeps the share of college graduates constant at the 2010 level in all countries. The third counterfactual keeps wage rates constant at the 2010 level in all countries

Bilateral migration backcasts We now investigate the capacity of the model to match the decadal distributions of immigrant stocks by destination, and the decadal distributions of emigrant stocks by origin. Figure 2 provides a graphical visualization of the goodness of fit by comparing the observed and simulated bilateral stocks of immigrants and emigrants for each decade. Footnote 17

By construction, as the observed past immigration stocks of all ages are scaled to match the working-age ones in 2010, the predicted immigrant stocks are perfectly matched in that year. For previous years, the correlation is unsurprisingly smaller; it decreases with the distance from the year 2010. This is because our model does neither identify past variations in migration policies (e.g. the Schengen agreement in the European Union, changes in the H1B visa policy in the US, the points-system schemes in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, guest worker programs in the Persian Gulf, etc.) nor past changes in net amenities and non-pecuniary push/pull factors (e.g., conflicts, political unrest, etc.). The biggest gaps between the observed and predicted migration stocks recorded in our data come from the non-consideration of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the French-Algerian war and of the Vietnam war, the conflict between Cuba and the US. In addition, the model imperfectly predicts the evolution of intra-EU migration, the evolution of labor mobility to Persian Gulf countries, the evolution of migrant stocks from developing countries to the US, Canada and Australia, and the evolution of immigration to Israel (especially the flows of Russian Jews after the late 1980—the so-called Post-Soviet aliyah).

Yet, the scatterplots on Fig. 2 show high correlations between the observed and predicted bilateral migration volumes throughout all decades. The lowest reported R-squared are 0.76 for immigrant stocks and 0.69 for emigrant stocks in 1970. These numbers reach 0.93 and 0.90, respectively, for the years 2000 and 2020. This demonstrates that the constant \(V_{ij}\) hypothesis does a good job on average despite big changes in immigration policies in the past whose restrictiveness was either increasing or decreasing. Footnote 18 In the former case, it may be that stricter entry policies have been balanced by increasing network effects.

As far as the technological variants are concerned, Table C.1 in Appendix C.2 confirms that they play a negligible role. The correlation between variants is always around 0.99. The variant with \(\sigma =2\) and no skill-biased externality marginally outperforms the others in replicating immigrant stocks; the one with \(\sigma =3\) and with skill biased externalities does a slightly better job in matching emigrant stocks. Hence, the backcasting exercise shows that our model does an excellent job in explaining the long term evolution of migration stocks; however, it does not help eliminate irrelevant technological scenarios. Regressing the log of actual immigration stocks on their predicted levels per decade, we obtain regression coefficients that are not significantly different from unity, with standard errors around 0.004 for the years 2000 and 2020, around 0.006 for 1990, 0.008 for 1980 and 0.010 for 1970. Roughly speaking, this means that the 95% confidence interval surrounding our predictions increases by about 0.4% per decade departing from 2010. For 1970 (4 decades before the calibration year), there is a 95% probability that the observed migration stocks are comprised between 98 and 102% of our predicted levels.

Comparison between actual and predicted migrant stocks, 1970–2020 a Immigrant stocks by dest. (in logs). b Emigrant stocks by origin (in logs). Note : Authors’ computations based on the variant with \(\gamma =0.7\) , \(\sigma =2\) and \(\kappa = 0.214\)

Backcasts by skill group Data on migration stocks by educational level are available for a few decades only. The DIOC database of Arslan et al. ( 2015 ) provides homogeneous data for the census rounds 2000 and 2010. In Appendix C.2, we show that our model replicates well the changes in the educational structure of migration stocks observed between two census rounds. As migration data by skill group do not exist for earlier periods, we use our model to backcast the global net flows of college-educated and less educated workers between regions. We use the scenario with \(\gamma =0.7\) , \(\sigma =2\) and with full skill-biased externalities. Footnote 19 For each pair of countries, we compute the net flow as the difference between the stock of migrants in 2010 and that of 1970, \(\Delta M_{ij,s}\equiv M_{ij,s,2010}-M_{ij,s,1970}\) . These net flows form the matrix \({\mathcal {M}}\) . On Fig.  3 , we group countries into eight regions and use circular ideograms following Krzywinski et al. ( 2009 ) to highlight the major components of \({\mathcal {M}}\) . Net flows are colored according to their origin, and their width is proportional to their size. The direction of the flow is captured by the colors of the outside (i.e., country of origin) and inside (i.e., country of destination) borders of the circle.

We also characterize the clusters of origins and destinations that caused the greatest variations in global migration between 1970 and 2010. Using the same matrix of migration net flows as above (denoted by \({\mathcal {M}}\) and including the \(J\times J\) net flows between 1970 and 2010, \(\Delta M_{ij,s}\) ). We use the Max-Sum Submatrix algorithm defined in Appendix B, a standard tool in applied mathematics which is used to identify the sub-matrix with a fixed dimension \(o\times d\) that maximizes the total migration net flows (i.e., that captures the greatest fraction of the worldwide variations in migration stocks).

Figure 3 a focuses on the net flows of less educated workers. The net flow of low-skilled immigrants equals 35.2 million over the 1970–2010 period. The ten main regional corridors account for 79% of the total, and industrialized regions appear 6 times as a main destination. By decreasing the order of magnitude, they include Latin America to North America (27.6%), migration within the South and East Asian region (13%), from MENA to Europe (6.8%), migration between former Soviet countries (5.2%), migration within sub-Saharan Africa (5.1%), intra-European movements (4.5%), Latin America to Europe (4.4%), South and East Asia to Western offshoots (4.2%), Others to Europe (4.0%), and migration between Latin American countries (4.0%). It is worth noting the low-skilled mobility from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe is not part of the top ten: it only represents 3.8% of the total (the 11th largest regional corridor). Applying the Max-Sum submatrix problem to the net flows of low-skilled migrants, we can identify the 25 origins and the 25 destinations (625 entries) that account for 64% of the worldwide net flows of low-skilled migrants between 1970 and 2010.

The 25 main destinations (in alphabetical order) are: Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Canada, Dominican Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, India, Israel, Italy, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nepal, the Netherlands, Oman, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Thailand, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Venezuela.

The 25 main origins (in alphabetical order) are: Albania, Algeria, Bangladesh, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Morocco, Myanmar, Pakistan, the Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.

Global migration net flows, 1970–2010. a Less educated workers. b College-educated workers. Regions: Europe (in dark blue), Western offshoots (NAM in light blue)(These include the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand),the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA in red), sub-Saharan Africa (SSA in yellow), South and East Asia including South and South-East Asia (SEA in pink), the former Soviet countries (CIS in orange), Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC in grey), and Others (OTH in green). Net flows are colored according to their origin, and their width is proportional to their size. The direction of the flow is captured by the colors of the outside (i.e., country of origin) and inside (i.e., country of destination) borders of the circle (color figure online)

Figure 3 b represents the net flows of college graduates. The net flow of high-skilled immigrants equals 27.6 million over the 1970–2010 period. The ten main regional corridors account for 74% of the total. A major difference with the low-skilled is that industrialized regions appear 9 times as a main destination, at least if we treat the Persian Gulf countries (as part of the MENA region) as industrialized. By decreasing order of magnitude, the top-10 includes South and East Asia to Western offshoots (19.8% of the total), intra-European movements (10.7%), migration between former Soviet countries (10.5%), Latin America to Western offshoots (9.7%), Europe to Western offshoots (6.5%), South and East Asia to Europe (4.6%), MENA to Europe (3.3%), sub-Saharan Africa to Europe (3.2%), South and East Asia to the MENA (3.1%), and Latin America to Europe (2.9%). Applying the Max-Sum submatrix problem to the net flows of low-skilled migrants, the set of main destinations mostly includes high-income countries. The 625 entries of the Max-sum submatrix account for 55% of the worldwide net flow of college-educated migrants between 1970 and 2010.

The 25 main destinations (in alphabetical order) are: Australia, Austria, Belarus, Canada, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Oman, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The 25 main origins (in alphabetical order) are: Algeria, Bangladesh, Canada, China, Colombia, Egypt, France, Germany, India, Iran, Japan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, the Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, South Korea, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, the United States, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.

Overall, as shown in the left panel of Table 2 below, the model predicts that the proportion of college graduates in the total immigrant stocks of the OECD countries rose from 13.3 to 34.0% between 1970 and 2010. It increased from 10.8 to 28.4% in EU15, from 13.9 to 34.4% in the United States. Larger changes were observed in Canada, Australia or the United Kingdom.

4 Forecasting

We now use the parameterized model to produce projections of migration stocks and income disparities for the 21st century. Availability of population projections until the end of the century allows us to systematically predict migration for that entire period, though the longer the distance from 2010, the more uncertain are our projections. Extrapolating insights from our backcasting exercice, there would be a 95% probability that actual migration stocks will be comprised between 98 and 102% of our predicted levels 40 years after the calibration year (i.e., in 2050), and between 95 and 105% of our predicted stock around the year 2100 (as the confidence interval increases by 0.4% per decade). This is at least what we obtain when the spatial and socio-demographic structure of the world population is observable. Hence, when turning our attention to forecasts, an additional source of uncertainty relates to the evolution of other socio-demographic variables. Below, we first describe our two main projection scenarios. We then discuss the global trends in international migration and income inequality generated by these two scenarios, with a special focus on migration flows to OECD countries, before discussing the policy options than can be used to curb future migration pressures.

Projection scenarios We feed our model with two socio-demographic scenarios obtained from the Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human Capital (Lutz et al. 2017 ). Footnote 20 The so-called Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) have been designed to capture future trends with respect to education, fertility, mortality and socioeconomic challenges (e.g., climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies). We use two scenarios, SSP2 and SSP3, that involve a strong negative association between the level of (female) education and both fertility and (child) mortality rates. The empowerment of women through education is key: it translates into significant changes in attitudes and behaviors. In high fertility countries it brings down birth rates and improves the survival of children. However, the effect of this better education on population growth is delayed because of two factors. First, if more girls get educated today, the effect on fertility will occur some 15 years later, when they will be in their child-bearing years. Second, the decrease in fertility rates does not translate immediately into falling absolute numbers of births because of the large age-structural momentum of population growth. Hence, differences between the two scenarios become visible only after a few decades (after 2050). SSP2 and SSP3 are defined below (Lutz et al. 2017 ):

Scenario SSP2 (Continuation/Medium Population Scenario) is “the middle-of-the-road scenario in which trends typical of recent decades continue, with some progress toward achieving development goals [...]. Development of low income countries is uneven, with some countries making good progress, while others make less.” It is assumed that each country will follow the average path of school expansion that advanced countries have experienced.

Scenario SSP3 (Fragmentation/Stalled Social Development) “portrays a world separated into regions characterized by extreme poverty, pockets of moderate wealth, and many countries struggling to maintain living standards for rapidly growing populations.” SSP3 is based upon the assumption that everywhere the most recently observed rates of school enrolment are frozen at their current levels. As compared with SSP2, SSP3 is characterized by an higher increase in the world population together with a lower educational level, and delayed demographic transition (higher fertility and mortality rates).

In the benchmark simulations, we also assume constant migration costs and amenity differentials \(V_{ij,s,2010}\) —which appears to be a reasonable working hypothesis in the backcasting exercise—and a constant technological progress of 1.5% per year. The latter hypothesis has no incidence on migration decisions as it affects all countries in a symmetric way. The hypothesis of constant migration costs will be relaxed in the end of the section. Our forecasts do not account for future conflict, climate shocks or natural disasters. Footnote 21 Future efforts should incorporate those elements. Finally, we acknowledge the reverse impacts of migration on population growth in sending countries due to change in demographic structure and transfer of reproductive norms. They are however not accounted for in this paper, which takes socio-demographic scenarios as given in order to analyze their effects on income and migration.

Global implications We first highlight the implications of these two socio-demographic scenarios for income growth, global inequality and migration pressures. The global income and migration forecasts are depicted on Fig.  4 , which combines the data for the period 1970–2010, and the model forecasts for the subsequent years. Two scenarios of SSP2 and SSP3 are presented in this Fig.  4 , both with \(\sigma = 2.0\) , \(\gamma = 0.7\) , and full technological externalities, i.e. \(\kappa = 0.214\) and \(\epsilon = 0.207\) . Footnote 22

Global income and migration forecasts, 1970–2100. a World GDP per worker. b Theil index. c World proportion of migrants. d Share of college-educated migrants. e Emigration rates from developing countries. f Immigration rate to OECD countries. Note : Authors’ computations based on the variant with \(\gamma =0.7\) , \(\sigma =2\) and \(\kappa =0.214\)

Let us first focus on income projections. Figure 4 a shows the evolution of the worldwide level of GDP per worker. Under SSP3, the average GDP/worker in 2050 is 1.5 times higher than the level of 2010 (and 2.4 times greater in 2100). Under SSP2 and due to the rise in the level of schooling, the average GDP/worker in 2050 is twice as high as the level of 2010 (and 3.5 times greater in 2100). Footnote 23 Figure 4 b describes the evolution of the Theil index between 1970 and 2100. We combine our backcasts, nowcasts and forecasts, and account for between-country inequality and within-country inequality (between the college-educated and less educated representative workers, only). Globally, we show that the Theil index decreases from 1970 to 2010, a phenomenon that can be due to convergence in the productivity scale factors between high-income and emerging countries. Our projections do not account for convergence forces that are not driven by human capital. Under SSP2, the model predicts that the Theil index is constant over time, or is increasing slightly when externalities are included. Under SSP3, we predict an increase in the Theil index.

Figure 4 c, d depict the evolution of the worldwide proportion of international migrants and of the skill structure of migration. Under SSP3, the proportion of migrants (ranging from 3.6 and 3.9%) and the share of college-educated (around 30%) are fairly stable. By contrast, under SSP2, progress in education makes people more mobile. Under constant migration policies, the proportion of migrants increases from 3.6% in 2010 to 4.5% in 2050 and to 6.0% in 2100, and the share of college graduates increases from 29% in 2010 to 34% in 2050 and to 70% in 2100. It is worth noticing that the important gap between the worldwide proportions of migrants in SSP2 and SSP3 does not result from a big difference in terms of worldwide migrant volume. The global stock of migrants amounts to 117 million in 2010. Under SSP2, it reaches 205 million in 2050 and 257 million in 2100. Under SSP3, it equals 180 million in 2050 and 245 million in 2100. This is because SSP2 and SSP3 involves drastically different demographic trends in the developing world. In 2010, the working-age population is estimated at 3.28 billion. Under SSP2, it will reach 4.67 billion by 2050 and 4.29 billion by 2100. Under SSP3, it will reach 4.74 billion by 2050, and 6.26 billion by 2100.

As for the proportion of the high skill population, it should be recalled that our backcasts reveal that past changes in educational attainment were small in developing countries; they hardly affected the trajectory of global migration (see Fig. 1 b). Figure 4 d illustrates the marked effect of human capital trends. SPP2 predicts large educational changes in the coming decades, with strong implications for the skill structure of global migration. Footnote 24

We now focus on emigration and immigration rates, separately. Figure 4 e depicts the evolution of emigration rates, defined as the ratio of emigrants to natives originating from developing countries. The average emigration rate equals 3.1% in 2010. Under SSP2, it is predicted to reach 4.1% in 2050 and to be twice as large in the year 2100; under SSP3, it reaches 3.6% only by the end of the century. As explained above, the emigration rate is governed by the change in the average level of education in the developing world. Under SSP2 progress in education makes people more mobile (remember college graduates migrate more than the less educated). Under SSP3 emigration rates remain fairly stable over time given the slower progress in education. Similar patterns emerge from Fig. 4 c,e, suggesting that the world proportion of migrants is shaped by emigration rates from developing countries.

Finally, Fig. 4 f depicts the evolution of the average fraction of immigrants in OECD member states, defined as the proportion of foreign-born in the total population. This proportion equals 12% in the year 2010 and it is expected to increase drastically over the 21st century. Nevertheless, Figure D.2 in the Appendix D.2 points to a remarkable result that the magnitude of the change is highly insensitive to socio-demographic and technological scenarios. Under SSP3, emigration rates from developing countries vary little, but population growth is large. Under the SSP2 scenario, the rise in emigration rates is larger, but it is partly offset by the fall in the population growth rates of developing countries. Under SSP2, the share of immigrants to OECD countries reaches 19.2% by 2050, and 27.5% by 2100. Under SSP3, this number reaches 16.9% by 2050, and 24.6% by 2100.

Implications for HI countries Table 1 provides projections of immigration rates for the main high-income, destination countries under constant immigration policies. Remember this hypothesis performed well when producing backcasting results. Results obtained under the SSP2 socio-demographic scenario are presented in the top panel; results obtained under SSP3 are presented in the bottom panel. In both cases, we consider the variant with \(\sigma =2\) and full technological externalities, the scenario that is the most compatible with future educational changes. Footnote 25 Under SSP2, from 2010 to 2050, the proportion of immigrants increases from 14.5% to 24.7% (i.e. 10.2 percentage points) in the EU15 and from 17.7% to 26.7% (i.e. 9 percentage points) in the United States. Under SSP2 and over the 21st century, the proportion of immigrants increases by 21.2 percentage points in the EU15 and by 14.3 percentage points in the United States. The greatest variations are obtained for the United Kingdom and for Canada. Under SSP3, the average population growth rates are larger in developing countries, with the exception of Asia. The proportion of immigrants increases by 8.3 percentage points by 2050 and 24.3 percentage points by 2100 in the EU15, and by 7.6 percentage points by 2050 and 22.4 percentage points by the end of the century in the United States. The greatest variations are obtained for Spain, the United Kingdom and for Canada. Projections for the coming 50 years are farily robust to the socio-demographic scenario, and extremely robust to the technological scenario.

In line with Hanson and McIntosh ( 2016 ) or Docquier and Machado ( 2017 ), future migration pressures mainly affect European countries, and are mostly due to rising migration flows from developing countries. To illustrate this, we use the same Max-Sum Submatrix algorithm as in the previous section, and apply it to the matrix of total migration net flows from developing countries to the 27 members of the European Union between 2010 and 2060; projections for subsequent years are more uncertain and scenario-sensitive. For each socio-demographic scenario, we identify the sub-matrix with a fixed dimension of \(25\times 10\) that maximizes the total migration net flows.

Under the SSP2 scenario, we obtain the following results (in alphabetical order):

Main destination countries: Belgium, France, Germany , Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom .

Main countries of origin: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bangladesh , Cameroon, Dem. Rep. of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, India , Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Morocco , Mozambique, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Senegal, Somalia , Tanzania, Turkey, Uganda , and Zimbabwe.

And under the SSP3 scenario, we have (by alphabetical order):

Main destination countries: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom .

Main countries of origin: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bangladesh , Bolivia, Colombia, Dem. Rep. of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire , Ecuador, Ghana, India, Iraq , Kazakhstan, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan , Peru, Philippines, Senegal, Somalia, Turkey, and Uganda .

Under SSP2, migration flows from sub-Saharan Africa and from the MENA play a key role, as well as the flows from a few Asian countries with large populations. As the majority of African migrants go to Europe, the EU15 experience greater migration pressures. Under SSP3, this change is mostly due to immigration from Africa, although the magnitude of this phenomenon is smaller than under SSP2. However, migration pressures from Asia, from MENA, and from some Latin American countries are stronger. Clearly, there is a large intersection of 9 destination countries (see countries in italics above) that are all member states of the EU15, and for which future migration pressures are expected to be strong, whatever the socio-demographic scenario for the coming half century. And there is large intersection of 20 developing countries (in italics above) that are responsible for such migration pressures, including sub-Saharan African countries, the MENA countries, and a few Asian countries.

Remarkably, the predicted rise in immigration to the main destination countries can be accompanied by a major change in its skill structure. Table 2 shows that the share of the highly skilled in the total number of immigrants to the main destination countries has always been increasing since 1970 and will continue to rise over the 21st century in the SSP2 scenario. By 2050, the share of high skilled will reach 49.7% in the EU15, 56.4% in the United States, 90.1% in Canada, and 68.5% in Australia. By the end of the century, this number will rise drastically to reach 75.1% in the EU15, 79.4% in the United States, 91.9% in Canada, and 85.2% in Australia. In other words, under SSP2 the number of immigrants to the main destinations will increase but they will also be more and more skilled. The situation differs with SSP3 where those numbers will sluggish and only increase by 1 or 2 percentage points compared to the current levels of 2010.

The case for migration restrictions We finally turn our attention to the inescapable nature of these migration trends. To illustrate the difficulty of curbing future migration pressure with immigration restrictions, we computed the relative change in \(V_{ij}\) required to keep the dyadic and skill-specific migration stocks at their level of 2010 in the years 2020, 2030, 2040 and 2050. The scale factor \(V_{ij,s}\) , while not directly interpretable in monetary unit, is proportional to migration costs which are affected by many factors, among which the size of the dyadic migration stocks is one of its most important determinants identified in the literature. As the elasticity of \(V_{ij,s}\) to the network size is equal to 0.725 (see Table A.1 in the Appendix A), dividing the relative change in \(V_{ij,s}\) by 0.725 gives the relative change in the network size that is required to limit people’s incentives to emigrated and keep the stock of migrants constant. The average result for income groups and for the main migration corridors are depicted in Fig. 5 under the SSP2 scenario.

As SSP2 predicts a rise in human capital, future migration pressures are stronger among college graduates than among the less educated. Hence, keeping skill-specific migration stocks at their level of 2010 requires a drastic change in \(V_{ij,h}\) , and smaller changes in \(V_{ij,l}\) . Looking at broad income groups, changes in \(V_{ij,h}\) are equivalent to reducing the network size by 13 to 21%. However, looking at the largest migration corridors (Mexico to US and sub-Saharan African countries to the EU15), the fall in \(V_{ij,h}\) is usually close to 100% (and sometimes even higher) while the fall in \(V_{ij,l}\) varies between 19% in the case of Mexican migrants to the US, and 86% in case of African migrants to Germany. Under SSP3, similare changes in \(V_{ij,l}\) and \(V_{ij,l}\) are required to keep migration stocks constant. While it is difficult to translate these measures into migration policy variables, our results suggest that sealed borders are virtually needed to control future migration pressures, as it is the case during the current Covid-19 crisis. The target is likely unattainable if the basic right to family reunification is respected.

Migration policies to limit migration pressures (Expressed as equivalent variations in the dyadic network size required to keep skill-specific migration stocks constant) a SSP2. b SSP3. Note: We computed the relative change in the scale factor of the migration technology, \(\frac{\Delta V_{ij}}{V_{ij}}\) , required to keep bilateral migration stocks constant over the period 2010–2050. We express this change as an equivalent decrease in the network size using \(\frac{\Delta V_{ij}}{V_{ij}}=0.725 \times \frac{\Delta Netw_{ij}}{Netw_{ij}}\) . Results for college graduates (in dark gray) and the the less educated (in light gray) are thus expressed in terms of \(\frac{\Delta Netw_{ij}}{Netw_{ij}}\)

The case for development policies Under the European Migration Compacts, Footnote 26 an investment plan has also been proposed to stimulate employment opportunities and income in Africa, in the hope of reducing migration pressures. The effectiveness of these Migration Compacts depends on the resources allocated to their implementation (in comparison to the development targets to be reached), and on the effectiveness of the measures undertaken. To illustrate the difficulty curbing future migration pressure with development policies, we consider the intersection of 20 developing countries emerging from our Max-Sum Submatrix problem (referred to as Compact 1 ), Footnote 27 or the combined region of sub-Saharan African and the MENA countries (referred to as Compact 2 ). We consider these sets of countries as potential partners of a Migration Compact, and we quantify the homothetic change in TFP (above normal trend) and derive the consequent GDP annual growth rates required to keep their total emigration stocks to Europe at their levels of 2010. Our simulations account for all general equilibrium effects.

Table 3 provides the results of these policy experiments, taking the population size and structure as given. Our discussion mainly focuses on net migration flows in the next two decades, the period for which socio-demographic variations between SPP2 and SPP3 are smaller and less likely to be affected by the TFP changes. In other words, this consideration partially mitigates the issue that fertility and human capital are endogenously affected by income, which our model does not account for. Indeed, if TFP and GDP start increasing from 2010 onwards, population growth rates and the skill composition of the labor force will be gradually impacted. Results obtained for 2030 and after (essentially beyond one generation) are likely to overestimate the requested changes and should be treated with more caution.

Under the SSP2 socio-demographic scenario, keeping the stock of the 20 main origin countries ( Compact 1 ) at its level of 2010 requires TFP to increase by 58% in 2020 and by 128% in 2030, compared to the baseline. Under the SSP3 scenario, the required TFP changes amount to 49% in 2020 and by 99% in 2030. Overall, this means multiplying GDP per capita by 2 above the normal trend over the next two decades. Equivalently, this requires a TFP growth rate of 5% per year under SPP2 (instead of 1.5% a year in the baseline), and a TFP growth rate of 4.2% a year under SPP3. In terms of GDP growth, the required levels are on average twice as high as the baseline levels; in all variants, the requested annual GDP growth rate is close to 10%. Implementing Migration Compacts with all sub-Saharan African and MENA countries ( Compact 2 ) requires similar changes in TFP and gives rise to similar effects. Footnote 28

Takeoffs of this nature have rarely been observed in the course of history. Footnote 29 They basically require all SSA and MENA countries to enter the “modern growth club” during the 21st century. Based on facts from the 19th and 20th centuries, Bénétrix et al. ( 2015 ) estimate that joining the club requires an annual GDP growth rate above 5% over a period of ten years; Jones and Romer ( 2010 ) argue that higher threshold growth rates are needed in the current period. Still, “explosive-growth” episodes were indeed recently observed in emerging countries. Taiwan multiplied its income per capita by 5 between 1980 and 2000, and South Korea multiplied it by 7.5 over the same period; China has increased its income level tenfold since 1990 with an average GDP growth rate of 8% per year. Similar takeoffs have not been observed in sub-Saharan Africa. However, Rwanda, which is usually seen as one of the fastest growing economies in Africa, has increased its income per capita threefold in the post-genocide period.

Sustaining TFP growth rates of 4 to 5% or real GDP growth rates of 8 to 10% per year on the spatial scale of a continent and over several decades is unprecedented. So far, development policies have not triggered such resounding and generalized economic booms (Hausmann et al. 2005 ). Hence, dramatic changes in the effectiveness of aid are needed if policymakers want to use development tools to reduce migration pressures (Berthélemy et al. 2009 ; Berthélemy and Maurel 2010 ; Gary and Maurel 2015 ). In addition, generating these booms in SSA and MENA would only attenuate migration pressures to Europe, but would not eliminate them since migration pressures from other countries and regions would still be observed. Table 3 shows that the EU15 immigration rate in 2060 would be around 20% in all scenarios, compared to 14.6% in 2010. Reinforcing immigration restrictions is another complementary policy avenue. However, it is a priori unclear whether changes in laws and policies can significantly affect the size of immigration flows. Past restrictions on migration have not prevented third-country nationals from moving in past decades (it may be recalled that our backcasts with constant \(V_{ij,s,t}\) fit well past migration flows), and have caused displacements and increasing flows of irregular migrants. Over the 21st century, increasing migration seems to be an inevitable phenomenon, which raises important challenges in terms of policy coherence for most industrialized countries.

5 Conclusion

The number of asylum applications lodged in 2015 in EU Member States exceeded 1.3 million, putting migration policy in the forefront of the global policy debate. While the proximate cause of the current crisis is the conflict and political unrest in the Middle East and Africa, the recent trends and forecasts for the world economy strongly suggest that there may be further episodes of large-scale migration in the near future, in Europe and in other OECD countries. Specifically, the underlying root causes of increased migration (demographic growth differentials, economic inequality, increased globalization, political instability, climatic changes) are all projected to exert a stronger influence on migration in the coming decades.

Relying on socio-demographic and technological scenarios, this paper produces integrated backcasts, nowcasts and forecasts of income and bilateral migration stocks for all pairs of countries. Our model fits very well the trends in international migration of the last 40 years, and demonstrates that historical trends were mostly governed by demographic changes. Turning to the migration prospects for the 21st century, we also find that world migration prospects are mainly governed by socio-demographic changes; they are virtually insensitive to the technological environment. We predict a highly robust increase in immigration pressures in general, and in European immigration in particular. These migration pressures are mostly explained by the demographic changes in sub-Saharan Africa and in the MENA countries. Curbing them with immigration restrictions or with development policies requires sealing borders or triggering unprecedented economic booms in many developing countries. More than ever, improving the management of migration flows and the coherence between development and migration policies will represent major challenges for European countries in the 21st century. In particular, helping developing countries to increase human capital for all and for women in particular could drastically transform the skill structure of global migration and make destination countries less hostile to immigrants.

The population ratio between LDCs and HICs increased from 3.1 in 1960 to 5.5 in 2010. This explains why a 0.9% increase in emigration rate from LDCs translated into a 6.5% increase in the share of immigrants to HICs.

In the medium variant, they assume long-run convergence towards low fertility and high life expectancy across countries, and constant immigration flows.

Future migration flows reflect expert opinion about future socio-political and economic trends that could affect migration. From 2060 onwards, it is assumed that net migration flows converge to zero (attained in the 2095–2100 period), implying that migration stocks also converge to zero.

A similar approach is used in Docquier and Machado ( 2017 ) who focus on 34 destination countries and consider non-official socio-demographic projections. Identifying assumptions are refined here thanks to the backcasting experiments, and richer technology and policy variants are considered.

Although Grogger and Hanson ( 2011 ) find that a linear utility specification fits the patterns of positive selection and sorting in the migration data well, most studies rely on a logarithmic utility function (Bertoli and Moraga Fernandez-Huertas 2013 ; Beine and Parsons 2015 ; Beine et al. 2019 ; Ortega and Peri 2013 ).

Bertoli and Moraga Fernandez-Huertas ( 2015 ), Bertoli and Moraga Fernandez-Huertas ( 2013 ) or Ortega and Peri ( 2013 ) used more general distributions, allowing for a positive correlation in the application of shocks across similar countries.

In fact, there is a slight abuse of terms here as \(A_{j,t}\) implicitly includes capital in supplement to the usual TFP, which is by definition the residual that explains a country’s output level apart from capital and labor. This is why we define \(A_{j,t}\) as a “modified TFP.”

See Katz and Murphy ( 1992 ), Card and Lemieux ( 2001 ), Caselli et al. ( 2006 ), Borjas ( 2003 ), Borjas ( 2013 ), Card ( 2009 ), Ottaviano and Peri ( 2012 ), Docquier et al. ( 2015 ) among others.

When missing, the latter are supplemented using the estimates of Docquier et al. ( 2015 ).

The 60 destinations that do not have any migrant recorded in our dataset are: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brunei, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo D.R., Congo R, Djibouti, East Timor, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Jordan, Korea, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Macedonia, Madagascar, Maldives, Mauritania, Micronesia, Moldova, Morocco, Myanmar, Nigeria, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Vietnam, Yemen, Zimbabwe. None of these destinations is an important immigration country.

Which is implicitly captured by the level of dyadic net migration costs, \(V_{ij,t,s}\) .

In practice, visa restrictions are likely to depend on the intensity of immigration pressures as well as on origin and/or destination countries’ characteristics.

Interestingly, Ortega and Peri ( 2009 ) find that capital adjustments are rapid in open economies: an inflow of immigrants increases one-for-one employment and capital stocks in the short term (i.e. within one year), leaving the capital/labor ratio unchanged.

Appendix C.2 provides details on the computation of these proxies.

Note that the pre-migration population levels are not directly observable but they can be identified as outcomes of our model, as explained in Appendix C.1.

Table C.2 in the Appendix C.3 shows that the actual total number of migrants of 2019 is 141 million. All of our predicted numbers for the year 2020 are only slightly higher. In the benchmark scenario where we consider the demographic scenario SSP2, \(\gamma =0.7\) , \(\sigma =2\) and full technological externalities, our predicted number of world migrants reaches 142 million in 2020. The correlation between the actual and predicted immigrants by destination and emigrants by origin is also very high (more than 0.94).

Table C.1 in the in the Appendix C.2 provides the coefficient of correlation between our backcasts for 1970–2000 and the actual observations aggregate at country level for each decade and for different parameter sets. It evidences the robustness of the model to different technological scenarios.

In the late 20th century from 1970 to 2000, we document both forms of tighter and loosened immigration policies in major receiving countries. In Western Europe, the Guest Worker program came to an end following the 1973–4’s oil crisis. While in the US, a series of immigration acts were introduced allowing more entry of family immigrants (the 1990 Immigration Act), legalization of illegal immigrants (the 1986 Reform and Control Act) (see Clark et al. ( 2007 ) for an overview) before immigration policies became restrictive again after the September 11 attacks in 2001. The third wave of immigration to the Gulf region also took place during this period after 1971—year of official independence of GCC countries from the United Kingdom—where mass industrialization and modernization have led to large importation of foreign workers.

Assuming \(\kappa \) is large, we may overestimate the causal effect of the skill ratio on the ratio of value shares. However, disregarding causation issues, this technological scenario is the most compatible with the cross-country correlation between human capital and the wage structure: it fits the cross-country correlation between the skill bias and the skill ratio in the year 2010.

More details about these scenarios are provided in Appendix D.

For instance, Missirian and Schlenker ( 2014 ) show that asylum applications increased when global temperatures rose, Desmet et al. ( 2018 ) predict how local sea-level changes affect human displacement. Burzynski et al. ( 2019 ) predict that 210 to 320 million people will be forced or incentivized to move over the 21st century. However, under constant migration policies, climate migrants will move first from rural to urban areas, within their own countries, before moving across borders (Maurel and Tuccio 2015 ). Existing literature suggests that massive international flows of climate refugees are unlikely, except under generalized and persistent conflicts over resources (Rigaud et al. 2018 ).

Additional results of different technological scenarios are presented in the Figure D.2 in the Appendix D.2. Under SSP3, worldwide changes in human capital are negligible; eliminating technological externalities hardly modifies the results. Under SSP2, technological scenarios play a more important role after 2050 but have little influence on global trends.

In Figure D.2 of the Appendix D.2, productivity growth is boosted when technological externalities are factored in. By contrast, assuming a higher level for \(\sigma \) generates very similar income projections.

Figure D.2 in the Appendix D.2 shows another remarkable result is that the global trends in international migration are virtually unaffected by the technological environment; they are totally governed by socio-demographic changes.

Very similar results are obtained when technological externalities are zero, as shown in Appendix D.2.

In line with the Sustainable Development Goals and the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (UN 2016 ), the European Commission has outlined a general line of action to address the global challenge of future migration (see the European Agenda on Migration and the new Partnership Framework on Migration). Migration Compacts include a set of measures to be implemented in the home country, targeting the reinforcement of border controls, the readmission of migrants who have been denied entry, or a higher level of economic development.

These include Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bangladesh, Dem. Rep. of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, India, Iraq, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Senegal, Somalia, Turkey, and Uganda.

We have also conducted another set of simulations ( Compact 3 ) keeping constant the total emigration stocks of sub-Saharan African countries only. The resulting required TFP growth rates are higher than the ones in Compact 2 where growth is fostered in both the MENA and SSA regions. This shows the capacity of the MENA countries to absorb migrants from SSA. Thus smaller but simultaneous investment in both regions is recommended to curb migration pressures to Europe.

This was even the case during the Industrial Revolution. Between 1820 and 1900, GDP per capita rose 2.5 times in Western Europe, and 3.3 fold in the United States (Maddison 2007 ). In other words, growth rates were 1.2 and 1.5% a year, respectively.

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Thu Hien Dao

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We thank three anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions. We also benefited from discussions with Christiane Clemens, Giuseppe de Arcangelis, Timothy Hatton, Vincent Vanderberghe, and Gerald Willmann. This paper was presented at the conference on “Demographic Challenges in Africa” jointly organized by the French Agency for Development and the University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne in February 2017, at the 8th International Conference on “Economics of Global Interactions: New Perspectives on Trade, Factor Mobility and Development” at the University of Bari Aldo Moro in September 2017, and at the Workshop on “The drivers and impacts of migration and labour mobility in origins and destinations: Building the evidence base for policies that promote safe, orderly and regular people’s and labour mobility for poverty reduction and sustainable development” at FAO Headquarters in Rome in December 2017. The authors are grateful to the participants for valuable comments. Thu Hien Dao acknowledges financial support from the European Commission in the framework of the European Doctorate in Economics Erasmus Mundus (EDEEM). Frédéric Docquier and Pierre Schaus acknowledge financial support from the ARC convention on “New approaches to understanding and modelling global migration trends” (convention 18/23-091).

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Dao, T.H., Docquier, F., Maurel, M. et al. Global migration in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries: the unstoppable force of demography. Rev World Econ 157 , 417–449 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10290-020-00402-1

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DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/s10290-020-00402-1

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Migration is defined as “movement from one country, place or locality to another.” Ever since the earliest humans began to spread from Africa, humans have been on the move. Even today, 3 percent of the world’s population—at least 258 million people— live outside of their country of origin . Whether voluntary or forced, migration has profoundly shaped our world.

First migrants

The earliest migrants were ancient humans who originated on the African continent. Their spread to Eurasia and elsewhere remains a matter of significant scientific controversy. The earliest fossils of recognizable Homo sapiens were found in Ethiopia and are approximately 200,000 years old.

The “out of Africa” theory posits that around 60,000 years ago, Homo sapiens dispersed across Eurasia, where they met and eventually replaced other human ancestors like Neanderthals. However, that theory has been challenged by evidence of migrations from Africa to Eurasia 120,000 years ago. Either way, early humans are thought to have migrated to Asia either across a strait that lies between the Horn of Africa and what is now Yemen, or via the Sinai Peninsula. After spreading to southeast Asia, early humans are thought to have migrated to Australia, which shared a landmass with New Guinea at the time, then to Europe, then to the Americas.

Modern humans migrated out of Africa over 60,000 years ago. This map shows their migration paths.

Those migrations were likely driven by climate, food availability, and other environmental factors. As time passed and cultures became less nomadic, war and colonialism began to fuel migrations, too. The ancient Greeks expanded their dynasty with a laundry list of colonies. Ancient Rome sent its citizens as far north as Britain. Imperial China, too, used its military to expand its borders and house refugees in ever farther-flung borderlands.

Reasons to flee

Migration has long been characterized and complicated by war, enslavement, and persecution. Jews fled their ancestral lands after waves of exile and the destruction of Jerusalem in 70 A.D., creating a widespread diaspora. At least 12 million African s were enslaved and forced to relocate to the Americas during the transatlantic slave trade between 1500 and the 1860s. In the aftermath of World War II in 1945, hundreds of thousands of Holocaust survivors and other civilians became displaced persons , emigrating to Western Europe, the territory of British-Mandate Palestine that later became Israel, and the United States. And at the end of the Vietnam War, over 125,000 people from Vietnam migrated to the United States in the face of a humanitarian crisis.

They weren’t the last: Migration continues in the 21st century, driven by famine, natural disasters, and human rights abuses. Beginning in 2013, migrants from North Africa and the Middle East began to move in increasingly larger numbers into Europe, seeking to escape poverty and political instability in their homelands. The migrant crisis stretched European resources thin, fueling xenophobia and frustration even in welcoming states. And hundreds of thousands of Rohingya people have been forced to migrate to Bangladesh from Myanmar despite centuries of history in their homeland .


In the future, the changing climate may fuel even more mass movements. A 2018 World Bank report found that more than 143 million people may soon become “climate migrants,” driven from their homes by floods, droughts, and water scarcity. No matter the reasons, migration will likely continue as long as there are humans—and as long as there are places to go.

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Five Ways COVID-19 Is Changing Global Migration

Photo: Erol Yayboke

Commentary by Erol Yayboke

Published March 25, 2020

The COVID-19 pandemic has changed human mobility for those of us washing our hands vigorously and avoiding social contact. But in addition to these disruptions to daily life, the pandemic could be fundamentally changing the face of global migration in at least five key ways.

As I write this from a corner of my daughter’s room which has been converted into a makeshift home office, odds are you are also reading this from your home—if you are fortunate enough to have access to the internet at home and the option to work remotely. Schools and restaurants are closed. Airports and bus terminals are next. Only when people have stopped moving do we realize how much freedom of movement—the ability to visit a neighbor, to catch the train to work, to see a movie in the theater, or to fly across the world to see family—is a fundamental part of the human experience.

COVID-19 has brought most of the world to a halt. It has ushered in an entirely new human experience full of hand soap and Zoom. But it has also fundamentally altered global human mobility. After 9/11, the Federal Aviation Administration shutdown airspace across the United States, and within hours almost all aircraft were grounded. Iconic time-lapse maps appeared soon thereafter showing once crowded skies becoming almost instantaneously empty. This is akin to what is happening to human mobility across the globe.

Much has been made of the important health and economic implications of COVID-19 that could linger well after workers return to work and travelers start traveling again. But the current global cessation of movement is unprecedented in modern times. Some are comparing the current pandemic to the so-called “Spanish Flu” of 1918, but from one important perspective the two pandemics differ greatly: the face of global migration was much different in the wake of WWI than in 2020. Thus, COVID-19 is likely to have lasting migration implications long after people, health systems, and the economy bounce back.

Human mobility has historically come in many forms. As planes, trains, and automobiles became safer, more efficient, and more accessible over the past century, short-term movements to and from places of work and schooling, between towns and cities, and even across the globe have become commonplace. Accelerated by the advent of the internet and the subsequent social media revolution, the desire and ability to move accelerated to the point that it has permeated even the furthest reaches of the planet.

Not everyone wants to leave home, of course, but many (and many more than in 1918) see migration as at least one future pathway, whether it be permanently or temporarily with the hopes to one day return home. In many ways, the global economy relies on people making decisions to migrate: Central American tomato pickers in Florida, Bangladeshi construction workers in Abu Dhabi, and Indian entrepreneurs in Melbourne. Global migration has proven to be an integral and necessary part of our globalized economy, though its face has looked different in every region, country, and city, as well as to each family.

Until COVID-19 brought it all to a screeching halt.

Today, unprecedented travel and mobility restrictions have potential short- and longer-term repercussions. In the short term, as of March 23, at least 174 countries, territories, or areas have issued new or changed existing COVID-19 related travel restrictions,” according to the UN Migration Agency . The most common types of restrictions are for those with medical issues, those traveling from “restricted countries,” and those with nationalities that happen to overlap with restricted countries. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is essentially tracking the day-by-day shutdown of global mobility pathways. Each day, countries get more restrictive, requiring more people from more places to be quarantined for longer upon arrival. These restrictions are likely to continue for months, at least until the curve has been flattened . In the meantime, separated families will stay separated, global summits (and the Olympics ) will be delayed or cancelled, and family reunions will be postponed.

More importantly, COVID-19-related disruptions are likely to have longer-term impacts on migration. Here are five possible ways that could happen.

1. Migrant labor—the engine of a globalized economy—stops moving. While exemptions might be made for key professions (e.g., scientists, doctors, journalists, government leaders), those who travel to work and travel for work may not be able to do so for the foreseeable future. This will have family, economic, and potentially food security implications. Migrant workers currently overseas may not be able to get home, and families already dealing with complicated immigration and visa regimes may experience prolonged separation for an entirely new reason. It is conceivable that, in response to current and future quarantines or “stay at home” orders, businesses will also accelerate development of automation capabilities, thereby removing some jobs often filled by migrants more quickly.

If migrant workers are unable to travel to agricultural fields and these restrictions are paired with broader disruptions to the global food supply chain, it is worth considering longer-term impacts on global food security . As pointed out by CSIS’s Caitlin Welsh, for the time being, countries such as the United States have plenty of food . But prolonged disruptions to migration could reorient agricultural production and value chains to the detriment of food security, especially in the developing world.

In most industries, inevitable COVID-19-related layoffs will undoubtedly target migrant workers, many of whom are on temporary visas. For example, New Zealand has around 190,000 people living on temporary visas, many of whom will face impossible choices upon being laid off: try to find another job suitable under their visa in a tanking economy before being deported, try to get a different type of visa, or try to get on one of the very restricted flights back to a home country that is likely dealing with even greater economic hardship. And when jobs do become available, the governments of New Zealand , the United States , and many other countries will undoubtedly encourage businesses to hire citizens over migrants. Such decisions will have lasting effects on migrant workers, their families, and their communities.

Whether it is Turkish guest workers to Germany in the 1960s, Vietnamese refugees across the globe in the 1970s, or rural farmers flocking to Chinese megacities in the 1980s, migrants have been the engine of the last century’s globalized economy. The inability of labor to move efficiently—or at all—will impact future global output while putting migrant families themselves under greater financial strain. This will, in turn, increase global inequality.

2. Global inequality increases. Global inequality was already at its highest levels in history when COVID-19 hit. As of January 2020, 2,153 people hold more wealth than the world’s poorest 4.6 billion people. The world’s 22 richest men have more wealth than all the women in Africa. While stock market losses will undoubtedly impact the near-term prospects of some wealthy individuals, recent history suggests that they will be just fine. In fact, global inequality is likely to increase in the medium-to-long term, in part because of the pandemic’s lasting impact on migration. Countries such as the Philippines, Bangladesh, Ghana, and Honduras rely heavily on remittances from citizens abroad. In 2018, the developing world as a whole received $529 billion in remittances, 75 percent of total foreign direct investment inflows received in the same year. If migrant labor abroad is significantly disrupted by the economic shocks detailed above, those sources of income for families across the developing world will be impacted, creating ripple effects throughout their economies and, in turn, further widening the gap between the richer and poorer countries. Governments do have options , and the way they respond will matter, especially since the full economic impacts of COVID-19 have not been felt in much of the developing world.

Some of us are fortunate enough to work from home during this time, benefiting from not only the requisite physical and digital infrastructure but also the types of jobs that can be taken online. Many labor migrants—especially of the low-skilled variety—do not have the option to work from home. Like many lower-income people , they must physically go to work, putting them at greater risk of contracting and spreading COVID-19 and putting them in further jeopardy because many do not have access to appropriate, financially-accessible health care. According to the United Nations , “[migrants] and their families are often part of marginalized and vulnerable groups that are already experiencing economic hardship as a result of containment measures.” In an extreme case, that could become more the norm as the pandemic worsens. For example, Iranian hospitals are refusing to treat Afghan migrants , resulting in many returning home to a country with a health infrastructure all but destroyed after decades of conflict.

Seeing unequal responses and increased xenophobic reactions to migrants, the United Nations Network on Migration has called for more uniform, non-discriminatory approaches in line with international law. A recent press release states that “[migrants] and people on the move face the same health threats from COVID-19 as host populations but may face particular vulnerabilities due to the circumstances of their journey and the poor living and working conditions in which they can find themselves.”

3. Faucets turn off more easily than they turn on. With few anecdotes to the contrary, politicians with skeptical or outright hostile views of migration have experienced electoral success around the world in recent years. COVID-19 has ushered in a new era of travel restrictions and required medical testing of migrants. While most of these regulations are designed to be temporary, it is not hard to imagine President Victor Orbán, or others, manufacturing crisis after crisis to keep Hungary’s borders de facto permanently closed to migrants. A fear of a second or third wave of COVID-19. A subsequent disease. A crisis originating in sub-Saharan Africa or the Middle East that forces millions to seek refuge in Europe. An entirely manufactured crisis playing to fears and a current lack of trust in institutions. Such never-ending emergency extensions are not unprecedented nor are they unrealistic in a post COVID-19 world. As Yuval Noah Hariri points out , “temporary measures have a nasty habit of outlasting emergencies.”

Though many migration pathways will reopen after the threat of COVID-19 disappears, some political leaders such as Orbán will see current migration restrictions as an opportunity to reinforce broader, longer-term agendas built around xenophobia and the “othering” of migrants. As deaths inevitably increase in the days and weeks ahead, these leaders will have increasing public support for tighter short-term migration restrictions. What the public does not realize is that it may not be as easy to turn the flow of migration back on after it has been turned off.

4. Forced migrants are unable to move, keeping vulnerable people in harm’s way. Though this commentary focuses heavily on the potential longer-term implications of restrictions to labor migration, already vulnerable forced migrants will also suffer from fewer movement options. Already at risk of COVID-19, the forcibly displaced—refugees, asylum seekers, and internally displaced persons—and other forced migrants are also faced with diminished institutional capacity offering them support. In Italy, this means that recently arriving asylum seekers face mandatory two-week quarantines and vastly fewer or no integration services even after the 14 days due to mandatory country-wide restrictions on workers going to work. If forced migrants—such as those coming to Italy via Libya—are seen as bringing COVID-19 with them, public opinion from Sicily to Sweden will undoubtedly harden in ways that will not soon go away.

Some movement pathways will reopen as quickly as possible, but their closing at all may have longer-term repercussions. Colombia has halved its Venezuela response services despite ever increasing needs . Even though they consider it a “ vital lifeline ” for the forcibly displaced, the United Nation’s migration and refugee agencies halted refugee resettlement globally over COVID-19 concerns. These and other necessary short-term restrictions, however, mean that vulnerable forced migrants often living in overcrowded camps and in dense urban areas with poor access to quality health care will be at increased risk. According to Jeremy Konyndyk , a senior policy fellow at the Center for Global Development who was a central player in the U.S. response to the 2014 Ebola outbreak, “[You] would have a hard time designing a more dangerous setting for the spread of this disease than an informal IDP settlement. You have a crowded population, very poor sanitation . . . very poor disease surveillance, very poor health services. This could be extraordinarily dangerous.” Much of this risk will be concentrated in the developing world, where 84 percent of refugees and 99 percent of internally displaced persons currently reside and to where COVID-19 is only recently arriving. For example, Italy had more COVID-19 related deaths in one day ( 602 ) than all of South Africa’s confirmed cases to date ( 402 ) as of March 23. When the virus inevitably spreads across sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the developing world, forced migrants will almost certainly be at greater risk.

But these risks are not all far from the United States. In northern Mexico , asylum seekers denied entry into the United States bide time in makeshift, overcrowded camps with poor access to sanitation, watching as COVID-19 spreads among their already vulnerable population. Even so, as pointed out by CSIS’s Jake Kurtzer , there are relatively few known cases of COVID-19 in displaced communities, but this is “more likely a result of a lack of testing and awareness than the absence of the virus.” Given the risks and the nature and spread of COVID-19, it is only a matter of time before a significant outbreak spreads throughout more displaced communities.

Additionally, the majority of forced migrants are internally displaced , so blocked movement pathways also mean that these people will be stuck in or near the dangerous places that forced them from home in the first place. This could create opportunities for non-state actors to exploit grievances against governments . It could also force desperate people escaping harm to do so via shadowy irregular pathways.

5. Global migration goes increasingly into the shadows. There is growing evidence that limits on safe, orderly, and regular migration push vulnerable people—as many as 100 million globally —into shadowy irregular pathways. As I wrote recently, “[irregular] migration exists because there are not enough opportunities for safety and prosperity at home and too few regular means through which to remedy that lack of opportunities.” COVID-19 means that there are fewer regular means for migration than there were a couple months ago. When combined, the economic, inequality, political, and displacement-related implications discussed above will only increase desperation at a time when fewer migration pathways exist. In such a scenario, those feeling compelled to move will do so increasingly using smugglers, traffickers, and other illicit groups. Migration will be increasing in and among developing countries with weaker health systems and rule of law. Irregular migrants will travel in close quarters with other people. They will cross international boundaries without documentation or health checks. In the age of COVID-19, they will also put themselves, their fellow travelers, and anyone in their extended path at grave risk.

The above list of five longer-term impacts on migration is by no means comprehensive, nor do any of these challenges come with easy solutions. However, it is important to consider longer-term repercussions when designing short-term human mobility restrictions, akin to efforts to make sure that people unable to work right now do not lose their jobs permanently. Not doing so could result in more economic stress, greater levels of global inequality, more vulnerability to forced migrant populations, and increases in irregular migration.

Erol Yayboke is deputy director and senior fellow with the Project on Prosperity and Development at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington D.C.

Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

© 2020 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

Erol Yayboke

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• Around the World, More Say Immigrants Are a Strength Than a Burden

Publics divided on immigrants’ willingness to adopt host country’s customs

Table of contents.

• Acknowledgments
• Methodology
• Appendix A: References
• Appendix B: Demographic tables

Majorities of publics in top migrant destination countries say immigrants strengthen their countries, according to a 2018 Pew Research Center survey of 18 countries that host half of the world’s migrants.

In 10 of the countries surveyed, majorities view immigrants as a strength rather than a burden. Among them are some of the largest migrant receiving countries in the world: the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Canada and Australia (each hosting more than 7 million immigrants in 2017).

By contrast, majorities in five countries surveyed – Hungary, Greece, South Africa, Russia and Israel – see immigrants as a burden to their countries. With the exception of Russia, these countries each have fewer than 5 million immigrants.

Meanwhile, public opinion on the impact of immigrants is divided in the Netherlands. In Italy and Poland, more say immigrants are a burden, while substantial shares in these countries do not lean one way or the other (31% and 20% respectively).

Countries surveyed hold half of the world’s migrants

The 18 nations surveyed contain more than half (51%) of the world’s migrant population, or some 127 million people, according to United Nations and U.S. Census Bureau estimates.

Countries with some of the world’s largest immigrant populations were surveyed, including more traditional destinations like the United States, Canada and Australia that have seen waves of immigrants arrive since at least the 19th century . Also surveyed were more recent destination countries in the European Union such as Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and Greece, all of which experienced immigration waves after World War II .

Japan and Israel were also surveyed. Japan is making efforts to attract more migrants due to its aging population. Israel has been a destination for immigrants since it enacted its 1950 Law of Return for Jewish people worldwide. Russia was surveyed since it has one of the world’s largest foreign-born populations. At the same time, South Africa continues to be a top destination country for many Africans.

Also included in the survey were some newer destinations. Mexico, for example, has become an increasingly important destination and transit country for migrants fleeing violence from El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. Similarly, Hungary became an important transit country for migrants entering Europe during the refugee surge that peaked in 2015. And although Poland for many years was a country of emigration, it has seen a recent wave of immigrants from Eastern Europe .

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are top immigrant destinations that were not surveyed. Pew Research Center does not have a history of conducting surveys in these countries.

In the U.S., the nation with the world’s largest number of immigrants , six-in-ten adults (59%) say immigrants make the country stronger because of their work and talents, while one-third (34%) say immigrants are a burden because they take jobs and social benefits. Views about immigrants have shifted in the U.S. since the 1990s, when most Americans said immigrants were a burden to the country.

Meanwhile, in six European Union countries surveyed, public opinion about the impact of immigrants has changed since 2014. That was the last time the Center asked European publics this question. It was also before hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers arrived on Europe’s shores in 2015. In Greece, Germany and Italy, three countries that experienced high volumes of arrivals, the share of adults saying immigrants make their countries stronger dropped significantly.

By contrast, public opinion shifted in the opposite direction in France, the UK and Spain, countries surveyed that received fewer asylum seekers in 2015. In all three countries in 2018, majorities said immigrants made their countries stronger, up from about half who said the same in 2014. 1

While majorities in many of the 18 countries surveyed see immigrants as a strength, this opinion is not equally shared across all groups within countries. In most countries surveyed, those on the left of the ideological spectrum are more positive about immigration’s impact on their country than those on the right. Similarly, in many countries surveyed, those with higher levels of education, younger adults, and those with higher incomes are more likely to say immigrants make their countries stronger because of their work and talents. (See Appendix B for group breakdowns .)

Also, in all countries surveyed, those saying they want fewer immigrants arriving in their countries are less likely to view immigrants as making their countries stronger.

Publics split on immigrants’ willingness to adopt their societies’ customs and way of life

Attitudes are mixed on immigrants’ willingness to adopt the destination country’s customs or wanting to be distinct from its society. A median of 49% among countries surveyed say immigrants want to be distinct from the host country’s society, while a median of 45% say immigrants want to adopt the host country’s customs and way of life.

In six destination countries – Japan, Mexico, South Africa, the U.S., France and Sweden – publics are more likely to say immigrants want to adopt the host country’s customs and way of life than say immigrants want to be distinct.

Japan is an outlier: A large majority of the public (75%) says immigrants want to adopt the country’s customs and way of life. This country, whose aging population and low birth rate make immigration relevant for its population growth, has recently changed its policies to attract more foreigners. Views about immigrant integration in Japan could be linked to the low number of immigrants the country hosts and that many immigrants in Japan are ethnically Japanese .

By contrast, in eight destination countries – Hungary, Russia, Greece, Italy, Germany, Poland, Israel and Australia – more people say immigrants want to be distinct than say they are willing to adopt the host country’s customs. Majorities hold this view in Hungary, Russia, Greece, Italy and Germany. In addition, sizable shares of people in most of these countries refused to choose one option or the other when asked this question.

In many countries surveyed, younger adults, those with higher levels of education and those on the left of the political spectrum are generally more likely to say immigrants are adopting the country’s customs and way of life (see Appendix B for group breakdowns ).

Publics are less concerned about immigrant crime than the risk they pose for terrorism

In recent years, security concerns about immigration have become part of the public debate in many countries. Some of these concerns are about crime and immigration, while others are about terrorism and immigration.

Immigrants and crime

In several immigrant destination countries, large majorities say immigrants are not more to blame for crime than other groups. This is the case in Canada, the U.S., France and the UK. Among other countries surveyed, only in South Africa, Sweden and Greece do majorities believe that immigrants are more to blame for crime than other groups.

In the Netherlands, Japan, Israel and Germany, opinions are split on the impact of immigrants on crime. In four other countries where views were mixed, substantial shares refused to choose either of the two statements offered – Italy (26%), Hungary (17%), Poland (15%) and Russia (14%).

In countries where majorities see immigrants as a strength, majorities also tend to say immigrants are not more to blame for crime. Notable exceptions are Germany and Sweden, where majorities say that immigrants strengthen their countries, but pluralities of adults say that immigrants carry more responsibility for crime.

Immigrants and terrorism

Publics across top migrant destination countries are split on whether or not immigrants increase the risk of terrorism in their countries.

In six countries, majorities believe immigrants do not increase the risk of terrorism in the host country. These include all surveyed countries in North America (Mexico, Canada and the U.S.), as well as South Africa and Japan. Publics in France and Spain, two European countries that were not at the center of the 2015 refugee crisis, also hold this view.

By contrast, majorities in seven European nations – Hungary, Greece, Italy, Sweden, Russia, Germany and the Netherlands – believe immigrants increase the risk of terrorism in their countries.

Views on the topic are divided in the UK, Australia and Israel. In Poland, half (52%) of the public says immigrants increase the risk of terrorism, while 28% say they do not increase the risk of terrorism. But a substantial share in Poland (19%) also refused to respond one way or the other.

CORRECTION (May 2, 2019): The original data for South Africa was incorrect in the chart, “Majorities in many European migrant destinations think immigrants increase risk of terrorism.” These numbers have been switched to correctly show that 32% of South Africans say immigrants do not increase the risk of terrorism and 62% say immigrants increase the risk of terrorism.

Majorities in many countries think immigrants in the country illegally should be deported

Majorities in most immigrant destination countries surveyed support the deportation of people who are in their countries illegally.

In seven of the 10 EU countries surveyed, majorities support the deportation of immigrants living in their country illegally. In 2007, between 1.7 million and 3.2 million unauthorized, or irregular, migrants were estimated to be living in the 10 EU countries surveyed. The number of asylum seeker applications has increased following the 2015 refugee surge. Since then, the number of rejected asylum applications has increased substantially. Many of these rejected asylum seekers may continue to reside illegally in Europe.

Similarly, majorities in Russia, South Africa, Australia and Japan also support deporting immigrants living in those countries illegally.

In the U.S., public opinion is divided on the issue. About half (46%) of the public supports deporting immigrants residing there illegally, while the other half (47%) opposes their deportation. 2 The Center estimates 10.7 million unauthorized immigrants lived in the U.S. in 2016, which represented less than a quarter (23.7%) of the U.S. immigrant population. The number of unauthorized immigrants in the U.S. has been falling since 2007 and is now at levels last seen in 2004.

In Mexico, fewer than half (43%) say they support the deportation of immigrants living there illegally. In recent years, Mexico has experienced an increasing number of migrants entering the country without authorization from Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador. Mexico has historically been a migrant-sending country: About 12 million people born in Mexico live outside the country, nearly all in the U.S. Among those in the U.S., nearly half are unauthorized immigrants.

In most countries surveyed, those on the right of the ideological spectrum are more likely to support deportation. Similarly, older people in several countries surveyed are more likely to support the deportation of immigrants living illegally in their countries (See Appendix B ).

Immigrants are foreign-born individuals living outside their country of birth, regardless of their citizenship. Refugees and asylum seekers are a subgroup within this broader population. The terms “immigrants” and “migrants” are used interchangeably in this report.

The terms “ asylum seekers ,” “ asylum applicants ” and “ refugees ”  are used interchangeably throughout this report and refer to individuals who have applied for asylum. Seeking asylum does not mean applicants will necessarily be permitted to stay in the country where they have submitted an application.

“ European Union ” in this report refers to the 28 nation-states that form the European Union (EU). At the time of the Pew Research Center’s Spring 2018 global survey, the UK was still part of the European Union.

• The survey question was not asked in other countries in 2014. ↩
• When the Center asked about this issue in the U.S. in a different way, a significantly lower share – 20% – said “undocumented immigrants should not be allowed to stay in the country legally,” while a large majority (79%) said “there should be a way for them to stay in the country legally, if certain requirements are met.” ↩

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The video above is from the January 2013 iPad edition of  National Geographic  magazine.

Groups of modern humans— Homo sapiens —began their migration out of Africa some 60,000 years ago. Some of our early ancestors kept exploring until they spread to all corners of Earth. How far and fast they went depended on climate , the pressures of population , and the invention of boats and other technologies. Less tangible qualities also sped their footsteps: imagination, adaptability, and an innate curiosity about what lay over the next hill.

Today, geneticists are doing their own exploring. Their studies have led them to a gene variation that might point to our propensity for risk-taking, movement, change, and adventure. This gene variant, known as DRD4-7R, is carried by approximately 20 percent of the human population . Several studies tie 7R (and other variants of the DRD4 gene ) to migration . ( Genetics is complex, however. Different groups of genes interact and yield diverse results in different individuals. DRD4-7R probably influences, not causes, our tendency toward “restlessness.”)

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October 19, 2023

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Featured Publication

Top 10 Migration Issues of 2021

The rollout of vaccines, increased testing, and other public-health measures led several parts of the world in 2021 to begin recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. But the virus and its variants abated in fits and starts. As a result, 2021 did not see a return to pre-pandemic migration trends, but instead witnessed new patterns of movement in some places. At the same time, new conflicts erupted in 2021, ongoing crises continued to smolder, and forcibly displaced migrants often found themselves stuck in the middle. Impacts of the pandemic were not responsible for all our Top 10 migration issues of the year, but the repercussions of the public-health crisis and related economic fallout were felt widely. Explore these and other issues in our annual countdown.

Click the links below to navigate to each issue:

1. World Reopens Unevenly after First Year of Pandemic as It Reckons with Delta and Omicron

2. In Landmark Integration Move, Countries in South America and the Caribbean Extend Protections to Millions of Venezuelans

3. Increasingly, Vaccination Is Becoming a Necessary Ticket to Travel, Challenging Those Who Lack Access

4. New Crises Around Globe Add to Existing Humanitarian Burden and Destabilize Countries of First Asylum

5. Biden Struggles to Dismantle Trump-Era Border Restrictions

6. As Government in Afghanistan Falls, Mass Evacuation of Afghans Occurs

7. At Europe’s Edge, "Weaponizing" Migration for Geopolitical Aims

8. Migration Streams through the Western Hemisphere Diversify

9. The United States Joins Europe in Focus on "Root Causes" of Migration

10. Remittance Flows Beat the Odds to Grow Despite Pandemic

Issue No. 1: World Reopens Unevenly after First Year of Pandemic as It Reckons with Delta and Omicron

A woman cleans a transit station in Bogotá, Colombia. (Photo: Jairo Bedoya/World Bank)

In fits and starts, 2021 saw the globe reckon with the COVID-19 pandemic and the Delta and Omicron variants that emerged during the year by finding ways to open borders to at least some arrivals. One year after every single country in the world imposed some sort of border restriction in an effort to halt the virus’s spread, many started to roll these restrictions back , at least in part. Efforts were complicated by the rapid spread of the more infectious Delta and Omicron variants, but over the course of 2021 blanket travel restrictions began to give way to approaches that condition entry on certain requirements. Chief among these are health protocols that require travelers to offer proof of vaccination and provide a negative COVID-19 test before entry or complete a period of quarantine.

However, the transition was often not coordinated, smooth, or equal. The European Union issued a nonbinding recommendation in June for its Member States to lift their bans on nonessential travel, but individual governments adopted their own schedules . In general, countries mostly changed their rules for entry on their own terms, with little global coordination or under the aegis of an international body such as the United Nations or even between close allies. The United Kingdom allowed some vaccinated travelers to skip quarantine in August, but the United States only began accepting vaccinated Brits in November, the same month that Australia began granting entry only to its citizens and permanent residents abroad. In many cases the easing of border restrictions was prompted by economic calculus: hunger for tourism and international business. Some Caribbean countries began keeping their borders open in mid-2020 , and Argentina and Chile abandoned their quarantine requirements in time for the southern hemisphere’s summer.

Generally speaking, land borders were much slower to open than airports and seaports. This created bizarre situations such as the one along the U.S.-Mexico border, in which an individual could easily fly from one country to the other but was unable to walk or drive across the border, splitting tight-knit crossborder communities and economies. Often, this arrangement privileged travelers who were wealthy enough to be able to afford plane tickets. And in some places, blanket restrictions persisted. China, for instance, plans to keep its limitations in place through mid-2022 .

Partly as a result of this uneven reopening, movement on the whole remained a fraction of its pre-pandemic rate. In September, demand for international air travel was down 69 percent compared to 2019. Many parts of the world will likely not see tourism at 2019 levels until at least 2023 , according to United Nations estimates.

Issue No. 2: In Landmark Integration Move, Countries in South America and the Caribbean Extend Protections to Millions of Venezuelans

A group of Venezuelan migrants in Colombia. (Photo: Greta Granados/World Bank)

Seven years after economic and political crisis spurred the start of large-scale flight from Venezuela, multiple countries in the region took significant steps in 2021 to provide legal status to millions of Venezuelan migrants and refugees. Leading the way was Colombia, where nearly all Venezuelan arrivals will be able to gain regular status under a landmark policy announcement in February that amounts to one of the most significant humanitarian acts in the region in decades. At the time the policy was announced, approximately one-third (1.7 million) of the 5.5 million refugees and migrants who left Venezuela lived in Colombia; the lack of legal status has left many stuck in the shadows. Under the new policy , those who entered by any means before February will be able to obtain temporary protected status for ten years, as will those who arrive legally by July 2023. Beneficiaries will be able to formally access education, job opportunities, and health care. Not surprisingly, uptake has been quite significant; more than 1.2 million Venezuelans had completed the first part of the registration as of September .

Next door, Ecuador in June announced a new normalization process for its approximately 420,000 Venezuelan inhabitants, around half of whom lack legal status. The effort mirrored a similar campaign in late 2019, which offered two-year humanitarian visas to many Venezuelans. Similarly, Peru in July unveiled a temporary protection regime for which more than 360,000 Venezuelans had preregistered ahead of time.

Similar efforts are underway in the Caribbean . A scheme introduced by the Dominican Republic in January offered renewable temporary protection to Venezuelans who had entered the country illegally since 2014; nearly 43,000 people applied during the one-month registration period. Curaçao, which has a much smaller Venezuelan population, offered one-year residence permits to migrants who legally entered the country before March 2020. Trinidad and Tobago previously introduced a regularization scheme in 2019 that provided temporary legal status to approximately 16,500 Venezuelans ; re-registration was opened for one month in 2021.

Finally, the United States offered Temporary Protected Status (TPS) to Venezuelans already in the country as of March 9. The designation, which had been a campaign promise of President Joe Biden, offers protection from deportation to an estimated 323,000 Venezuelans lacking legal status, until September 2022.

The moves represent a response to multiple factors, not least the recognition that Venezuelan migrants and refugees will remain in their host countries for a period of years and therefore their fuller integration into society is important. The actions also are motivated by efforts to better document residents, identify those in need , and bolster nationwide defenses against the COVID-19 pandemic such as by vaccinating more people. In some cases, the policies reduce strain on overwhelmed asylum systems and acknowledge the challenges in large-scale deportations of illegally present migrants. They also serve to undermine the Venezuelan government (a geopolitical rival of many political leaders). These policies represent a major development in the international response to the hemisphere’s most severe and protected migration crisis.

Issue No. 3: Increasingly, Vaccination Is Becoming a Necessary Ticket to Travel, Challenging Those Who Lack Access

A man receives a shot of a vaccine for COVID-19 at the Washington DC Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Washington, DC. (Photo: Adam Schultz/White House)

Requirements that travelers provide proof of vaccination as a condition for entry date back decades, mostly for countries with significant yellow fever transmission . But in 2021, the idea gained new life in countries around the world. As governments rolled back required quarantines and other border restrictions imposed earlier in the COVID-19 pandemic, they often have done so only for travelers who can show proof of vaccination against the novel coronavirus.

Unlike efforts by national and local governments to require vaccine “passports” to access businesses and other institutions, which often prompted stiff resistance, the imposition of this new vaccine mandate for international travel has received little domestic pushback. These policies have, however, led to concerns about equity in terms of who has access to COVID-19 vaccines, which vaccine, and who administers it. For one, although vaccines have been easily accessible in many wealthy countries, there remains a global scarcity, and barriers have often been particularly acute for migrants and refugees. More than 50 countries missed a target set by the World Health Organization (WHO) for vaccinating 10 percent of their populations by the end of September. Most of them were in Africa, where the continent-wide rate of vaccination remained less than 8 percent as of early December. The WHO’s goal of vaccinating 40 percent of people in all countries by the end of 2021 appears out of reach. Many factors are to blame, including rolling out vaccine distribution in persistent conflict- and crisis-affected places such as Afghanistan and Haiti, as well as difficulties accessing drugs through the global Covax scheme . As result, the WHO’s emergency committee opposed vaccine requirements for travel, although wealthy countries have largely instituted them all the same.

Even for individuals able to be vaccinated, not all drugs are considered equal. The WHO had only approved eight COVID-19 vaccines as of mid-December. As such, the millions of people who obtained jabs of Russia’s Sputnik V and other unapproved serums do not count as vaccinated under rules from the United States , Canada , and other countries. In the United Kingdom, where shots are administrated also matters: Rules rolled out in September do not recognize vaccinations administered to individuals in certain countries , many of which are in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, even if the drug itself has been approved.

Often, countries are offering alternatives for unvaccinated arrivals, including requiring individuals to undergo quarantine and testing for COVID-19. But the costs for these measures—which could include weeks in a hotel or other quarantine location—tend to be passed along to the individual traveler, which poses an additional barrier to mobility. Going forward, the slow pace of vaccine rollout globally suggests there may be a yawning gap in the people who can travel internationally and those who cannot.

Issue No. 4: New Crises Around Globe Add to Existing Humanitarian Burden and Destabilize Countries of First Asylum

A group of Ethiopian refugees walk through a camp. (Photo: © UNHCR/Olga Sarrado Mur)

The civil war in Syria entered its second decade in 2021, with continued dire conditions for millions of refugees, internally displaced people, and others. In all, about half of Syria’s prewar population has been forced to flee—sometimes multiple times. Elsewhere, Yemen retained its status as the world’s worst humanitarian crisis , and continued to be engulfed in conflict. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, persistent humanitarian crisis was exacerbated in the east by the volcanic eruption of Mount Nyiragongo, displacing hundreds of thousands . Extreme flooding in South Sudan was the worst in decades , affecting 700,000 people in a country still struggling with widespread insecurity.

Millions of people affected by these and other crises were joined in 2021 by new situations demanding urgent attention. The Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan will likely have long-running implications for that country and its neighbors. So too will conflict between the Ethiopian government and opposition groups in the Tigray region, which displaced more than 2 million people early in the year and led to famine-like conditions . Onset of drought is also exacerbating risk of hunger in East Africa. Meanwhile, an escalation of conflict between militants and government forces in northern Mozambique displaced vast swaths of the population. The February military coup in Myanmar led to a new crackdown against civilians and left millions in need of humanitarian assistance.

In several cases, many of the people affected by crisis were refugees and others who had previously been forcibly displaced, either internationally or within their own country’s borders. In Ethiopia, a pair of camps housing mostly Eritreans were closed after the refugees were allegedly targeted for horrific abuses by Eritrean forces and Tigrayan militias. As Lebanon descended into dire economic crisis, the approximately 1.5 million Syrian and other refugees were among the hardest hit , with the vast majority resorting to begging, borrowing money, or declining health services and education. Dozens of African migrants were killed in Yemen in March when a fire allegedly set by Houthi militants engulfed an overcrowded detention facility. And ongoing instability across countries of the Sahel repeatedly ensnared forcibly displaced people and the aid groups trying to assist them.

Situations such as these demonstrate the strain placed on host countries, which was one of the items the Global Compact on Refugees is intended to address. In many situations in 2021, impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, including deteriorating economic conditions, aggravated challenges. Going into the year, the number of people needing humanitarian assistance increased by 40 percent over 2020. While development has grow n, funding overall remains meager. Through October, humanitarian aid was just 39 percent of what was needed, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). Startlingly, funding was slightly lower than at the same point in 2020, at the height of the pandemic, even though need has risen.

Issue No. 5: Biden Struggles to Dismantle Trump-Era Border Restrictions

President Joe Biden delivers remarks from the White House. (Photo: Adam Schultz/White House)

U.S. President Joe Biden entered office in early 2021 with a sweeping plan to roll back the restrictive immigration policies of his predecessor, Donald Trump. The change in administration represented a new posture towards migrants that was difficult to overstate ; Trump had taken up the mantle of immigration restrictions more fervently than any U.S. president in decades, while Biden’s political coalition depended in part on progressive activists who had urged a moratorium on deportations and pathway to citizenship for the country’s estimated 11 million unauthorized immigrants.

The transition has led to a significant pendulum swing in some areas. The Biden administration scaled back immigration enforcement in the U.S. interior, made immigration benefits easier to access, took steps to begin to revamp parts of the asylum system , and called for an overhaul of immigration law that includes legalization for the unauthorized population. The new administration also expanded Temporary Protected Status (TPS) provisions for hundreds of thousands of individuals from multiple countries and raced to bring tens of thousands of Afghan translators, assistants, and others to the United States as the Taliban swept through the country.

Yet at the border, core elements of Trump’s policies remained in place, pointing to the limited ability of any White House to upend immigration law without assistance from other branches of government. The once obscure public-health provision Title 42, which the federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) enacted in 2020 to allow the government to immediately expel even migrants seeking asylum, was a policy that the Biden administration has continued to implement and defended in court . Critics including senior public-health officials have said the policy lacks sound epidemiological grounding, particularly after the U.S.-Mexico border reopened in November.

More often, though, the Biden administration was prevented from making a clean break from Trump-era polices because of court orders, state resistance, and frayed institutional capacity. The administration was ordered in August to reimpose the “Remain in Mexico” policy, formally known as the Migrant Protection Protocols, although it has since renewed efforts to end it. Texas meanwhile assumed the role of chief foil to the administration, ramping up border enforcement activities and litigation to stymy Washington’s efforts. And despite a public tussle with Democratic lawmakers and activists over the limit for refugee resettlement, the United States in fiscal year (FY) 2021 resettled fewer than 11,500 refugees , the lowest number since the country’s resettlement system was formally created in 1980. Meanwhile, the temporary shuttering of U.S. consulates and other impacts of the pandemic contributed to the steady growth of the backlog for permanent residence, known as green cards, and processing of other immigration paperwork.

Issue No. 6: As Government in Afghanistan Falls, Mass Evacuation of Afghans Occurs

A member of the U.S. Marine Corps escorts Afghan evacuees to a plane at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar. (Photo: Lance Cpl. Kyle Jia/U.S. Marine Corps)

More than 122,000 people had been airlifted from Kabul by the time the U.S. military completed its withdrawal from Afghanistan amid a surprisingly fast takeover by the Taliban in August. Among the Afghan evacuees were former military translators, guides, and others who had worked with the U.S. and allied governments and contractors. The Biden administration has expected that 95,000 Afghans would come to the United States by September 2022, in the most dramatic postwar evacuation of its kind since the end of the Vietnam War. Thousands of others were brought to the United Kingdom , which has announced plans to accept up to 20,000 in coming years, as well as Australia , Canada , and countries across continental Europe .

An array of legal pathways was used for these evacuees, potentially requiring migrants and governments to navigate complicated systems to access benefits and ultimately permanent residence. In the United States, tens of thousands of Afghans remained on U.S. military bases months after arrival . The largest group of Afghans in the United States was likely to be humanitarian parolees who were expected to seek asylum after arrival, though many also benefitted from the Special Immigration Visa (SIV) created for people who assisted the U.S. mission. The United Kingdom announced a new bespoke resettlement route for Afghans, modeled after a previous system for Syrians.

Despite the specific visa pathways, there were at times major bureaucratic delays in processing cases and acknowledged failures to evacuate tens of thousands of others who remained in Afghanistan and in danger for having worked with U.S. and allied forces.  Even as communities have opened their arms to the new arrivals, integration challenges could be significant for Afghans who experienced  trauma and other harms while fleeing their native country under duress.

Afghanistan’s neighbors, which for years have hosted the largest number of Afghan refugees, were also affected by the messy U.S. withdrawal, and many closed border crossings to prevent large numbers of arrivals. As of December, nearly 97,000 Afghans arrived in neighboring countries needing protection, according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), adding to the 2.2 million refugees and asylum seekers already residing in Pakistan, Iran, and other neighbors. However, true numbers are likely to be higher; Iranian officials have said unofficially that between 100,000 and 300,000 Afghans may have arrived in Iran over the course of 2021.

Slightly farther afield, Turkey reinforced defenses along its eastern border with Iran to prevent unauthorized arrivals of Afghan and other migrants. Neighboring Greece, anxious about a repeat of the hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers and other migrants who arrived in 2015 and 2016, also solidified its barriers with Turkey.

The long-term consequences of the withdrawal are unknown, but the likelihood of dire conditions in Afghanistan—including the reality that millions of Afghans are facing famine as winter descends, brutal rule by the Taliban, and a growing economic crisis —could prompt new waves of humanitarian migrants in months to come.

Issue No. 7: At Europe’s Edge, "Weaponizing" Migration for Geopolitical Aims

A woman at a migrant camp near the Belarus-Poland border. (Photo: UNHCR/Natalia Prokopchuk)

Migration is rarely disconnected from issues of geopolitics. But around Europe’s periphery, 2021 saw countries take new steps to wield their management of migration flows as tools to achieve broader aims.

Most notably, tensions between the European Union and Belarus (and to some degree Russia, Minsk’s close ally) escalated after EU officials imposed sanctions on the Lukashenko government for diverting a May flight carrying a Belarusian dissident . In subsequent months, thousands of migrants attempted to illegally cross from Belarus into Poland , Lithuania , and Latvia , in what U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and others derided as a Belarusian government attempt to “ weaponize migration .” Most of these migrants from Iraq, Afghanistan, or other countries far afield had traveled directly to Minsk from Iraq and were then helped to the EU border by Belarusian officials, according to reports.

In response, Poland built a razor-wire fence along the border, sent troops to secure it, and began efforts to build an 18-foot (5.5-meter) wall. Thousands of migrants were trapped in the middle and endured brutal conditions while camped out in a forest without adequate supplies as temperatures plunged. Several migrants died .

On the other end of the continent, Moroccan officials in May seemed to allow as many as 12,000 migrants to cross into the Spanish enclave city of Ceuta, in apparent retaliation for Spain’s offer of health-care treatment to the leader of the Polisario Front, a group that has spent decades fighting for independence of Western Sahara. Relations along the border cities have at times been uneasy in the past, but they deteriorated further amid economic challenges that followed the COVID-19 pandemic.

The episodes were not unprecedented, and were foreshadowed most explicitly in 2020, when Turkey ushered thousands of migrants to the Greek border in a bout of brinksmanship with EU leaders over a pre-existing migration deal and military operations in Syria. In some ways, these actions herald a new era in international relations: as the European Union and other significant migrant destinations enroll peripheral countries to manage flows under a growing focus on externalization, these border countries find themselves with new leverage.

Issue No. 8: Migration Streams through the Western Hemisphere Diversify

A mural representing migrants' journey on the wall of a shelter near the Guatemala-Mexico border. (Photo: UNHCR/Tito Herrera)

South and Central America in 2021 were a throughway for a growing and increasingly diverse group of northbound migrants, some coming from Africa, Asia, and beyond. The treacherous Darién Gap in Panama has long served as a barrier for migrants seeking to cross South America into Central America, but was transited more than ever in 2021. The approximately 122,000 people who passed through the jungle as of the end of October was quadruple the previous record of 30,000 arrivals in all of 2016.

The migrants were from countries across the Americas as well as outside the region. The most prominent among them were tens of thousands of Haitians, many of whom had been living elsewhere in South America since the 2010 earthquake that leveled parts of Haiti. Brazil and Chile had been common destinations for these migrants in previous years, but recent economic, political, and social turns in those countries prompted many to set off again. In September, more than 15,000 Haitian migrants suddenly massed at a remote section of the U.S.-Mexico border, prompting U.S. officials to fly more than 8,500 on expulsion flights back to Haiti, where many had not lived in years. Although the numbers arriving at the U.S. border subsequently declined, thousands of Haitians continued to pass from Colombia into Panama during the fall.

Haitians were not alone. The year also saw new flows of migrants from Cuba , South America , sub-Saharan Africa , and elsewhere. Fiscal year (FY) 2021 saw a more than sevenfold increase compared to the prior year in U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) encounters of migrants from countries other than El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico. Notably, a significant share of these migrants were Black, which raised complicated questions in the United States and other countries grappling with issues of racial equity.

Migrants’ movement was a response to several factors, among them the imbalance in countries’ economic recoveries from the COVID-19 pandemic. While the United States and other wealthy countries bounced back, South America experienced the heaviest economic blow from the pandemic. Many migrants’ expectations that they would receive a warm welcome in the United States also seemed to be a factor in their movement.

In response, governments attempted alternatingly to coordinate and contain. Panama and Colombia struck a deal in August to limit the number of migrants able to cross the Darién, which mirrored the pre-existing “controlled flow” agreement between Panama and Costa Rica. Mexico has largely relied on trying to contain migrants in the south of the country and took to breaking up caravans of migrants to halt their passage, at times offering humanitarian visas and using other tactics to relieve pressure . While the United States had been the ultimate aim of many migrants, these efforts have prompted some to seek out new lives in Mexico and other countries that have been traditionally been used primarily only for transit, but where growing numbers of migrants are deciding to settle, perhaps permanently .

Issue No. 9: The United States Joins Europe in Focus on "Root Causes" of Migration

Fog rolls through a field in Guatemala. (Photo: Tory Taylor/USAID)

Efforts to address the so-called root causes of migration by tackling poverty, insecurity, impacts of climate change, and other issues in migrant-origin countries gained new momentum in 2021. Using economic development to curb irregular migration is a years-old proposition for Europe, most prominently through the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) which launched in 2015. The efforts have evolved and grown more nuanced in recent years, and have recently adopted a less explicit migration focus such as with the new Neighbourhood, Development, and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI).

Across the Atlantic, U.S. President Joe Biden seemed to echo the European approach by restarting a previously intermittent effort by his country to focus on development in Central America . The $4 billion plan focuses on El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—in recent years the origins of the largest number of new irregular migration to the United States. The plan aims to use foreign assistance and other measures to target five elements at the root of regional migration: economic insecurity, corruption, threats to human rights, organized crime, and violence. The effort bore traces of the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America, which was unveiled by President Barack Obama in 2014 but subsequently scaled back during the Trump administration. That earlier effort yielded mixed results, and the United States’ uneasy relationships with some Central American leaders suggests there may be challenges in the future.

The relationship between development and migration is complex and often indirect. While greater wealth may prompt some would-be migrants to stay in place, it may also give others the means to afford a journey that would have been otherwise impossible.

Yet the moves by the Biden administration suggest that leaders on both sides of the Atlantic have been persuaded by arguments that economic stagnation, corruption, and other factors contributing to emigration can be at least partially addressed by development assistance. This marks a change from just a few years ago, when leaders were more likely to embrace preventative measures such as the Trump administration’s “zero tolerance” policy or efforts to bottle up asylum seekers and other migrants in Libya and Turkey. Although externalization of migration management remains a tempting tool to prevent some migrants from reaching European and U.S. borders—or quickly expel those who do—policies in 2021 also looked farther afield to conditions within migrant-origin countries.

Issue No. 10: Remittance Flows Beat the Odds to Grow Despite Pandemic

An elderly woman counts money in China. (Photo: Curt Carnemark/World Bank)

At the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the conventional wisdom was that international remittances would slow to a trickle . Migrants and diaspora members who had lost jobs due to the global economic downturn, the thinking went, would be unable to send money back to their countries of origin or ancestry, imperiling families and communities depending on those transfers.

But as in so many other areas, the pandemic created surprises. After a modest drop in 2020, remittances remained surprisingly strong in 2021, increasing by 7 percent to a total projected $589 billion sent to low- and middle-income countries. Money transfers were projected to have increased to every region of the world except East Asia and the Pacific and grew the most (by 22 percent) to Latin America and the Caribbean.

Why were predictions so wrong? In part, the strong remittances were in line with longer running findings that money transfers increase during times of crisis. While this logic tended to assume that the crisis was on just one end of the remittance system, affecting either the senders or receivers, the pandemic suggested that a similar phenomenon occurs when both sides are impacted. The swift economic recovery and government-led stimulus programs in the United States and Europe were other likely factors. So too was the increase in oil prices, which most affected senders in Russia and countries in the Middle East.

Another reason was that the costs of sending money dropped slightly as many services moved from cash- to digital-based systems. The significantly fewer travelers during the pandemic meant that fewer individuals hand-carried cash and goods; instead, more people sent money via digital platforms such as mobile money and online wallets. El Salvador embraced the notion wholeheartedly in September when it adopted the cryptocurrency bitcoin as legal tender, in part to reduce remittance costs (remittances account for around one-quarter of El Salvador’s gross domestic product, more than all but a handful of other countries). Still, mobile services represent a small share of the ways that people sent money, in part because they require a bank account. The costs of sending remittances averaged 6.3 percent through the first six months of the year, more than double the 3 percent target set by the United Nations.

For countries and communities that received large amounts of remittances, the money was often a lifeline that served to meet subsistence needs and immediate expenses such as to buy food, pay for health care, and cover utilities.

Early Human Migration

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Disregarding the extremely inhospitable spots even the most stubborn of us have enough common sense to avoid, humans have managed to cover an extraordinary amount of territory on this earth. Go back 200,000 years, however, and Homo sapiens was only a newly budding species developing in Africa , while perceived ancestors such as Homo erectus and Homo heidelbergensis had already travelled beyond Africa to explore parts of Eurasia, and sister species like the Neanderthal and Denisovan would traipse around there way before we did, too. Meanwhile, the wake-up calls of Homo floresiensis , found in Indonesia, and Homo naledi from South Africa (which do not seem to fit with previous, more linear models) serve as excellent reminders that the story of human migrations across the prehistoric landscape is far from a simple one.

How, when, and why both fellow Homo species and our own Homo sapiens started moving all over the place is hotly debated. The story of early human migration covers such an immense time span and area that there cannot be but one explanation for all of these groups of adventurous hunter-gatherers going wandering around. Where for some groups a change in climate may have pushed them to seek more hospitable lands, others may have been looking for better food sources, avoiding hostile or competing neighbours, or may have simply been curious risk-takers wanting a change of scenery. This puzzle is further complicated by the fact that only a highly fragmentary fossil record exists (and we do not know exactly how fragmentary it is, or which bits are missing). Recently, the field of genetics has shot to the forefront by analysing ancient DNA, adding to the fossil, climatic, and geological data, so that hopefully we can attempt to piece together a story from all these titbits.

This story will keep changing, however - at least in the details but perhaps even amounting to considerable overhauls - as new bones are dug up, tools are found, and more DNA is studied with increasing accuracy. Here, a basic overview will be provided based on what we think we know right now, alongside a discussion of the possible motivations these many different early humans may have had to migrate away from their homelands, across the far reaches of our globe.

Early transcontinental adventurers

Already millions of years ago, middle and late Miocene hominoids – among which were the ancestors of our species of Homo as well as of the great apes – were present not just in Africa but also in parts of Eurasia. Our own branch developed in Africa, though; the Australopithecines , our supposed ancestors, lived in East and South Africa's grasslands. The earliest Homo to be securely found outside of Africa seems to be Homo erectus around 2 million years ago, and when interpreted in the broad sense (there is some dispute over which fossils should be included within the species) it is seen to have set the bar high, spanning an impressive geographical range indeed.

However, the very tricky to place species of Homo floresiensis (nicknamed 'hobbit'), found at Liang Bua in Indonesia, must be named, too; it may be descendant from a very early (before or not long after Erectus ) and still unknown migration from Africa. Clues are trickling in about migrations of people possibly predating Homo erectus , anyway. By now, five or six sites in Eurasia together span an suggested timeframe of roughly 2,6-2 million years ago, sporting tools made by as of yet unknown species; recent finds at Shangchen in the southern Chinese Loess Plateau, for instance, indicate hominin occupation there that dates back as far as 2,1 million years ago. Palaeoanthropologist John Hawks suspects that 'there were many movements and dispersals from Africa and back into Africa, starting much earlier than 2 million years ago and extending up to the most recent.' (Hawks, 12 July 2018). The main model followed today – that of Erectus being the first globetrotting humans spreading out from Africa across Eurasia – does not seem to account for all the evidence cropping up today. But, seeing that we do not have enough material yet to flesh out a more complex story, Homo erectus must still play a feature role in our story of early human migration.

Popping up in East Africa at sites such as Olduvai Gorge in the Turkana Basin in Kenya, from roughly 1,9 million years ago onwards, Homo erectus is also seen in South and North Africa. They are generally thought to have gone wandering out of Africa by 1,9-1,8 million years ago, travelling through the Middle East and the Caucasus and onwards towards Indonesia and China , which they reached around 1,7-1,6 million years ago. Erectus may even have braved the normally cold north of China in a period with somewhat milder temperatures, as early as roughly 800,000 years ago.

The follow-up crew

Erectus had set the trend for far-reaching early human migration, and their successors would push the boundaries further still. By around 700,000 years ago (and perhaps as early as 780,000 years ago), Homo heidelbergensis is thought to have developed from Homo erectus within Africa. There, different bands made territories within East, South, and North Africa their own. Of course, migration within Africa itself also occurred, in general.

From there on, a particularly energetic group of Homo heidelbergensis spread out all the way through western Eurasia, crossing the major mountain ranges of Europe and making it as far north as England and Germany. This is Ice Age Europe we are talking about, and these humans would have had to flow along with the often-changing climate; they were quite good at coping with the colder conditions of Europe and were able to survive on the southern edge of the subarctic zone, but naturally avoided the actual ice sheets. Evidence from Pakefield and Happisburgh in England, for instance, shows that early humans around 700,000 years ago were indeed able to make it this far north when the climate was more temperate, while they probably edged back into southern refuges during colder stages.

Homo Sapiens Spreads out

Meanwhile, what we call Homo sapiens gradually began to emerge, most likely from Heidelbergensis ancestors within the rich territories of Africa, in either Africa's southern or eastern reaches, by at least 200,000 years ago. Many sites have been found in both these regions that show that early bands of anatomically modern humans successfully lived there. However, they were not alone; the discovery in 2013 CE of Homo naledi in South Africa's Rising Star Cave, whose fossils were dated to between 236,000-335,000 years old, adds more players to the African stage. Already around c. 315,000 years ago, a species with some modern human features but also some archaic ones – possibly making them a precursor to Sapiens , or a related side-branch – lived out at Jebel Irhoud in Morocco, Northern Africa, too. Genetic evidence furthermore seems to suggest that our modern human ancestors may well have had company from other ancient groups that were related to them in varying degrees. The story of hominin evolution is not one in which single species succeeded each other; it was rather a complex mosaic of different players, many of them likely interbreeding and/or overlapping in terms of timeframe.

From Africa, members of the branch that is related to us modern humans formed migrated away from their homelands and into the Near East, where Homo sapiens burials have been uncovered at the sites of Skhul and Qafzeh in Israel, dated to between 90,000 and a staggering 130,000 years old, respectively. Similarly, the site of Jebel Faya in the United Arab Emirates seems to show through the tools that were found there that Homo sapiens may have migrated here as early as 130,000 years ago, too. Even older migrations are not exactly unlikely, either, as fossils that appear to be Homo sapiens (although some alternatives have been suggested, too) found at Misliya Cave in Israel were recently found and dated to c. 180,000 years ago. Far from there being one, singular big migration of one species to far-flung areas – which does not really make sense if you think about it, anyway – there appear to have been multiple instances of adventurous people moving about.

A recent study has shown that some of these early adventurers made it all the way to the island of Sumatra in western Indonesia between 73,000 and 63,000 years ago; this ties in well with other evidence that hints at humans reaching inner Southeast Asia some time before 60,000 years ago, and then following the retreating glaciers up towards the north. There is even new evidence that places humans in the north of Australia by 65,000 years ago, seemingly also stemming from an early migration.

But which route did they take on this huge trek? Regarding possible ways out of Africa, Egypt is an option, but so is a journey through 'wet' corridors in the Sahara, through East Africa and into the Levant . Once out, we know through genetic research that in this Near Eastern setting, humans met Neanderthals and interbred with them (not for the first time, by the way: physical contact with them dates back to at least 100,000 years ago), after which an offshoot branched off and eventually migrated into Europe around 45,000 years ago.

Within Europe, modern humans probably dispersed rapidly, as hinted at by new evidence for their seemingly early arrival in southern Spain (for instance at Bajondillo Cave, Málaga) c. 43,000 years ago. In such a scenario of consistent and quick spread throughout Europe, the use of coastal corridors may have played a role. Homo sapiens also continued towards the east, though, probably all the way along the coastline, through India and into Southeast Asia, where they may have bumped into the possibly resident Denisovans and interbred with them (it is clear interbreeding happened somewhere, and the most likely location seems to be Southeast Asia).

All of this apparently happened at record speed; already by 53,000 years ago, descendants of that main wave out of Africa reached the north of Australia, the south taking until around 41,000 years ago. Reaching it was not straightforward, though. Although sea levels were about 100 meters lower than today, there was still a slightly inconvenient amount of water – a stretch of some 70 km – standing in between these early Homo sapiens in Asia and the landmass that included Australia, Tasmania, and New Guinea. Rather than surviving such an ambitious swim, they probably built boats or rafts to help them on this gutsy crossing.

Meanwhile, within Asia, a migration towards the north of East Asia could have begun around 40,000 years ago, paving the way to the Bering Land Bridge – a happy grassland steppe-covered side effect of the Ice Age, connecting Asia to the Americas. Humans are usually thought to have reached the Americas through this route, by around 15,000 years ago, expanding downwards along the coast or through an ice-free corridor in the interior, but this is far from a closed case. After this, there were some last strongholds that remained human-free for a long time still, such as Hawaii – reached by boat around 100 CE – and New Zealand, which held out until around 1000 CE.

Possible driving forces

The question of why these prehistoric people decided to leave and move somewhere else is a tough nut to crack, especially considering we are looking at a time that predates written sources. Migration is generally seen a result of push and pull factors, though, so that is a place to start. Push factors relate to the circumstances that can make someone's homeland an unpleasant enough place for them to ditch it entirely in favour of something new. With regard to these early human migrations, of course 'no jobs' or 'terrible political circumstances' do not apply; rather, think of stuff like the climate taking a turn for the worse and turning places into huge ovens or freezers where barely anything can live or grow, natural disasters, competition with hostile neighbouring groups, food and other resources running too low to support the amount of people within an area, or the more mobile type of food (herds of herbivores) migrating away.

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Pull factors, on the other hand, involve the draw of new possibilities and rewards; basically, the more favourable side of the things mentioned in the 'push' section, such as greener lands with better climates and luscious amounts of food and resources. Of course, this is a bit of a simplification, and it will be hard to track down the exact combination of factors that led to each individual instance of early human migration.

There are some prerequisites for successfully handling migration. It is stressful and dangerous – Homo erectus , for instance, most likely had no idea what they would find when they left Africa – and it challenges a group's resourcefulness and ability to adapt. If you move into a new environment, it helps to have adequate technology to help you tackle it; in this case, tools to successfully hunt and gather the resident animals and plants, or to protect yourself against colder areas via clothing or fire (the latter has been known by humans since probably at least 1,8 million years ago, but was not habitually used until probably between 500,000-400,000 years ago). Inventiveness and cooperation in securing new resources also help.

There was the slight problem of the Sahara standing between Homo sapiens and a possible way out, however. Other climate studies have shown, though, that there were 'wet' or 'green' phases during which more friendly corridors would have opened to form pathways across the Sahara, the timings of which seem to coincide with the major dispersal of humans leaving sub-Saharan Africa (identified wet periods are between roughly 50,000-c. 45,000 years ago and c. 120,000-c. 110,000 years ago). However, a recent study has shown that although the 'wet' phase holds up for Sapiens ' early migration into the Levant and Arabia between roughly 120,000-90,000 years ago, during the time of the main migration (around 55,000 years ago) the Horn of Africa was actually really dry, arid, and a bit colder. This may, then, have helped push the main wave out.

Another instance in which the impact of the climate on early human migration seems to become visible occurs even earlier. Around 870,000 years ago, temperatures dropped, and both North Africa and eastern Europe became a lot more arid than before. This may have caused large herbivores to migrate into southern European refuges, with early humans following hard on their tails. At the same time, the Po Valley in northern Italy first opened up and formed a pathway for possible migration into southern France and beyond. This ties in pretty well with Homo heidelbergensis making its way into Europe. Following herds of large herbivores would have been a good strategy in the challenging process of migration, anyway, and a 2016 CE study suggests Homo erectus may also have done this, while also sticking close to flint deposits and avoiding areas with loads of carnivores, at least early on in their dispersal.

Whatever the exact driving forces or the exact difficulties early humans ran into en route, as time passed adaptability reigned supreme and humans – starting with Homo erectus and culminating in Homo sapiens ' greedy dispersal - spread across the whole wide world.

Blind spots

There are obviously a lot of holes in this story, though, and it cannot hurt to explicitly name some of the blind spots we have to take into consideration at this point in time. As a whole, the dates mentioned above are only our best estimates based on our interpretation of the data we have gathered so far. Some areas in which the story can be fleshed out a lot more if we can get our hands on more evidence are found below.

The Denisovans, for instance, are known to us only through one finger bone and three molars found in a cave in Siberia, and through their DNA (their genome was sequenced in 2010 CE) which seems to imply they ranged from there all the way to Southeast Asia. It is moreover possible that they interbred with an unknown archaic human, which would obviously tell a story of its own. Fossils of these mysterious humans would be very welcome in trying to fill in the picture of their life and their movement. Another enigmatic species is Homo floresiensis ; exactly how and when did they get to the island of Flores (and did they somehow use boats at this very early point in time)? Who were their ancestors? More evidence is required to seal the deal on this.

More evidence is clearly needed before this can overwrite the current story regarding the Americas, but it forms a good example of what could happen to our current image of early human migration as new discoveries are made. We certainly cannot paint a complete and finished picture yet.

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Homo Heidelbergensis

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Groeneveld, E. (2017, May 15). Early Human Migration . World History Encyclopedia . Retrieved from https://www.worldhistory.org/article/1070/early-human-migration/

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Groeneveld, Emma. " Early Human Migration ." World History Encyclopedia . Last modified May 15, 2017. https://www.worldhistory.org/article/1070/early-human-migration/.

Groeneveld, Emma. " Early Human Migration ." World History Encyclopedia . World History Encyclopedia, 15 May 2017. Web. 13 Sep 2024.

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Exploring migration causes: why people migrate

People migrate for many reasons, ranging from security, demography and human rights to poverty and climate change. Find out more.

The total number of non-EU citizens residing within the EU as of 1 January 2021 was 23.7 million, according to Eurostat, the EU’s statistical office. This represents 5.3% of the EU population. In most EU countries, the majority of non-nationals were from outside the EU.

What is migration?

Migration is the movement of people from one place to another, to settle in a new location. Migration can be voluntary or involuntary and can occur for a variety of different reasons, including economic, environmental and social issues.

Reasons for migration: push and pull factors

Push factors are the reasons people leave a country. Pull factors are the reason they move to a particular country. There are three major push and pull factors.

Social and political factors

Persecution because of one's ethnicity, religion, race, politics or culture can push people to leave their country. A major factor is war, conflict, government persecution or there being a significant risk of them. Those fleeing armed conflict, human rights violations or persecution are more likely to be humanitarian refugees. This will affect where they settle as some countries have more liberal approaches to humanitarian migrants than others. In the first instance, these people are likely to move to the nearest safe country that accepts asylum seekers.

The backbone of international humanitarian law is the Geneva Conventions , which regulate the conduct of armed conflict and seek to limit its effects.

In recent years, people have been fleeing to Europe in large numbers from conflict, terror and persecution at home. Of the 384,245 asylum seekers granted protection status in the EU in 2022, more than a quarter came from war-torn Syria, with Afghanistan and Venezuela in second and third place respectively.

Demographic and economic causes

Demographic change determines how people move and migrate. A growing or shrinking, aging or youthful population has an impact on economic growth and employment opportunities in the countries of origin or migration policies in the destination countries.

Demographic and economic migration is related to poor labour standards, high unemployment and the overall health of a country’s’ economy. Pull factors include higher wages, better employment opportunities, a higher standard of living and educational opportunities. If economic conditions are not favourable and appear to be at risk of declining further, a greater number of people will probably migrate to countries with a better outlook.

According to the UN International Labour Organization, migrant workers - defined as people who migrate with a view to being employed - stood at roughly 169 million worldwide in 2019 and represented more than two thirds of international migrants. More than two-thirds of all migrant workers were concentrated in high-income countries.

Environmental and climate migration

The environment has always been a driver of migration, as people flee natural disasters, such as floods, hurricanes and earthquakes. However, climate change is expected to exacerbate extreme weather events, meaning more people could be on the move.

According to the International Organization for Migration , "Environmental migrants are those who for reason of sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad."

It is hard to estimate how many environmental migrants there are globally due to factors such as population growth, poverty, governance, human security and conflict, which have an impact. Estimates vary from 25 million to one billion by the year 2050.

How is the EU addressing these causes?

Migrant workers having easier access to legal ways to move to the eu.

The European Union has been encouraging legal migration to address labour shortages, fill skill gaps and boost economic growth. These include:

• The EU Blue Card: a work and residency permit that allows non-EU citizens to work and live in an EU country, provided they have a degree or equivalent qualification and a job offer that meets a minimum salary threshold
• The Single Permit: a combined work and residency permit, issued for up to two years by an EU country
• EU long-term resident status: allows people from outside the EU to stay, work and move freely in the EU for an indefinite period
• Read more about legal ways to work in the EU

New Pact on Migration and Asylum

Managing migration effectively to deal with asylum seekers and protect external borders has been an EU priority for many years. The EU has been working on a New Pact on Migration and Asylum , and in April 2024 Parliament backed an agreement with the Counci to revamp the EU’s asylum and migration laws.

The pact sets out improved and faster procedures throughout the EU’s asylum and migration system. It revises the Dublin regulation, which determines the country responsible for processing each asylum claim. The new system sets different types of contributions from EU countries, including the relocation of asylum seekers from the country of first entry, financial contributions or providing operational and technical support. The new system is based on solidarity and flexible forms of support, which could become requirements at times of pressure .

Once the new rules come into force, EU countries will have two years to incorporate them into their national laws.

• Read more about the EU’s response to migration
• Facts and figures on asylum and migration in the EU

More about migration

• Study: interlinks between migration and development
• Briefing: legal migration to the EU

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7 Migrants Share Their Stories of Struggle and Resilience

Author: Joe McCarthy

Oct. 29, 2019

There are more than 258 million migrants in the world. A growing proportion of them are migrating by irregular means, secretly crossing borders, scaling fences, or contacting smugglers who ship them across bodies of water, deserts, and conflict zones. They risk violence, detention, exploitation, enslavement, and death. They often leave their families and friends behind. Their journeys usually burden them with debt.

When they arrive in a new country, these migrants often live in the shadows, unable to get identification paperwork, legal protections, and other safeguards of citizenship. As a result, they often work in low-paying, exploitative jobs and have trouble finding shelter, support networks, and accessing other basic human rights. 

To make matters worse, they’re regularly vilified and face routine discrimination.

“You abandon everything you’ve ever known, and come to a foreign land, only to be subjected to all types of discrimination and violations,” Yerima, a migrant from Togo who traveled to Spain , told the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

The UNDP recently surveyed 1,970 migrants from 39 African countries who traveled to 12 European countries. Their voices are included in a sweeping new report on irregular migration, its causes and consequences, its geopolitical ramifications, and how it can be humanely addressed. 

The report, Scaling Fences: Voices of Irregular African Migrants to Europe , relied on migrants sharing their experiences. Here are some of their stories, as told to the UNDP  and provided to Global Citizen for publication.

Aziz Abdoul, Senegal to France

Aziz Abdoul is from Senegal and now lives in Grenoble, France. Aziz Abdoul is from Senegal and now lives in Grenoble, France. He is an artist and works a lot for his community in Ville Nouve, a neighborhood in Grenoble. Image: @ Lena Mucha/UNDP

I had a decent life back home in Senegal and ran two businesses. But in 2008, I made the decision to travel.

Not because I was facing difficulties or had financial troubles. I wanted to travel because I wanted to experience other cultures. I wanted to live and work in a country that wasn’t my own. I always saw foreigners come to visit Senegal, but I had no idea what their part of their world was like.

I am an artist at heart, and I yearned to experience artistic expressions that were different from my own.

I wanted to see more, explore more, and learn more. That was the main motivation behind me leaving. Now that I am here in Europe, I am making the best of my situation. Faith and hope keep me going. Faith kept me alive during the difficult journey here, and hope allows me to look forward to a brighter future.

Fortunately, I’ve been able to make a reputation for myself here, performing and showcasing my artwork to large audiences. This is what I have always wanted to do — share my culture with the world.

Music is my escape. When I play, I am transported into a different realm. I want people who listen to my music to forget their earthly worries. There is so much suffering in the world.

Ultimately, we all want the same things in life: good health, decent jobs, liberty, and freedom to pursue opportunities for our families and ourselves. And because many people don’t feel they have that in Africa, they come to Europe. If I had one thing to say to our African leaders, it is that the population does not belong to you. You belong to the people. You have to respect them and create opportunities for them so they are not risking their lives.

Carole, Cameroon to France

Carole Mengue is originally from Cameroon and now lives in Grenoble, France with her two-year-old son. Carole Mengue is originally from Cameroon and now lives in Grenoble, France with her two-year-old son. Image: @ Lena Mucha/UNDP

I never attended school. My father believed there was no value in girls attending school. He said I should focus instead on tending the house and preparing for marriage. And yet, I always knew my father was wrong. I longed to get educated. I knew that if you could not read or write, your place in life would be meaningless. In my community, women and girls who attended school were much better off than those who didn’t.

The thought of leaving my country had never crossed my mind. But then, I met some friends who encouraged me to consider leaving. They said if I left, I could have a better life. They said I would make a lot of money styling hair in Europe and even learn other skills.

And so I left Cameroon and eventually ended up in Algeria, where I spent two years. Algeria is a challenging country for blacks because of the level of racism there. While in Algeria, I had a baby boy.

When he was just 3 months old, I embarked on the journey to Europe. We spent three days traveling by sea. It was extremely cold and we had no vests, no blankets, no protection, and very little food. I would not advise even my worst enemy to take this journey.

I landed in Italy and spent six very difficult months in a camp. We were mistreated, fed spoiled food, and received inadequate healthcare when we were sick. The conditions were inhumane.

In the end, I made it to France. I like it here. My wish is to get my work papers and get training in something other than styling hair. No matter what, I know that my son will have a better future than I did.

Helen, Nigeria to Italy

Esther Sunday, is from Nigeria and now lives in Rome, Italy. Esther Sunday, is from Nigeria and now lives in Rome, Italy. Image: @ Lena Mucha/UNDP

Staying in Africa meant one of two things: getting married at a young age, or getting pregnant at a young age. Both would have shattered my dreams. I did not want to waste my potential.

I made my way to Europe via Libya. I spent a year working in Libya as a cleaner and maid for a wonderful Spanish family. They treated me well and saw me as their daughter. A conflict erupted in Libya and the family had to leave for Spain. They asked me to go with them, but I was unable to leave because I did not have enough time to get a passport. They left and promised to file for me to join them in Spain.

I did not wait for the family to send me an invitation to Spain. I took it upon myself and found my way to Italy. I arrived in 2014 and am still trying to navigate my way through. I don’t have many complaints about being here. Sometimes I feel accepted and other times I feel like a foreigner. The main issues I have are the barriers to fully integrate into Italian society, especially the language barriers if you want to study or apply for job. Fortunately, I was able to find a job working as a secretary at a government agency. I also sing and write, so I volunteer at the refugee center as a choir director, and style hair on the side to earn extra money.

But these are all temporary situations. I want to further my studies and build my professional career. I have thought about exploring other countries like Germany, Sweden, or Canada that may have better opportunities. I am destined for far greater things in life. And I know I will accomplish my goals.

Kone, Ivory Coast to France

Kone Larouba Nza is from Cote D' Ivoire and arrived in France in 2016. Currently he lives in Lyon. Kone Larouba Nza is from Cote D' Ivoire and arrived in France in 2016. Currently he lives in Lyon. Image: @ Lena Mucha/UNDP

I wanted a life where I could earn a living and support my mother and siblings. I felt sad that my country did not provide young people like me the promise of a brighter future, and I was determined to take matters into my own hands.

I have been in France for two years now. I have a small community of friends, mostly from various parts of Africa, but I also have French friends. It can get very lonely here. I did not expect how hard it would be to settle into French society.

When you hear about Europe, you think it is filled with endless opportunities. And there are opportunities, but they are not immediately available when you come into the country the way I did. You’re not treated like a citizen. There are many hurdles before you can start to lead a normal life.

When I first arrived, I spent time in a shelter. I got into trouble and was arrested and spent time in prison, and I had a hard time finding my way. But eventually, I was able to get my residence permit. I miss my mother a lot. I call her often. I tell her about my life here in France. I tell her that everything is OK even when it’s not.

I have always dreamt of becoming a footballer like Yaya Toure. He’s Ivorian too. I admire his life story, how he became a footballer. But I know that becoming a football star is hard, so I’m putting my energy into something more attainable. I’m training at a restaurant because I like to cook. My wish is to open a restaurant one day. I’m not sure what I would call it — maybe Chez Kone. But one thing I do know is that African food will be served.

Miguel, Cameroon to France

Miguel Mbinowa Ngnobidadji is pictured at his cooking school in Vernet les Bains, France. He currently lives in Perpignan. Miguel Mbinowa Ngnobidadji is pictured at his cooking school in Vernet les Bains, France. He currently lives in Perpignan. Image: @ Lena Mucha/UNDP

My life back in Cameroon was not a great one. I grew up very poor and life in the village was hard. I couldn’t afford school. If I had work, I would not have left my country. But when things are not going well and you feel stuck, you are forced to leave for better opportunities elsewhere, no matter the cost. It’s not a matter of choice, it’s a matter of survival.

I am happy with my new life in France. I have all the things that I used to dream of: a job, a house, a car, access to public and social services — I am comfortable. I may not be at home, but I feel at home here. I spend most of my time working because for me, work is a luxury and something I take seriously. I don’t take for granted that I came here and found a way to gain employment and earn a living.

It’s a shame that one has to travel thousands of kilometers to someone else’s land to create a better life. I blame our leaders for most of these problems and if I had the chance to exchange words with African leaders, I would probably need an eternity.

It’s actually very simple: create opportunities for young people. Make sure our young children are in school and not out selling in the streets. Empower our girls and women. Provide access to services like health care. We should take these basic issues as human rights.

I tell my family and friends at home the truth about life here. I tell them about the difficulties of integrating and succeeding in this society. I feel it is my responsibility to be honest about the conditions, so they can make informed decisions. At the same time, I have been where they are now, and I know how trapped one can feel.

Vivian, Nigeria to Spain

Vivian Ntih, 43, is pictured with her daugthers Elizabeth, 9, and Mari Mensah Damson, 15. Vivian came from Nigeria to Spain in 2000 and lives now with her daugthers in Valencia. Vivian Ntih, 43, is pictured with her daugthers Elizabeth, 9, and Mari Mensah Damson, 15. Vivian came from Nigeria to Spain in 2000 and lives now with her daugthers in Valencia. Image: @ Lena Mucha/UNDP

My parents decided to send me to my aunt in Spain to find work. I arrived in Spain and spent one month in a refugee camp before being granted residence and a work permit.

My aunt and her husband picked me up from the train station in Madrid and I was asked me to hand them over all my documents. I soon learned the truth: my aunt and her husband were running a sex trafficking ring and tricked vulnerable young girls from Africa into sex work.

Never did I imagine that someone my parents trusted would be involved in trafficking.

I rejected customers and earned almost no money. My aunt decided she could not afford to keep me. We agreed that I would go to Valencia and find work to pay back the money for the journey to Spain — $20,000.

In Valencia, I went to a home that she had recommended — only to discover that the girls living there were all sex workers working for my aunt. I knew this was not a life for me, but I had no choice: without my papers, I couldn’t apply for formal jobs. After a few months, I met a man who wanted to help me.

He helped pay down my debt to my aunt until we paid it off entirely. After that, I cut off all ties with her.

I had my first daughter in 2003, and my second seven years later. My partner and I separated.

It has been almost 20 years since I came to Europe, and I've been through hell. There were days we were homeless with nothing to eat. But my daughters are my greatest blessings.

These days, I am taking classes to further my education. I want to protect girls that are at risk of trafficking.

I also want to fight for migrant rights.

Yerima, Togo to Spain

Yerima Gado is from Togo and now lives in Valencia, Spain. Yerima Gado is from Togo and now lives in Valencia, Spain. Image: @ Lena Mucha/UNDP

I lived with my parents until I was 18 years old. I worked as a driver but earned very little. So, I decided to leave for Europe. I went to Dakar where I spent six months, then to Mauritania. From there, I entered Europe via the Mediterranean.

A man is supposed to eat three times a day. If you have a family, you have to ensure they have food, shelter, medicine, and education. If you cannot provide those basic necessities for your family because of lack of opportunities in your country, then you have to try and find a way somewhere else.

I have a young daughter. When I left Togo, my daughter was just 2 months old. People may ask what kind of father I am, to leave behind my wife and infant daughter. But what kind of a father would I be, if I stayed and couldn’t provide them a decent life?

So, you abandon everything you’ve ever known, and come to a foreign land, only to be subjected to all types of discrimination and violations. The very rights that international organizations are meant to protect. But there is nothing you can do about it, because you’re not in your own land.

Many of our brothers and sisters died trying to come here. For what? We are losing our best and brightest to the Mediterranean Sea; to slavery and exploitation; and to European countries where their talents are being wasted. How can we say that Africa is a continent of young people, and that young people are the future, when we are losing so many?

5 Essays about Immigration

According to the UN, the number of international migrants surpassed 270 million in 2019. This represents an increase of 51 million since 2010. Nearly half of all international migrants moved to one of 10 countries. 19% of the world’s total immigrant population lives in the United States. One of every seven international migrants is younger than 20 years old. What are the stories behind these statistics? What does the world think of immigrants? To start answering these questions, here are five essays about immigration:

“Out of Eden Walk” (2013-present) – Paul Salopek

At the time of this 2019 essay, Paul Salopek has been walking for seven years. In 2013, he started from an ancient fossil site north of Ethiopia. His plan? Cover 21,000 miles over ten years, retracing humankind’s walk out of Africa. While he’s walking through the past, his project is also timely. Numbers-wise, we’re living with the largest diaspora in human history. More than 1 billion people are on the move, both within their own countries and beyond borders. During his journey, Salopek covers climate change, technological innovation, mass migration, and more. Through essays, photographs, audio, and video, he creates a vivid tapestry of stories from people rarely heard from. This essay is a great introduction to Salopek’s “slow journalism.” You can find more at OutofEdenWalk.org.

Journalist and writer Paul Salopek is a two-time Pulitzer Prize winner. He has reported for publications like The Atlantic and National Geographic Magazine. John Stanmeyer, who took the photos for this essay, is an Emmy-nominated filmmaker and photographer.

“Mohsin Hamid: why migration is a fundamental human right” (2014)

Author Mohsin Hamid was born in Pakistan and educated in the US. He lives in the UK. In this essay, he explains how he wishes for “a world without borders.” He believes the right to migrate (which includes emigration and immigration) is as vital as other human rights, like freedom of expression. People have always moved, crossing borders and sharing cultures. Humans are also migrants in that simply by living, we move through time. Unfortunately, this human right has been denied all over the world. Hamid looks forward to a day when migration is respected and welcomed.

Mohsin Hamid is the author of several books, including Discontent and Its Civilizations: Dispatches from Lahore, New York, and London. He writes both fiction and nonfiction.

“I’m a Dreamer. Ask my 80+ Employees if I should be deported.” (2020) – Victor Santos

Young and brilliant, Victor Santos is the founder of Airfox, a Boston-based tech startup. On the surface, Santos is living the American Dream. In this essay in the Boston Globe, he describes that for the past 10 years, he’s worried about ICE taking him away. He’s an undocumented immigrant dependent on DACA. Santos briefly describes his experience growing up in the US, working through college, and getting opportunities because of DACA. Following the publication of this piece, the Supreme Court ruled that the Trump administration cannot immediately end DACA. For now, Santos and the other hundreds of thousands of Dreamers are protected.

Victor Santos is the founder and CEO of Airfox, a loan app that uses mobile data to estimate credit risk. He was on the list of MIT Technology Review in Spanish’s Innovators Under 35 Latin America 2018.

“My Life As An Undocumented Immigrant” (2011) – Jose Antonio Vargas

Vargas opens this essay describing how, at 12-years old, he left the Philippines for the US in 1993. At 16, while going to get his driver’s permit, he was told his green card was fake. He realized he was undocumented. In this essay from 2011, partially inspired by four students who walked from Miami to Washington to lobby for the DREAM Act, he spoke out. The essay describes Vargas’ life and career in America, navigating the system with his secret. It’s a vivid, personal look at Vargas’ experience of “hiding” in plain sight and an act of courage as he owns his story.

Jose Antonio Vargas is a former reporter for the Washington Post. He shared a Pulitzer Prize for coverage of the Virginia Tech shooting. He is also a filmmaker, writer, and immigrant rights activist. He founded Define American, a nonprofit that strives for dialogue about immigration, in 2011.

“A Young Immigrant Has Mental Illness, And That’s Raising His Risk of Being Deported” – Christine Herman

Immigrants, especially undocumented immigrants, deal with a variety of challenges. One of them is the mental health care system. Those with untreated mental illnesses are at higher risk of getting in trouble with the law. When the person who is mentally ill is also undocumented, things get even more complicated. Deportation to a country with an even worse mental healthcare system could be a death sentence. This story from NPR is about a specific family, but it highlights issues that affect many.

Christine Herman is Ph.D. chemist and award-winning audio journalist. She’s a 2018-2019 recipient of a Rosalyn Carter fellowship for mental health journalism.

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About the author, emmaline soken-huberty.

Emmaline Soken-Huberty is a freelance writer based in Portland, Oregon. She started to become interested in human rights while attending college, eventually getting a concentration in human rights and humanitarianism. LGBTQ+ rights, women’s rights, and climate change are of special concern to her. In her spare time, she can be found reading or enjoying Oregon’s natural beauty with her husband and dog.

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• Copy URL https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/climate-change-is-already-fueling-global-migration-the-world-isnt-ready-to-meet-peoples-needs-experts-say

Climate change is already fueling global migration. The world isn’t ready to meet people’s changing needs, experts say

TIJUANA, Mexico (AP) — Worsening climate largely from the burning of coal and gas is uprooting millions of people, with wildfires overrunning towns in California, rising seas overtaking island nations and drought exacerbating conflicts in various parts of the world.

Each year, natural disasters force an average of 21.5 million people from their homes around the world, according to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. And scientists predict migration will grow as the planet gets hotter. Over the next 30 years, 143 million people are likely to be uprooted by rising seas, drought, searing temperatures and other climate catastrophes, according to the U.N.’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report published this year.

READ MORE: How climate change is hurting living things on Earth right now, according to a new report

Still, the world has yet to officially recognize climate migrants or come up with formalized ways to assess their needs and help them. Here’s a look at climate migration today.

Who are climate migrants?

Most climate migrants move within the borders of their homelands, usually from rural areas to cities after losing their home or livelihood because of drought, rising seas or another weather calamity. Because cities also are facing their own climate-related problems, including soaring temperatures and water scarcity, people are increasingly being forced to flee across international borders to seek refuge.

Yet climate migrants are not afforded refugee status under the 1951 Refugee Convention, which provides legal protection only to people fleeing persecution due to their race, religion, nationality, political opinion or particular social group.

Defining climate migration

Identifying climate migrants is not easy , especially in regions rife with poverty, violence and conflicts.

While worsening weather conditions are exacerbating poverty, crime and political instability, and fueling tensions over dwindling resources from Africa to Latin America, often climate change is overlooked as a contributing factor to people fleeing their homelands. According to the UNHCR, 90% of refugees under its mandate are from countries “on the front lines of the climate emergency.”

In El Salvador, for example, scores each year leave villages because of crop failure from drought or flooding, and end up in cities where they become victims of gang violence and ultimately flee their countries because of those attacks.

“It’s hard to say that someone moves just because of climate change. Is everyone who leaves Honduras after a hurricane a climate migrant?” Elizabeth Ferris, a research professor at the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University, wrote in an email to The Associated Press. “And then there are non-climate related environmental hazards – people flee earthquakes, volcanic eruptions and tsunamis – should they be treated differently than those displaced by weather-related phenomena?”

Despite the challenges, it’s vital that governments identify climate-displaced people, Ferris added.

“The whole definitional issue isn’t a trivial question – how can you develop a policy for people if you aren’t clear on who it applies to?” she wrote.

International efforts

While no nation offers asylum to climate migrants , UNHCR published legal guidance in October 2020 that opens the door for offering protection to people displaced by the effects of global warming. It said that climate change should be taken into consideration in certain scenarios when it intersects with violence, though it stopped short of redefining the 1951 Refugee Convention.

The commission acknowledged that temporary protection may be insufficient if a country cannot remedy the situation from natural disasters, such as rising seas, suggesting that certain climate displaced people could be eligible for resettlement if their place of origin is considered uninhabitable.

An increasing number of countries are laying the groundwork to become safe havens for climate migrants. In May, Argentina created a special humanitarian visa for people from Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean displaced by natural disasters to let them stay for three years.

Shortly after taking office, President Joe Biden ordered his national security adviser to conduct a months-long study that included looking at the “options for protection and resettlement of individuals displaced directly or indirectly from climate change.” A task force was set up, but so far the administration has not adopted such a program.

Low-lying Bangladesh, which is extremely vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, has been among the first to try to adapt to the new reality of migration. Efforts are underway to identify climate-resilient towns where people displaced by sea level rise, river erosion, cyclonic storms and intrusion of saline water can move to work, and in return help their new locations economically.

Transforming debates on migration

Policy debates on migration have long centered on locking down borders. Climate change is changing that.

With hundreds of millions of people expected to be uprooted by natural disasters, there is growing discussion about how to manage migration flows rather than stop them, as for many people migration will become a survival tool, according to advocates.

“One problem is just the complete lack of understanding as to how climate is forcing people to move,” said Amali Tower, founder and executive director of Climate Refugees, an advocacy group focused on raising awareness about people displaced because of climate change. “There is still this idea in the Global North (industrialized nations) that people come here because they are fleeing poverty and seeking a better life, the American Dream. In Europe, it’s the same spin of the same story. But no one wants to leave their home. We’ve got to approach climate displacement as a human security issue and not a border security issue.”

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European politicians say migration is out of control. The numbers tell a different story

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BARCELONA, Spain (AP) — Unauthorized migration to European Union countries dropped significantly overall in the first eight months of this year, even as political rhetoric and violence against migrants increased and far-right parties espousing anti-immigration policies made gains at the polls.

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There was, however, a spike in migrant arrivals to the Canary Islands, a Spanish archipelago close to the African coast that is increasingly used as an alternate stepping stone to continental Europe.

Irregular migration dominated the European parliamentary elections in June and influenced recent state elections in eastern Germany, where a far-right party won for the first time since World War II. The German government this week announced it was expanding border controls around its territory following recent extremist attacks.

What do the numbers show?

Despite the heated debates, irregular crossings over the southern borders of the EU — the region that sees the most unauthorized migration — were down by 35% from January to August, according to the latest preliminary figures compiled by the United Nation’s International Organization for Migration.

Nearly 115,000 migrants — less than 0.03% of the EU’s population — have arrived without permission into the EU via Mediterranean and Atlantic routes so far this year, compared to 176,252 during the same period last year, the U.N. says. In contrast, more than a million people, most of them fleeing conflict in Syria, entered the EU in 2015.

Data shared by the EU’s border and coast guard agency Frontex shows a similar trend: Unauthorized crossings over the region’s southern borders fell 39% overall this year compared to last year.

“The emergency is not numerical this year, nor was it last year,” Flavio di Giacomo, a spokesperson with the IOM office for the Mediterranean, told The Associated Press.

Camille Le Coz, an associate director of the nonprofit Migration Policy Institute in Europe, said irregular migration is “getting way too much attention compared to the scope of the issue and compared to other issues Europe should be tackling, such as climate change.”

The most commonly used route for migrants is from North Africa, across the dangerous Central Mediterranean to Italy. Yet roughly 64% fewer migrants disembarked in Italy this year than during the same period in 2023, according to IOM and Frontex numbers.

Experts say that’s a result of the EU-supported crackdown in Tunisia and Libya, which comes at a price for migrants, many of whom are systematically rounded up and dumped in the desert.

How long the downward trend will hold remains to be seen, however. Smugglers are always quick to adapt and find new routes around border controls. In the Eastern Mediterranean, the second-most-used route, smuggling networks are now using speedboats in increasingly aggressive ways to avoid controls and targeting islands farther away from the Turkish coast in the central Aegean, according to Greek authorities.

The number of migrants arriving in Greece by sea and overland during the first eight months of the year rose by 57%, U.N. data shows.

An alarming spike in the Atlantic

Meanwhile, irregular migration from West Africa to the Canary Islands via the Atlantic, the third-most-used route, has more than doubled: More than 25,500 migrants — mostly from Mali, Senegal and other West African countries — had arrived in the islands as of Aug. 31, the U.N. says.

Countless other migrants have gone missing along the route, where rough winds and strong Atlantic currents work against them. Several migrant boats, carrying only the remains of Malian, Mauritanian and Senegalese citizens, have been found this year drifting as far away as the Caribbean and off Brazil. Precise numbers are hard to verify, but the Spanish migrant rights group Walking Borders has reported more than 4,000 dead or missing.

The trend has Spanish authorities on alert for the fall, when conditions in the Atlantic are most favorable for the journey. The treacherousness of the route seems to have done little to dissuade would-be migrants, whose ranks have swelled to include people from Syria and Pakistan, according to rescuers.

“There are situations that need to be addressed, like the situation in the Canary Islands,” Le Coz acknowledged.

A humanitarian crisis

The adult migrants who successfully make it to the Canaries usually keep moving, headed for the promise of jobs and safety in mainland Spain or other European countries farther north. But that is not the case for thousands of unaccompanied minors. Under Spanish law, these young migrants must be taken under the wing of the local government, leading to overcrowded shelters and a political crisis. Earlier this year, island leaders fought unsuccessfully to have other regions of Spain share the responsibility.

Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez recently traveled to three West African countries in an attempt to curb migration. In Senegal, he and President Bassirou Diomaye Faye signed agreements to promote temporary work opportunities in Spain for Senegalese nationals and vocational training in Senegal. They also agreed to step up police cooperation.

No magic solutions

Current anti-immigrant sentiments notwithstanding, Europe’s aging population, declining birth rates and labor shortages have only increased the need for immigrant workers to sustain pensions and boost economic growth.

And as long as migrants lack opportunities in their own countries, their exodus will continue. Add to this the growing instability and conflict in parts of Africa, the Middle East and Asia that have displaced millions.

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“There is no magic deterrence,” Le Coz said. “Migrants end up taking the toll of all of this: They are risking their lives, doing jobs in Europe where they face uncertain legal status for years and are vulnerable to all sorts of exploitation.”

While long-term solutions to tackle unauthorized migration are being implemented, such as temporary work programs for migrants, they are still falling short.

“That’s one step in the right direction, but this needs to happen at a much larger scale, and they need the private sector to be more involved,” Le Coz added.

Follow AP’s coverage at https://apnews.com/hub/migration

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Unauthorized migration into the EU declined despite heated politics

Spain migration numbers.

BARCELONA, Spain (AP) — Unauthorized migration to European Union countries dropped significantly overall in the first eight months of this year, even as political rhetoric and violence against migrants increased and far-right parties espousing anti-immigration policies made gains at the polls.

There was, however, a spike in migrant arrivals to the Canary Islands, a Spanish archipelago close to the African coast that is increasingly used as an alternate stepping stone to continental Europe.

Irregular migration dominated the European parliamentary elections in June and influenced recent state elections in eastern Germany, where a far-right party won for the first time since World War II. The German government this week announced it was expanding border controls around its territory following recent extremist attacks.

What do the numbers show?

Despite the heated debates, irregular crossings over the southern borders of the EU — the region that sees the most unauthorized migration — were down by 35% from January to August, according to the latest preliminary figures compiled by the United Nation's International Organization for Migration.

Nearly 115,000 migrants — less than 0.03% of the EU’s population — have arrived without permission into the EU via Mediterranean and Atlantic routes so far this year, compared to 176,252 during the same period last year, the U.N. says. In contrast, more than a million people, most of them fleeing conflict in Syria, entered the EU in 2015.

Data shared by the EU's border and coast guard agency Frontex shows a similar trend: Unauthorized crossings over the region's southern borders fell 39% overall this year compared to last year.

“The emergency is not numerical this year, nor was it last year," Flavio di Giacomo, a spokesperson with the IOM office for the Mediterranean, told The Associated Press.

Camille Le Coz, an associate director of the nonprofit Migration Policy Institute in Europe, said irregular migration is “getting way too much attention compared to the scope of the issue and compared to other issues Europe should be tackling, such as climate change."

The most commonly used route for migrants is from North Africa, across the dangerous Central Mediterranean to Italy. Yet roughly 64% fewer migrants disembarked in Italy this year than during the same period in 2023, according to IOM and Frontex numbers.

Experts say that’s a result of the EU-supported crackdown in Tunisia and Libya , which comes at a price for migrants, many of whom are systematically rounded up and dumped in the desert.

How long the downward trend will hold remains to be seen, however. Smugglers are always quick to adapt and find new routes around border controls. In the Eastern Mediterranean, the second-most-used route, smuggling networks are now using speedboats in increasingly aggressive ways to avoid controls and targeting islands farther away from the Turkish coast in the central Aegean , according to Greek authorities.

The number of migrants arriving in Greece by sea and overland during the first eight months of the year rose by 57%, U.N. data shows.

An alarming spike in the Atlantic

Meanwhile, irregular migration from West Africa to the Canary Islands via the Atlantic, the third-most-used route, has more than doubled: More than 25,500 migrants — mostly from Mali, Senegal and other West African countries — had arrived in the islands as of Aug. 31, the U.N. says.

Countless other migrants have gone missing along the route, where rough winds and strong Atlantic currents work against them. Several migrant boats, carrying only the remains of Malian, Mauritanian and Senegalese citizens, have been found this year drifting as far away as the Caribbean and off Brazil. Precise numbers are hard to verify, but the Spanish migrant rights group Walking Borders has reported more than 4,000 dead or missing.

The trend has Spanish authorities on alert for the fall, when conditions in the Atlantic are most favorable for the journey. The treacherousness of the route seems to have done little to dissuade would-be migrants, whose ranks have swelled to include people from Syria and Pakistan, according to rescuers.

“There are situations that need to be addressed, like the situation in the Canary Islands,” Le Coz acknowledged.

A humanitarian crisis

The adult migrants who successfully make it to the Canaries usually keep moving, headed for the promise of jobs and safety in mainland Spain or other European countries farther north. But that is not the case for thousands of unaccompanied minors. Under Spanish law, these young migrants must be taken under the wing of the local government, leading to overcrowded shelters and a political crisis. Earlier this year, island leaders fought unsuccessfully to have other regions of Spain share the responsibility.

Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez recently traveled to three West African countries in an attempt to curb migration. In Senegal, he and President Bassirou Diomaye Faye signed agreements to promote temporary work opportunities in Spain for Senegalese nationals and vocational training in Senegal. They also agreed to step up police cooperation.

No magic solutions

Current anti-immigrant sentiments notwithstanding, Europe’s aging population, declining birth rates and labor shortages have only increased the need for immigrant workers to sustain pensions and boost economic growth.

And as long as migrants lack opportunities in their own countries, their exodus will continue. Add to this the growing instability and conflict in parts of Africa, the Middle East and Asia that have displaced millions.

“There is no magic deterrence,” Le Coz said. “Migrants end up taking the toll of all of this: They are risking their lives, doing jobs in Europe where they face uncertain legal status for years and are vulnerable to all sorts of exploitation."

While long-term solutions to tackle unauthorized migration are being implemented, such as temporary work programs for migrants, they are still falling short.

“That’s one step in the right direction, but this needs to happen at a much larger scale, and they need the private sector to be more involved,” Le Coz added.

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